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
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The Discontented Farmer: State-Society Relations and Food Insecurity in Rural Tanzania

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International
Studies



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Abstract

In many developing countries, those people who work the land as food producers are also the ones who most suffer from food insecurity. While many studies look at the power dynamics within the food system at the global level and the role played by transnational companies in particular, this investigation starts at the local level to look into the reasons behind the high levels of food insecurity among farmers. Specifically, it analyses how the relationship between the domestic food producers and the state in Tanzania has affected food security in rural areas, in particular in farmers' households. The question it asks is: How has the relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence?

A qualitative approach has been employed: farmer interviews were conducted in 8 villages located in two regions of Tanzania - Coast and Kilimanjaro - and supplemented by interviews with state officials and civil society representatives. The villages surveyed in the Coast region suffer from arid conditions and are isolated from the main road that connects Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, while the villages studied in the Kilimanjaro region are on the slopes of the mountains around the town of Usangi, far from the touristic and commercial centres of Moshi and Arusha. Through interviews with farmers in these villages, the qualitative approach of this research offers a contextualised insight into food insecurity, the problems of the agricultural sector and farmers' attitude towards the state and its policies. The interviews with state officials and representatives of civil society were employed to investigate both current agricultural policies and officials' attitude towards small scale farmers.

This thesis makes an empirical contribution to the literature on food security and state-farmer relationships. I argue that the mixture of agricultural policies implemented by the state over the years have done little to improve the livelihoods of small scale farmers that live in isolated rural areas. One of the reasons why this is so is that the policies are not framed around the needs of small scale farmers (despite them being the great majority of the farmers in the country), and hence are not welcomed positively by the communities. The results of this study identify a reciprocal distrust between the state and farmers as one of the main causes of policy failure and unsatisfactory improvements in food security in rural areas. On one side, state officials see small scale farmers as inefficient and wish for the agricultural sector to be driven by medium and large scale farmers. On the other side, most farmers tend to dismiss state officials' advice as inadequate to the reality of farming. In general, farmers see the state as a distant entity, with which they have little contact and which they do not trust.

I argue that the controversial relationship between the Tanzanian state and farmers is historically grounded and has a direct link with food insecurity amongst farmers for two main reasons. First, it affects the framing, objectives and implementation of agricultural policies, which thus fail to support small scale farmers. Second, it hinders the ability of farmers to successfully cooperate and/or create a coherent farmers' movement to improve food security and address their challenges at state level. Farmers' discontent is perceived in their alienation to politics, and in their distrust towards a state that has historically not been able to address their challenges nor improve their condition.

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My supervisors, Ben Richardson and Liz Dowler, have been extremely helpful, in all phases of this research. They have inspired me with their passion on the topic of food studies, and have assisted me with the writing of this thesis, offering many useful reflections and giving me the strength to continue thinking, writing and editing when I was feeling a bit lost. They have never lost faith in this project and in my capabilities to complete this research. I am very grateful for their support.

An enormous acknowledgement goes to my students of Kwala Secondary School and to all the children I met during the time spent in Tanzania, for having given me the inspiration for this study, for sharing with me their hopes and their dreams, and for having filled my days in Tanzania with the most amazing smiles. I am also greatly grateful to my Tanzanian family, baba and mama Msangi, who have hosted me and made me feel at home everytime I was in Kwala, helping me to adapt to the circumstances of life in the village in the best possible way. Baba has also been my assistant in the whole interview process, coming with me to the farmers' households, helping me during the interviews and with the translations. He has also hosted me in

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Declaration

This thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1. The world's quest to achieve global food security

The relationship between people and food has been explored for centuries. Throughout history, food and different diets have characterised the distinction between classes, and determined social and political power. The rich banquets consumed in the courts of the feudal Europe in the late Middle Age period were produced and cooked by poor peasants, who consumed much more modest meals. The wealthy ate, while the poor suffered. And after many centuries not much has changed.

Under-nutrition is still widespread, and most importantly, it is still strictly connected to a condition of poverty.¹ Curiously, the producers of food are often the ones that most stay hungry. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that small scale farmers produce nearly 70% of the total world food supply (FAO, 2013, p.22). However, most of them are unable to produce enough food or earn enough income to meet their own household's needs, as explained by the UK Food Group (2010, p.1). A study by the World Food Programme (2013) also underlines how agricultural households are more vulnerable to food insecurity than urban ones, and are also the ones in which diversification of food is lowest and where the share of income spent on food is the highest (more than 75%). It is indeed curious to see that those most active with the production of food are often also those that have the least food in their hands at the end of the day.

¹ The connection between poverty and food insecurity has notably been analysed by Amartya Sen in the book *Poverty and Famine* (1998).

This apparent contradiction is what struck me most during my year and a half in Tanzania in the years 2010 and 2011, and inspired me to investigate this issue further through this study. It was difficult to understand why and how, in a country where around 80% of the population are farmers, over a third could be undernourished. This thesis will unveil the historical and political reasons why this is the case, and offer a possible explanation to the contradiction that sees small-scale farmers worldwide producing the majority of food but at the same time suffering most from food insecurity.

The issues of hunger and inequality have been analysed by many scholars over the years, and has gained more and more coverage over time, so much that the terminology such as ‘food security’, ‘the right to food’, and ‘food sovereignty’ are now commonly used to refer to specific branches of the literature that have explored the topic and the problems of food in connection to politics, economics, and socio-cultural factors. Such investigations are illustrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For now, it is important to mention that this thesis borrows the concept of food security as used by the FAO in 2006. Food security was here defined as ‘the situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such access’ (FAO, 2006).

Hence, the FAO identifies four dimensions of food security, related to access, affordability, utilisation and stability of enough, nutritious and diverse food. The long term dimension of food security is extremely important, hence vulnerability is a factor to be considered when assessing the food insecurity condition of a determined

household,² as explained by Kalibwani (2005) and Guha-Kasnobis et al. (2007). While the term food security is often used with reference to the global scale, in this thesis it will be used in its household dimension, for reasons that will be explained later on. Moreover, issues such as power, equity, control and sustainability, generally neglected by the global talks on food security, at least according to the Food Sovereignty movement, will also be considered.³

Food insecurity is a political problem, both at its global and national level. This thesis claims that such dimensions cannot be ignored. Achieving food security on a global level is one of the biggest challenges of politics in modern days. Despite the progress in technology and in some social development indicators (for example primary education), food insecurity is still a problem in the twenty-first century, and affects not only less developed countries, but also developed ones too, both as regards under-nutrition and obesity. The commitments to fight hunger and food insecurity undertaken at the international level are several, with the right to food having been recognised in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 where signatory states committed themselves to take the measures ‘[...] needed to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food [...] to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need’⁴ (ICESR, 1966, Art. 11, 2a). Nevertheless, the increasing unreliability of weather patterns, differing

² For example, the households that heavily rely on agriculture to satisfy their food needs could have enough food to satisfy the family’s needs during the post-harvest season but suffer in the period before harvest. Such households depend on seasonality and are to be considered vulnerable to food insecurity.

³ As it will be explained in Chapter 2, according to the Food Sovereignty movement, these issues are often ignored in the discussions over food security (Declaration of Nyeleni, 2007 and Sustainable Development Commission, 2009).

⁴ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, 2a, 1966. 157 states have signed the Covenant.

economic interests, and limited political will (including the right to food not being enforced) have hindered efforts towards enabling a growing population to have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and diverse food. Moreover, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is essential to understand why food producers are often the ones that most lack this access.

Scholars such as Harriet Friedmann (1993), Geoff Tansey (1995) and Philip McMichael (2009) have tried to provide an answer to these questions by locating food producers in the global food system and its historical context. According to these scholars, in the current ‘global food regime’ the control over food production is increasingly in the hands of large corporations instead of farmers who are unable to compete with mass scale production. Moreover food is being progressively commoditised⁵ and financial speculation on crops distorts the agricultural market leading to volatile food prices and increasing poor households’ vulnerability towards food insecurity. Under these circumstances, reaching food security at the national level becomes increasingly complicated and small scale farmers’ households are often the ones that suffer the most.

As a consequence, many farmers worldwide are leaving their lands and moving to the cities and/or looking for off-farm side activities to satisfy their households’ needs. These phenomena have been defined as respectively *deagrarianisation* and *depeasantisation* by authors such as Henry Bernstein (2001) and Deborah Bryceson (2009). They are seen as symptoms of a food system in which large corporations lobby national and international political representatives to influence and assume increasing control over the future of food. Hence, for many small scale farmers, unable to compete with the large scale highly mechanised - and often subsidised -

⁵ Food produced, seen and commercialised likewise any other commodity.

agricultural production of these multinational corporations, agriculture is often seen as a burden, an activity that does not guarantee a state of food security and a dignified livelihood.

Following this line of analysis, and looking at the future of food security, many academics and activists have demanded a different food system where small scale farmers and sustainable agriculture are at the core (including scholars such as Vandana Shiva, 2000, Eric Holt Gimenez, 2006 and 2012, Rajeev Patel, 2008, Julia Wright, 2010, and movements such as Slow Food and Via Campesina). Others believe that only technology and a second green revolution can improve food production and hence provide sufficient food to a growing world population (researchers such as Norman Borlaug 2000 and 2003, and Albert Sasson, 2012, and organizations such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa - AGRA, Sasakawa Africa Association -SAA and the Syngenta Foundation). This study places itself in the first camp, and is thus part of the literature that advocates the exigency of a new food system where the needs, concerns and requests of farmers should be at the centre of international and national policy and not subordinated to agribusiness or the market logic. In this thesis, food insecurity is not merely regarded as a problem concerning the provision of food to an increasing population, but as a deeply political issue that requires a strong stance of governments to assist farmers in their struggle to achieve food security in a sustainable and democratic way.

It is exactly at this point where the main argument for opting for the first camp lays. Whereas the second camp looks at food insecurity as an issue where the central problem is constituted by a shortage of food supply, a perspective that begins with farmers, as put forward throughout the next chapters, reveals a much wider range of issues. In other words, a quantitative perspective on food security that tends to focus

on the global level considers the problem as one in which certain stocks of resources are unable to produce a certain amount of food. In short, the problem is one of efficiency and of maximisation of production. However, once the theme is addressed from the starting point of actual farmers, the wider social aspects of food security come to the forefront. Once the daily lives of farmers are observed, food security is not merely defined through a quantity of food or calories, but as a deeply social issue, characterised through complex relationships between different actors. As will be expanded later on in the next chapter, with reference to the literature on the topic, preferences, access to diversified food and subjective perceptions all play an important role in the definition of food security. This thesis hence focuses on the effective conditions of the household and its political dimensions and turns away from a globalised perspective that operates on quantifiable parameters.

The approach taken in the thesis is also informed by my own intellectual development. Being raised in Italy and having witnessed the difficulties of small scale fruit and vegetable producers in Sardinia, I have always been interested in food, but just as much in the lives of the producers. I approached the issue of food security in developing countries during my post-graduate studies, and wrote my first research essay on the topic of food security in Southern and East Africa as part of my Master degree in 2009. In the aftermath of the food price spike crisis of 2008, debates about the concept of food security had become popular in the arena of international politics. For instance, at the G8 Summit at L'Aquila in 2008 the Aquila Food Security Initiative was launched, and at the G20 Summit in 2010, the Development Working Group was created, declaring global food security as one of the nine commitments of the G20 group.

Back then however, I was mainly interested in the statistically measurable performances of the countries analysed (Malawi and Zimbabwe), as outcomes of national agricultural policies framed within the regional guidelines on food security of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In this approach the social aspects of food security and its political implications were little discussed, and I mostly focused on statistical data based on food production (availability), utilization and access. Nevertheless, after having spent almost two years in Tanzania as a teacher and development worker myself, it seemed to me that the issue of food security, as previously mentioned, is much more complex than just statistical data, and that the political dimensions of the problem ought to be at the centre of the debate. In particular, I felt that statistical data were not offering me the answers I was looking for and neither were telling me much about the subjective perceptions of the people who are mostly affected by food insecurity.

Also, the time spent in the communities of the villages where interviews were collected made me realise how important it is to analyse the issue of food insecurity in its proper cultural and political context. Discourses on the global food regime as summarised above, seemed to offer me, on the ground and in the Tanzanian context, only a partial explanation on why and how the majority of the population was involved in the agricultural sector but was still food insecure. For instance, on the ground, all I could see was an informal economic exchange of agricultural products, and land so dry and unproductive that would be difficult to imagine investors running to grab it. The description of the global food regime felt like an abstract concept in these circumstances. In order to understand what triggers food insecurity in countries where agriculture is the main economic activity, I realized that I needed to immerse myself in the specific context of the country I wished to analyse.

The initial inspiration that drove this research originated from observing the students of one of these villages, named Kwala, in Coast region, at about 80 km distance from Dar es Salaam. The secondary school (KWASS) student performances were extremely weak, and according to students and teachers alike, the poor concentration in the classroom was directly connected to the malnutrition and hunger experienced. These students belong to farming households, in an area of the country where local market exchange and production for self-consumption are widely diffused, while the presence of multinational companies or other sort of foreign investments is basically inexistent. It became clear rather quickly that in such a context, the events at the international level only had a partial indirect influence over the food security dynamics in these villages, and the problems of the agricultural sector had to be investigated using a different perspective. In an attempt to contextualise the issue of food insecurity in rural Tanzania, this research found a connection between food insecurity and farmers's relationship with the state, that in several ways complicated and hindered the development of a successful, pro small scale farmers agricultural policy that could have improved the food security condition of many rural areas in Tanzania.

Hence, while recognising the validity of the literature on the global food system as a general preamble and as a guideline on the issue of food security, this thesis underlines the importance of a contextualised approach, stressing that although it is true that the general tendency towards a global food regime (as defined by McMichael and Friedmann, 1989) is in place, my exposure to Tanzanian farmers has demonstrated that there are also many different local food systems to take into account. Hence a simple generalisation of these systems could give a misleading answer to the problem of food insecurity. Again, this thesis argues for an approach

that is open to more generalised theorising, but that collects the data at the local level and that thus takes into account the characteristics of the subject population.

1.2. The importance of contextualisation: towards a study of state-society relationships

In these terms, this dissertation aims at contributing to the general literature on food security by providing an analysis of a specific case study, Tanzania. This analysis follows a bottom-up approach with a qualitative empirical focus. The original contribution comes from the fact that, in this study, the issue of food security is not merely analysed under its social household perspective, but is investigated through the political lens of the dynamics of power between the state and the food producers in the specific context of Tanzania, for the reasons enunciated in the previous section and with particular reference to the qualitative data collected. Indeed, national policies influence very directly upon the local specifications of the farming communities. This research borrows concepts developed broadly by the general literature on food security, the politics of food, farmers' movements and state-society relationship, and tries to build a bridge that aims at connecting these concepts together.

In a specific manner, the thesis explores the impact of the relationship between farmers and the state on food security in farming households in the Tanzanian context. Hence the main research question is:

How has the relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence?

The ways in which the relationship between the Tanzanian state and small scale farmers affects households' food security in rural areas are explored from different perspectives, by looking at both farmers and state officials' declarations and the interaction between these two subjects. It is argued that this relationship has a direct impact on farmers' food security as it affects the framing, the implementation and the outcome of agricultural policies. Moreover, the effects on farmers' food security are looked at by analysing the extent to which this relationship conditions and shapes the political interaction between the farmers and the state. Whether this interaction is characterised by cooperation or attitudes of contestation, this thesis proves that there is a strong connection between the state-farmer relationship and the ability of farmers to improve their food security situation, and this by actively participating, contesting or addressing issues at the state level.

To this end, literature theorising state-society engagement, incorporation and disconnection are employed. Besides theories on the nature of the state in relation to power, one of the questions around the concept of 'state' and 'society' is whether the society and the state are separate entities or whether society is instead an inclusive part of the state (Migdal, 2001 and Li, 2005). While these positions will be more thoroughly introduced in the literature review chapters (chapters 2 and 3), it is important to underline at this stage that this study borrows the framework of analysis put forward by Scott (1998), Chabal and Daloz (1999), and Ferguson and Gupta (2002) indicating that state and society are two separate entities, where the state is seen as being 'above' society.

It is also important to outline here that the Tanzanian state is best described as a complex body composed of several organisms which hold different levels of power, mainly at the local, district and national level. This hierarchical structure of power

connects the state authority to the regional, district and local authorities. Nevertheless, the devolution of powers to lower authorities is mostly only apparent, since regional and district officials are usually appointed by the political party in charge and follow the indications given by the party.⁶ The case for local representatives (village chairpersons) is rather different as they are directly elected by the villagers, and hold little decisional power. For example, they can decide and organise the village-owned land concessions between the villagers, but they need to have the consensual agreement from the district in matters such as land selling, education and health. The structure of the state as summarised above provides indications on the limits of communication between the Tanzanian central authority and the society that will be explored in this study. Long bureaucratic processes and internal conflicts between the different levels of power within the state (national, district, local) complicate the relationship between state and society in several ways. Moreover, as we will see, the political structure of the state is fundamental to understand the dynamics of power and political engagement between the state and rural society.

The state-farmers relationship is analysed following the theoretical framework provided by authors such as Rothchild, Chazan, Hyden and Bratton, and in particular the definitions provided by Azarya and Olorunsola on society incorporation and disengagement to the state (in Rothchild and Chazan, 1988). Is Tanzania's rural society an incorporated society or a disengaged one in relation to the state? And how does this affect the outcome of agricultural policies and eventually food security in

⁶ The party currently in power is named *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) and is in power since independence, despite a multiparty system being in place since 1992. In the last elections, in 2010, it gained the majority of the votes (more than 60%) that culminated with the re-election of Jakaya M. Kikwete as President. Currently, the CCM party occupies 263 out of 357 seats at the National Assembly. Electoral turnout in the mainland in 2010 elections was recorded at around 39% (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website, 2014).

farming households? In answering these questions, this study argues that Tanzanian rural society presents the characteristics of a disengaged society in relation to the state, and analyses the terms and characteristics of this disengagement. In short, an incorporated society is a society where its individuals feel part of the state and take active part in the state processes and decisions, while a disengaged society is described by Olorunsola (1988) and Ayoade (1988) as a society that looks at the state with scepticism and considers it inefficient in satisfying the population's needs. This research will analyse the extent to which Tanzanian rural society's disengagement is the result of a desire of autonomy from state control and a lack of confidence in the capabilities and willingness of the state in improving the conditions of society. As we will see in Chapter 4, this distrust needs to be investigated through a historical lens, since it finds its roots in the creation and development of the very idea of the state since independence.

Tanzanian rural society, which appears to be disengaged from the state, and hence, using the term borrowed by Hyden (1980, 1983), 'uncaptured', is therefore a sceptic society that tends to alienate itself from the state. Several authors have found the reasons of this disengagement in the Tanzanian cultural or historical tradition. For instance, Hyden blames the 'economy of affection' of Tanzanian rural society for hindering the process of development and compromising a fruitful collaboration between the state and its society. With the expression 'economy of affection' he indicates the network of relations within societies in which kinship and community ties affect the development and the political behaviour of individuals. As a result, according to Hyden, members of society expect special favours or special treatments from political representatives within their community ('expectation of reciprocity'). The impossibility to please everybody within the community inevitably led to these

expectations not being met. Consequently the disillusion of society is visible, just as is the alienation from the state, according to the scholar. Authors like Rothchild and Chazan (1988), Daloz (2003), Kelsall (2004) and Chabal (2009) come to very similar conclusions.

Ayoade (1988) and Barker (1989) stress how in Tanzania high expectations were actually actively raised by the state after independence in the attempt to create a strong idea of nation state. The failure in fulfilling them stirred up a process of disillusion and disengagement from the state by the society. This thesis embraces these theories partially, arguing that recent events have contributed to the development of a controversial relationship between the state and rural society. Hence, this study argues that the distrust towards the state is the result of a mixture of causes, among which are the failure of past policies, corruption and bad implementation of programmes in more recent years.

Furthermore, some neo-patrimonial features, such as the presence of corruption and clientelal practices and the tendency of state officials to use state resources at their personal advantage, as described by Bayart et al. (1999) and Daloz (2003), were also identified in the Tanzanian state and could be interpreted as a result of the historical development of the relationship between state and society. For example, clientelism, corruption practices, and the personification of politics were evident during the Nyerere era and are still pervasive in Tanzania today. These aspects developed by the neo-patrimonial literature are employed in this study to analyse the relationship the state has with society and how it may affect the outcome of agricultural policies.

Clearly, the alienation between state and society frames society's (dis)engagement with politics. The disconnection between the state and rural communities is certainly

not a novelty, it is common in many countries worldwide, even in developed ones. As a matter of fact, in several parts of the world farmers' movements are growing in popularity. For instance, the movement of Via Campesina originated in Latin America and is embracing the concept of Food Sovereignty⁷ which claims a direct control over resources and food policies, is now popular within many communities of farmers worldwide.

Given Tanzanian farmers' discontent, and the historical importance of cooperative associations in agriculture (explained in Chapter 4), we would expect to find great cohesion and strong rural movements in the country. Nevertheless, as it will be explained, generally rural movements in East Africa, including in Tanzania, receive little acknowledgement, and little media coverage. But how much are rural movements spread in reality? This research will analyse farmers' political engagement and assess the assumption (and general first impression) that rural movements in Tanzania are not strong. Moreover, it will question the literature that considers a lack of strong movements in the countryside to be a symptom of political apathy, individualism or passivity (Hyden, 1980, Bernstein, 1981, Forrest, 1988, Kelsall, 2004, and Becker, 2009).

⁷ Signed by several rural movements in over 80 countries in 2007, the Declaration of Nyeleni provides a comprehensive definition of Food Sovereignty: 'the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal - fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations'.

This thesis stresses the need to contextualise farmers' political actions and engagement with the state in the social and political history of Tanzania, suggesting that the reasons behind the state-society disengagement are key to understand farmers' attitudes towards politics. Again, the world food system as presented by McMichael, and the reaction - often expressed in direct contestation - that has been witnessed from small scale farmers worldwide facing the challenges of the global food regime do not necessarily portray a valid picture of the Tanzanian food system or Tanzanian farmers' reaction to certain dissatisfactions. In fact, countries such as Tanzania, in which capitalist exploitation has not completely pervaded the society and where foreign influences in the form of agribusinesses are limited may tell us a different story concerning food security and small scale farmers' everyday difficulties, although we will see in Chapter 3 and 4 that the limited penetration of capitalism is debated by several scholars such as Ponte, 1998 and 2000, Meertens, 2000, Bernstein, 2004, Thomson, 2010 and Cooksey, 2011. Again, history and contextualisation play a considerable role in determining food politics dynamics and understanding food security nowadays.

Nonetheless, the focus of this study on the state-farmer relationship and the affirmation that 'foreign influences are limited' should not be understood as an interpretation of the Tanzanian state as being completely autonomous. On the contrary, it will be illustrated in Chapter 6 that one of the objectives of the state policy is to tie the linkages with international organizations as well as with non-governmental organizations. And indeed the latter are widespread in the country, although in some areas more than in others. Hence, the state policy is influenced by external forces and in particular by the political agendas of donors, as claimed by Hyden and Bratton (1992), Li (2005), and Lund (2006). This thesis will analyse the

ways in which the state-society relationship is complicated by these influences and what this means for food security in rural households (Chapter 7).

1.3. Case selection and focus of the study

The choice for Tanzania as a case study has several reasons. First, it is a country of which I had a first-hand knowledge having lived there for almost two years and, secondly, it seemed an appropriate country to analyse the state-farmer relationship in relation to food security. This is because the large majority of Tanzanian population (around 75%) is composed by small scale farmers but, with more than 40% of its population living in food-deficit regions, and about a third of the total population being classified as undernourished by the FAO, malnutrition remains a considerable problem. Moreover, it is important to note that there is also an issue of food diversification, with about 70% of all energy obtained from staples such as maize and rice. As it will be explained in chapter 5, the lack of differentiation is a problem as it is associated with Vitamin A, calcium and protein deficiency (FAOSTAT, World Bank and African Development Bank data).

Given these poor records, we may expect to find a general neglect of the agricultural sector in state's policy. On the contrary, and what also makes Tanzania an interesting case study, agriculture has always officially been recognised as a significant and important activity by the state, from the socialist governments in the aftermath of the independence in 1961 to the introduction and transition to liberalism. Nevertheless, and despite the potential of the country in terms of water resources, its low population density and high availability of land, agriculture has failed to flourish and to improve rural areas, while poverty is amongst the highest on the African

continent.⁸ Truly, in order to understand the persistence of malnourishment despite attempts to reform the agricultural sector over the years, it is essential to understand its political history and the evolution of the state-farmers relationship over time.

With 4 climatic zones (the coast, the central plateau, the northern and the western and central highlands), and over 100 different ethnic groups, Tanzania is very diverse, and while statistical data offers a general view of the country as a whole, regional and local conditions may vary greatly. This is why this thesis employs a local perspective, underlining the importance of qualitative data in analysing the role of politics and its effects on the food security conditions of certain communities of farmers. This particular approach and the political analysis in relation to food security that characterise this study and distinguish it from the general literature on food security find their main focus in the figure of small scale farmers in rural areas of Tanzania. The choice of farmers as the object of study has several explanations, many of which have already been mentioned. Representing the majority of the rural population in Tanzania, they are also the main recipients of state agricultural policies and they have, at least in the chosen case study, a direct connection with the state through the figure of the extension officer - a state official working in the village that is supposed to train, advise, inform and assist farmers. This figure will emerge several times during the analysis of the state-farmer relationship as it represents the main point of connection between farmers and the state.

This study will guide the reader into the lives of the farmers interviewed, showing their vulnerabilities and insecurities, but nevertheless their force to overcome difficulties of everyday farming in a resource-poor context. Similarly to other

⁸ Tanzania ranks 8th in the world in the Poverty Headcount Index, with over 67% of the population living under 1.25\$ per day (PPP) (World Bank, Development Research Group). In the Human Development Index Tanzania is ranked 157th out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2014).

analyses, this thesis tells a story of dynamics of power within society, of hierarchies, law and traditional customs. The voices of small scale farmers will emerge and will uncover a complex web of relationships and connections: their engagement with the state and their reaction to state policies directed at controlling them, their torn relationship with agriculture and with nature which is their only source of survival, even if it represents a hostile source at times.

1.4. Argument of the thesis

With reference with what has been already said in the previous sections, the objectives and the arguments of this study will be here defined. Contrasting with analyses of food security that stress the importance of increasing food production by using modern technologies and biogenetics as an answer to malnutrition, it is argued, with the example of Tanzania, that food security needs to be analysed according to its socio-economic and political context and it is not only about availability of food, but also about the ability to acquire food and to satisfy a wide range of food needs within the households, including personal preferences.

It is also argued that past and current agricultural policies in Tanzania did not achieve the expected success. The failure of agricultural policies, that intended to boost food security to farming communities in several ways, through increased production and/or increased economic value, is the result of an antagonistic relationship between farmers and the state that is historically grounded and related to the dynamics of power within the state structure. This influenced the way farmers came to perceive the role of the state in different spheres of everyday life, including their nutrition. As a consequence this shapes the way they address malnutrition and

contest government policies, affecting their level of success in improving their conditions.

In other words, by providing an empirical contribution to the literature on food security and state-society relationships, this thesis will argue that food security in rural Tanzania is related to the way farmers - the majority of the rural population - relate to and regard the state, in particular the higher state apparatus, and its role in improving their food security condition. It will be explained how the disconnection between farmers and the state apparatus complicates the implementation of policies for local politicians and officers, contributing to unsatisfactory results in terms of agricultural performance and to an insecure food condition, especially in rural areas.

Also the thesis will demonstrate, perhaps counterintuitively, that farmers seem relatively unwilling to cooperate with each other, which leads to unsuccessful cooperative attempts and the lack of a strong political farmers' movement. Nonetheless, while the unwillingness of farmers to work in a cooperative way can partly be justified by the failure of previous communitarian schemes enforced by the state (such as the villagization project), the lack of a strong movement that unifies farmers is a more complex phenomenon, that will be explored in its historical roots, and in the way the farmers came to see themselves in relation to the state.

Concerning foreign influences, this dissertation will analyse the role of external actors and their influences on the state-farmer relationship and food security in rural areas. In general, this study found that farmers are more willing to cooperate and welcome projects coming from third parties like international organizations and NGOs if they feel empowered and can have decisional power over the governance structure. It will be explained how this may create dependency and cut society off

even further from the state, as the state loses sovereignty, control and presence over agricultural projects in the countryside.

In conclusion, by analysing the reciprocal relationship between the state and the farmers, this thesis underlines how the estrangement between these two actors has brought Tanzanian farmers into a loop of distrust and fatalism in their relationship with the state and in relation to other farmers. In this environment, no policy seems to be successful in improving the conditions of the countryside and the food security condition of rural households. Feeling powerless in the face of the state, farmers refrain from direct political action and express their discontent in other ways, ranging from reticence towards cooperating with governmental officials to open social conflict.

1.5. Structure of the thesis

The connections between farmers' food security and state-society relationship are explained throughout the study and supported by both theoretical and empirical literature. The question rotates around the concept of food security, a political concept that has evolved over time and today has gained considerable importance in both global and national governance structures.

There are mainly three interconnected objectives in this study, and the structure of this study will explore them in a coherent manner. First, this study aims at exploring food security in farming households. Secondly, the evolution of the relationship between farmers and state is analysed, and, finally, the connection between these two findings is investigated.

The objectives of this research are reflected in the structure of this dissertation itself. In chapter 2 an analysis of the term food security and its evolution will be presented, followed by an analysis on the literature around the right to food, food systems, and rural movements. The literature on the relationship between the state and the society will be presented and analysed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will introduce the case study, outlining some important historical events and agricultural policies that have characterised Tanzania as a country and the current condition of agriculture in the countryside. This chapter will focus, in particular, on the agricultural policies in the afterwards of dependency, in 1961, and Nyerere's influence in the creation of the newly born state. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are the core of the thesis, where the results of the empirical research will be presented, analysed and interpreted in light of the theoretical literature exposed in chapters 2 and 3 and the events reported in chapter 4.

Specifically, chapter 5 defines the methodology of the study and analyses the results of the interviews concerning the level of food security in the households interviewed and the challenges faced by the farmers interviewed. Chapter 6 will focus on the results of the research concerning the state-farmer relationship and its effects on food security in rural households. Finally, chapter 7 will focus on analysing farmers' coping strategies and their political reactions towards unsatisfactory agricultural policies. The final chapter will offer concluding remarks in the light of what has been written and return to the research question, trying to connect all the issues at stake.

Chapter 2 - Food security: a concept in evolution

2.1. Introduction

Essentially, this research is about food security and farmers' livelihoods. 'Food security' as a concept has evolved to embrace different perspectives, becoming a widely studied multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary theme. Hence, this chapter will present the literature around the topic of food security, starting from the various definitions and evolution of the term and moving over to its political and economic implications. In relation to the research question (*How has the relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence?*) this chapter will then analyse the connection between food security, farmers and the state, situating this study in its theoretical framework. The political and social dimensions of food security will be explored by looking at the ways the state and farmers interact and affect the food system: the farmers as both food producers and consumers and the state through its policies.

2.2. From Malthusian fears to Food Sovereignty

This section will provide the theoretical framework of the concept of food security, underlining the complexity of the term and the various approaches over time.

Talks about 'food security' gained prominence in the 1970s and were shaped by the Malthusian theory. Originally developed in 1798 by Thomas Robert Malthus, in his *Essay on the Principle of Population*, the Malthusian Theory is the idea that the increase of population outpaces the increase of the means of subsistence, hence the idea that population growth should be controlled if famine, war, and social diseases were to be prevented. Paul R. Ehrlich recalled this theory in his book *The*

Population Bomb, in 1968, in which he predicted a catastrophic famine and death rate increase in the 1970s as a consequence of food shortage and population growth⁹. Issues of supply and production were regarded as the chief determinants of food security. The definition provided by the UN at the first World Food Summit reflects this tendency, by defining food security as 'the availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic food-stuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices' (UN, 1975, p.6).

Nevertheless, the Malthusian predictions did not seem to have materialised,¹⁰ and since then food security has become much more than just a matter of supply and production. Yet, dysfunctions in the global food systems are evident, with food prices on the rise and undernourishment still widespread. Since the 1990s there has been a decline in both the relative percentage and the absolute number of undernourishment - from over 1 billion to 805 million in 2012-14 -, but the achievements are not equal all over the world. The majority of undernourished people for instance still live in developing countries, and in Africa the number of undernourished people has actually increased from 182 million in 1990-92 to over 220 million in 2012-14 (FAO, 2014, p.8). This underlines that the problem is mostly due to food access (ability to purchase the food available) rather than supply, as remarked by Amartya Sen (1981). Similarly, the FAO and WFP claim that there is currently enough food to feed a growing population, but stress the

⁹ The population growth rate had seen a rapid acceleration since the 1950s, but a decline in world food supply during 1973 and 1974 - for various reasons, including the increase in the price of oil, and weather disruption in different parts of the world - saw a rise in the prices of grain and recalled fears of food scarcity.

¹⁰ The world has reached 7 billion people (from around one billion at Malthus' time) and food production has kept pace, experiencing an increase in the per capita availability of calories, from 2220Kcal/person/day in the early 1960s to 2790Kcal/person/day in 2006-08 (FAO, 2012)

challenge of many people to access it (FAO, 2012).

Predictably, the Malthusian theory, re-proposed by scholars such as Ehrlich et al. (1993), met several criticisms, for different reasons. For instance, Friedman (1982) noted that even before the decline in food production of the 1970s, hunger and malnutrition were present in various parts of the world, hence food production and population growth were not the only factor affecting the food crisis in those years. Economic and political reasons seemed instead to be behind the crisis and in particular the economic recession in the USA and the subsequent decline of surpluses of grain exported from the country. Once again, this points at poverty and unemployment plus the ability to purchase the food available as the causes of hunger rather than population outstripping food supplies (Friedman, 1982, p.283, Brandt, 1990). Furthermore, as Amartya Sen observes (1981), there can be starvation even when the world food supply is not in decline, as many people may still be unable to afford to buy the food available. Indeed, sustained food production does not necessarily mean that there will be equal distribution of that supply all over the world (Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2007b).

For these reasons, Amartya Sen thought that food security should be analysed in its household and individual dimension: food security is connected to the relationship that the individual - or the household - can have with the commodity through the possession of entitlements. Food security is therefore defined as having enough entitlements to be able to generate a relationship of exchange with the commodity (food in this case). He identifies four kinds of entitlements related to food security: Trade-based entitlements derived by trading something one owns with a willing party, production-based entitlement generated by arranging production using one's

own resources, own-labour entitlement related to the capability to own one's own labour power in order to create trade-based and production-based entitlements, and inheritance and transfer entitlements deriving from gifts, transfers or inheritance (Sen, 1981, p.2).

The personal dimension of food security was also explored by Staatz et al. (1990) who recognised that food security can be perceived at different levels (national, regional, household and individual), and affirmed that promoting food security involves assuring both an adequate supply of food through production and trade, and access to that supply. Moreover, by stating that food security is also the condition for an 'active, healthy life' the World Bank underlines the individual dimension of food security and social importance of being food secure (World Bank, 1986). A shift towards the household perspective is also evident in Reutlinger (1982) and Frankenbergen and Goldstein (1991), who claim that the condition of 'food insecurity [is perceived] when the viability of the household as a productive and reproductive unit is threatened by food shortage' (Frankenberg and Goldstein, 1991, p.2). Maxwell (1992 and 1996) and Devereux and Maxwell (2001) emphasise the perceptions and feelings of the food insecure themselves, underlining the value of personal choices as well as the role of coping strategies adopted during food shortages.

Nevertheless, only in more recent definitions of food security, the aspect of sustainability has increasingly assumed importance. For example, Lang and Barling (2012), underline that 'the only food system to be secure is that which is sustainable, and the route to food security is by addressing sustainability' (ibid., p.321, on the importance of sustainable food systems see also Wright, 2010;

Wibbelmann et al., 2013). The sustainability aspect of food security has also emerged strongly in the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology (IAASTD), an international commission that analyses the effectiveness of public and private sector policies and institutional agreements in reaching food security. The IAASTD report, in particular, underlines the importance of food diversification, noting that the total dependence on a few staple crops, experienced by several countries, created a decline in nutritional security, besides increasing community vulnerability towards unpredicted weather events, crop diseases or economic events such as the sudden rise of some crop prices (IAASTD, 2009). The importance of crop diversification is also strongly recognised by the FAO, in order to improve food security, nutrition and health, to improve employment and the distribution of high value products and to improve the resilience of farming systems and environmental services (FAO, 2012b, p.9).

The evolution of the concept about food security shows the importance of adopting a multifaceted approach. Recent definitions are more inclusive, and seek to embrace all the elements (access, availability, utilisation, stability, preferences and sustainability) brought up by different theories in different years. For example, Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2007a and 2007b) stress the importance of analysing household vulnerability to food insecurity. According to the scholars, food security is a complex concept which depends on many different factors, and should be considered in its long term dimension. Therefore, individual or household vulnerability to food scarcity should be addressed by policy-makers in order to promote food security in the long run. The concept of vulnerability has been included in all modern definitions of food security (Kalibwani, 2005; Baro and Deubel, 2006; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007a and 2007b). An analysis of food

security through the lenses of vulnerability implies the importance of predicting food availability, analysing production trends and monitoring seasonal variations in order to predict supply shortages (crop, droughts and flood monitoring). Yet, it is also extremely useful in identifying the households that are at risk of becoming food insecure because of their social condition, facilitating the formulation of political responses which prevent food insecurity and assist the households that are most vulnerable. It is clear that the concept of food security is a complex one and has been analysed and defined in different ways throughout the years and different scholars. Nevertheless the need for a simple and comprehensive definition remains, and is perhaps provided by the one proposed by the FAO in 2006:

'Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such access' (FAO, 2006).

As a matter of fact, this definition embraces all four main elements initially identified by the FAO as related to food security during the World Food Summit of 1996 (FAO, 1996):

- i. Food availability: the availability of sufficient nutritious quality food, supplied through domestic production or imports, including food aid.
- ii. Food access: the access to natural resources and the acquisition of entitlements so that individuals can access appropriate food for a nutritious diet.
- iii. Utilisation: the importance of the good and sustainable utilization of food

through an adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care.

iv. Stability (or vulnerability, as defined by Guha-Khasnobis et al, 2007a and 2007b): being food secure is seen also as a long term condition, whether vulnerability should be addressed in order to protect the weakest part of the population in case of sudden shocks, such as economic or climatic crisis, or cyclical events such as agricultural seasons.

In my view, these four elements and the definition of food security provided by the FAO in 2006 (see above), summarise and include all the different aspects of food security underlined by different scholars over time. For example, the food availability and access elements can be read as also including the ability of individuals or households to satisfy their food preferences, embracing hence also the subjective dimension on the matter. Furthermore, the importance of a diversified diet is expressed in the utilisation element, while the sustainability aspect is implied in the stability element, since without a sustainable approach to food security there would not be food security stability. This study adopts this notion of food security, in its wider and multifaceted dimension.

Nevertheless, besides various definitions of the term, the question on how to best achieve it practically is still far from being answered. Moreover, the FAO definition of food security has been considered reductive by some scholars (for instance Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005; Pimbert, 2008; Rosset, 2008; Patel, 2009 and 2011; Schambacher, 2010; Wittman and Desmarais 2010; Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2012) that introduced the concept of ‘food sovereignty’, focusing on the importance of control over food and resource. According to these scholars, the FAO definition of food security neglects issues such as power, equity, control over

resources and environmental sustainability. On the contrary, they affirm, the concept of food sovereignty is embedded in larger questions of social justice and the rights of farmers and indigenous communities to control their resources. The Forum for Food Sovereignty held by the International NGO/CSO Planning Committee (IPC) in 2002 (and later on in 2004) provided this definition of the term:

‘Food Sovereignty is the right of individuals, peoples, communities, and countries to define their own agricultural, labour, fishing, food and land policies, which are ecologically, socially, economically and culturally appropriate to their unique circumstances. It includes the true right to food and to produce food, which means that all people have the right to safe, nutritious and cultural appropriate food and to food-producing resources and the ability to sustain themselves and their societies.’ (IPC, 2014).

The concept of food sovereignty has assumed more relevance and visibility with the evolution of the global food system and the expansion of industrial agriculture and multinational corporations worldwide. In fact, food sovereignty as a concept opposes to the commoditisation¹¹ of food, looking at a more localised and self sufficient food system where the needs of small scale farmers are at the forefront. Small scale farmers worldwide have indeed been penalised by the expansion of a global and industrial food system, and as remarked by Bryceson (2009), they have generally been increasingly forced to leave the countryside and/or find another source of income outside agriculture. But how exactly has the food system changed,

¹¹ Food seen, sold and produced as a commodity, where the prices are set by international markets (McMichael, 2006).

and why has it done so? The next section will explain this in more details, and will locate this study in its global context.

2.3. Food security as a political issue: the evolution of the global food system

The ‘food regimes’ literature developed by Philip McMichael and Harriet Friedmann (1989) provides a Marxian analysis of the evolution of the global food system within the process of globalisation. It is essential to understand the dynamics behind the current globalised food system in order to assess the new challenges that the achieving of food security faces on a global level. Moreover, this section will locate this study, helping us to identify the current dynamics under which farmers contest food policy and governments’ action.

In *The Origins of Third World Food Dependence* Friedmann identifies a first food regime, from 1870 to 1929, driven by colonialism, when European settled in wheat-producing areas of the world to supply grain to the growing European working classes (Friedmann, 1993; see also Crow et al., 1990). This led to an agricultural crisis in Europe, as local grain farms struggled to face competition of cheaper grains from settled regions. As a consequence, states in Europe started to protect the agricultural sector by setting up price supports, market control policies, and tariffs on imports (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). This regime collapsed during the Great Depression and the World War II when Europe started promoting self-sufficiency in wheat.

The second food regime could be identified in the years 1947-1972. This was the surplus regime or food aid regime as defined by McMichael (2005) with the signing of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). This food regime was linked to the American food policy and the exigency of finding new markets

for the increasing surplus of wheat produced domestically and by the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War (see also Hopkins, in Clapp and Cohen, 2009, pp.79-93). Given the logic of food aid and the difficulties of local economies in competing with the highly subsidised agricultural products of developed countries, 'third world' countries were encouraged to increase their food imports while investing in industrialisation and in the production of crop for the export market. Indeed, during the 1960s there has been a booming of agricultural exports in these countries. Following the success of the Green Revolution in Asia, foreign donors started actively supporting farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa, helping them to modernize their agriculture, improve staple food packages and the use of fertilizer with subsidies (Bryceson, 2009).

However, by the end of 1960s, several countries worldwide started to experience the decline of world grain production caused by several factors including weather disruption in several parts of the world. This led to a decline of USA grain surpluses, and the consequent rise of the world wheat price. Soon, food aid was transformed into food sales. As a consequence, the end of this second food regime saw the start of third world countries' indebtedness, as they experienced an unexpected shift from surplus to scarcity on a world scale (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). The food crisis of the early 1970s was further exacerbated by the oil crisis and the decision of the USSR to buy three quarters of all commercially traded grain in the world in 1972-73 (Friedmann, 1993). In the following years, the recession in industrialised economies, related to the oil crisis, brought the food prices down, reducing the foreign-exchange earnings of many African countries which were mainly exporting primary commodities to industrialised countries. The loss of foreign exchange earnings further undermined the ability of several African

governments to pay back the loans they had incurred in the previous years in order to modernise their agricultural sector. Moreover, warfare and droughts in various countries in the African continent - for instance conflicts in Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe and a severe drought in the Sahel region - further exacerbated foreign-exchange shortages in these countries by increasing the need for food imports.

McMichael (2005) identifies a new regime from the 1980s – a corporate food regime - which was no longer related to the political or economic hegemony of single states but driven by the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in developing countries. The increased liberalisation of the agricultural market allowed international agribusiness companies to gain substantial control and power in all spheres of the food supply chain. Ideally, the Agreement on Agriculture was set up in order to prevent market distortions caused by industrialised governments' tariffs and subsidies aimed at protecting their domestic agricultural market (Pritchard in Rosin et al., 2012, pp.46-59; also Dawkins, 1999). Actually, one of the consequences of the Agreement on Agriculture was that the prices for commodities reached historically low levels. Since its implementation in 1994, world prices for agricultural primary commodities have in fact fallen 30% or more, clearly affecting producers worldwide which were receiving a lower price for their produce (McMichael, 2009). More recently, the increasing financial speculation over agricultural products is playing a significant role in the food price volatility, increasing producer vulnerability to sudden changes in the prices on the global food market. Indeed, this is often the result of speculation on agricultural futures contracts rather than it being driven by the demand-supply market principles

(Clapp, 2009, pp.43-57).

Moreover, as a consequence of the adoption of SAPs accorded by the IMF and the World Bank, the state generally withdrew its support from the agricultural sector, especially in the area of food crop production, whilst promoting the expansion of monoculture plantation and commercial agriculture for the export market of high-value crops. Farmers in many countries were encouraged to sell their lands to food corporations, and increasing parts of land were degraded and misused, as a consequence of intensive monoculture plantation and the increased use of pesticides (McMichael, 2006; Patel, 2008).

The globalisation of the food system, or better, the way the commoditization of food over the years has been shaped through the internationalisation of world markets and the increasing role of finance within agriculture, has shifted the control over the production of food from farmers towards large corporations. This has been criticised on different levels from several authors (Tansey and Worsley, 1995; McMichael, 2007; Clapp, 2008; Patel, 2008; IAASTD, 2009; Rosset, 2009; Godfray et al., 2010). It has been charged as being unsustainable as it promotes a model of intensive agriculture that does not take into account the preservation of resources and the respect of the environment, while enriching food corporations and further impoverishing small scale farmers. It has therefore been deemed ineffective in providing adequate and nutritious food to an increasing population worldwide.

What is more, since issues of power and democracy are brought to the fore, it has been argued that control over food production and supply chains is increasingly in the hands of a few agribusinesses, which might undermine the possibility of states

to promote food security. It is in this context that the concept of food sovereignty situates itself, arguing that the global food regime is eroding the ability of farmers to decide their own farming system and keep the control over their land.

The food sovereignty dialectic has the merit to have brought the needs of small scale farmers and rural communities at the centre of the discourse around food and agricultural issues within the context of a globalised food system. Nevertheless, the food security language is of easily application to different contexts, even where the food regime as identified by McMichael and Friedmann has had a limited influence. Furthermore, the food security language remarks that the problems surrounding the food system are strictly political: seeing food as a 'security' issue underlines the importance of the single states and international community to provide a political answer to the problem of food insecurity in all its aspects: lack of access to diverse food, scarce quality of food, vulnerability and so on. The food security terminology has therefore been employed in this study, where the role of the state in affecting the food system at local and national level is recognized, despite many are the influences coming from international agreements and the globalisation of the agricultural sector.

Nonetheless, opting for the food security terminology instead of the food sovereignty one does not imply that the small scale farmers are left out of the debate. On the contrary, as it has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the farmers are at the centre of this study. By analysing farmers' relationship with the state and their engagement with politics, this study suggests that the relationship between the two subjects (state and farmers) is extremely important in achieving food security. This aspect will be better explored in the next chapter, while the

following sections of this chapter will illustrate the two subjects in a separate manner. Starting with the state, the next section asks what exactly is the role of the state in promoting food security, and what are the instruments at its disposal to achieve food security for its citizens. The last two sections of this chapter will instead illustrate the figure of the farmer.

2.4. The role of the state in promoting food security

As I have claimed before, food security is heavily related to politics. For instance, the FAO highlights the importance of political will in eradicating hunger and ensuring long term food security for all, when it claims that:

‘The world has the resources and technology to eradicate hunger and ensure long-term food security for all, in spite of many challenges and risks. It needs to mobilize political will and build the necessary institutions to ensure that key decisions on investment and policies to eradicate hunger are taken and implemented effectively’ (FAO, 2009).¹²

In this study, in line with the definition elaborated by Max Weber in 1919, the state is recognised as an important agent, a political entity which exercises power over society and regulates public matters, and hence clearly influences the agricultural sector and national food security. Nevertheless, historically there has always been great debate on the level of state intervention to transform or protect the agricultural sector (Schultz, 1953; Bates, 1981; Timmer, 1991). For instance, as it was mentioned above, during the 1980s and as a consequence of international

¹² A very similar idea was expressed by scholars such as Pinstrup-Andersen (1999) and Ching (2009) who have stressed the need for governments to invest in agricultural research and biotechnology in order to increase the productivity of agriculture whilst also implementing measures to eradicate poverty and promote sustainable development (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 1999, Ching et al., 2009).

agreements signed with global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, many countries were asked to remove their subsidies to the agricultural sector in the name of the global liberalisation of agricultural markets (McMichael, 2006; Patel, 2008; Clapp, 2009). At the same time, policies in developed countries which aim at protecting the agricultural sector from foreign competition - for example in the USA and the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union -, have been more resistant to change.

Despite the difficulties of individual states to implement agricultural policies in full autonomy in the context of the new food regime, the role of the state in promoting food security is recognised at international level and remains of valuable importance. For instance, the right to food was recognised in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, art. 25), which ratified the right of every person to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, indicating the duty of the states to protect this right. In 1966, the UN adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in which 157 ratifying states clearly expressed their commitments to take the measures and specific programmes needed to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food. This involved making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and developing or reforming agrarian systems to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need (ICESCR art.11, 2a). The right to food, according to the Covenant, is associated to the 'fundamental right to freedom from hunger and malnutrition', and it is realized when 'every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has the physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement' (ICESCR, General Comment No.12,

1999).

Considering food as a right implies a different approach when analysing food security issues. If food is a right, food security is a political issue that must be considered part of a broader economic and political condition of the society that enables the individual to meet certain conditions: an economically stable situation that enables to have access to an adequate, nutritious and diverse amount of food, a democratic set of institutions and government and the freedom to express oneself in order to be able to address any issues at political level and participate at the political life of the country, the right to have health care and sanitation and social security programs to alleviate the inequalities across the society. As a consequence, food security is not only about availability, access, utilization of food and vulnerability but is also related to a wider frame of analysis and social issues. Hence no food policy can be successful if it is not connected to a broader set of policies enhancing the development of other aspects of the society and addressing poverty. Besides, this highlights the importance of the state fulfilling the right to food and promoting food security in the long run.

Despite the right to food being widely recognised at the international level, little effort has been made towards enforcing it and official agreements such as the Right to Food Guidelines (RTFGs)¹³ are still unclear on how to assess and monitor the

13 In the *World Food Summit: five years later* held in 2002 to evaluate the achievements since the WFS of 1996, an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) was established in order to create a set of Right to Food Guidelines (RTFGs) (FAO, 2002). The Guidelines in general recognize the need of nutritional information, the importance of safety nets in assisting vulnerable sections of the population, and the need of inclusive and non-discriminatory policies towards improving availability and access to nutritious food. More recent attempts to define the right to food have been made by the FAO, such as *The Right to Food and Access to Natural Resources*, that stress the need for policies to focus on the access to livelihood assets (e.g. access to natural resources and to employment and/or credit) in order to improve food security. The

implementation of this right (Rae et al., 2007). Olivier De Shutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, remarks that ‘legal recognition of the right to food and multi-year strategies that hold authorities accountable are the only way to ensure policy coherence over time and thus lasting success’, hence each country should establish a legal framework for the right to food (De Shutter, 2012). Nevertheless, even in the countries where the right to food is legally recognized - such as in India, Mexico and Nicaragua - the progresses towards food security have been uneven (De Shutter, 2012). According to Riches, a ‘depoliticisation of hunger’ is the reason of the failure of the states to fulfil the right to food; hence, besides being included in a legal framework, food insecurity needs to be addressed as a political problem (Riches, 2002).

The right to food literature is interesting as it underlines the importance of food as a basic need of each individual, and the responsibilities of the state in warranting such need. Nevertheless, how can the states enforce the right to food, and insure that there is enough, safe, nutritious, and diverse food for all its citizens? The ways in which the state could promote the right to food on the long term is by creating the right conditions for food security to flourish. There are diverse approaches used by states in developing countries with a prevalent agricultural economy to do so. Some states focus on improving their agricultural sector, while others concentrate on welfare policies to support the part of their population that is most vulnerable to food insecurity.

Concerning policies strictly related to improving the agricultural sector, several organisations, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),

report also reminds the role of the state in promoting the respect of human rights and in the redistribution of food and resources (FAO, 2008a).

the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the FAO and the World Bank have advised developing countries states to support agricultural research, the development of new technology to improve agricultural production and improve the social conditions of producers. According to Timmer (1991, p.3), investments in new technologies have generally increased farmers' incomes, food production and consequently helped address the problem of rural underdevelopment and malnutrition.¹⁴ Yet, as a consequence of what has been described in the previous section as the rise of the corporate food regime, private companies such as Monsanto and Syngenta (which was recently awarded with the '2013 World Food Prize') rather than governments are increasingly supporting agricultural-related research and the spread of technology. This has led to several criticisms as several scholars and activists of civil society have accused multinational corporations of controlling the food system at the expenses of small scale farmers who cannot often afford the new technology produced and sold by these companies. These scholars argue that a greater involvement of the state and local communities in running the research could instead focus on the real needs of small scale farmers, better address inequality of access to resources, and consequently improve the conditions and the food security of the most vulnerable farmers (Shiva, 2000; Patel, 2008; Holt-Gimenez, 2009).

The state could also promote innovation and good agricultural practices via agricultural extension services. Extension officers are the most direct contact between farmer communities and the state itself, and implementation and preparation are essential to guarantee success, as shown by many studies. Again, however, extension services need to be part of a more comprehensive approach and

¹⁴ This approach to agriculture is based on the theories of Schultz (1964), according to which poverty in rural areas is mostly due to lack of technology.

need to be based on a solid collaboration between the state and the farmers, in order to be successful. As Timmer (1991) claims:

‘wide cultural and educational gaps between scientists, government extension agents, and farmers seem to be the major reasons for continuing problems in establishing effective two-way channels of communications [between the state and the farmers]’ (Timmer, 1991, p.8; on the challenges of agricultural extension see also Maiangwa, Omolehin Adeniji and Mohammed, 2010).

Moreover, agricultural extension programmes have often been criticised because of their top-down approach, which fail in involving local communities (Norton, 2004, Chapter 8, in particular pp.417-424). In response to this criticism, and in the attempt to involve communities through a bottom-up approach, new knowledge transfer programs have been recently formulated and implemented by the FAO in particular to involve local communities, for example the Farming Field Schools (see chapter 7).

Furthermore, states in developing countries could improve their agricultural sector and help farmers by investing in irrigation schemes and transport infrastructure. Infrastructures increase the accessibility of farming communities to inputs and markets where they can exchange their produce and improve their diet diversification. Marketing opportunities often work as a stimulus to agricultural production and increase farmers’ economic return by improving their livelihoods and their ability to purchase better quality or diverse food (Fan, 2004, pp.3-4, Norton, 2004, pp.96-97). What is more, in periods of famine, adequate infrastructure allows alleviation operations to reach rural populations in a quicker

and more cost-effective way. Recently, in developing countries, irrigation and infrastructure investments are often pursued by the public sector or in conjunction with the private sector and international organizations. However, given the complexity and the large amount of money involved in such projects, concerns over the efficiency and the long term durability of such schemes arise, especially in countries where corrupt practices are an invasive reality (Timmer, 1991, p.9-11; Narasaiah, 2003, pp.64-75; Norton, 2004, pp.247-254). Furthermore, the development of infrastructure in politically marginal areas may be neglected in favour of more politically important ones, as Blimpo et al. underline (2013, pp.61-63).

Although they are less widely used now – as a result of the increasing liberalisation of the agricultural markets at the international level - marketing boards and price interventions were especially used in the 1970s by many states to better control the agricultural output of the country and its exports. The general consequence was the creation of a monopoly in the food marketing system, which in some occasions favoured the consumers at the expenses of producers (as we will see in the case of Tanzania, chapter 4), since the state had an interest to keep the prices of food low and farmers could not sell to third parties or export to nearby countries, at least legally. This meant a decrease of the competitiveness and of the incentive to produce, pushing farmers to look out for alternatives, often black markets, to sell their produce at a better price. In other circumstances, where marketing boards subsidized farmers at the expense of the consumers, budgeting, inefficiency and corruption undermined their success (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2005). A negative account of the state's involvement in the agricultural sector and the consequence of price distortion is presented by scholars such as Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua

(1990) and Norton (2004, pp.55-104). Other scholars have written about the effects of food export-oriented policies on food security (Houck, 1991, pp.116-122; Valdés, 1991, pp.84-115). Nonetheless, many researchers (such as Timmer, 1989, 1991, p.23 and Lindert, 1991, pp.29-83) have shown that a stabilisation of prices has been proven to be beneficial in protecting farmers from the consequences of the international volatility of prices. According to these scholars, a stable food system promotes investments and expenditure on consumer goods, leisure, and education while also improving farmers' self-esteem and households' perception of their food security.

Another area where the state could be influential and affect food security is through its land policy. Land legislation differs between countries, but usually states have a major role in determining rights and usage related to the land, affecting farmers, agriculture and food security in different ways. The food sovereignty movement underlines the importance of local communities in controlling land and resources, but the land legislation worldwide is very diverse and the state still represents a major actor in land tenure policy in many countries. Usually, state policy over land ownership has to find a balance between equity and efficiency, trying to promote foreign direct investments while also protecting local villagers' rights (Timmer, 1991, p.16). In practical terms, land ownership also affects the ability of farmers to obtain a loan from the bank, as land represents an asset that can be mortgaged: generally, landless farmers face more difficulties to get a loan approved to improve their production and their livelihoods (Norton, 2004, pp.109-196).

Another area where the state can affect food security is through its response to a food crisis. In situations of food shortages, there are several ways the state could

activate an emergency food programme. One of these is via food transfer from surplus areas to deficit regions or through food imports. Given the risk of negatively impacting local producers, Clay underlines the need for a broader food policy analysis and an assessment of the areas most affected and in need of food aid (Clay, 1991, pp.202-236). For instance, Reutlinger agrees in affirming that financial aid - money transfer to the households most in need - may be preferable to food aid, since poverty is one of the triggers of food insecurity. With financial aid, households could purchase the food locally following their needs and preferences. Indeed, the state could fund activities such as food-for-work, school meals, or food vouchers (Reutlinger, 1999, p.7; Norton, 2004, pp.72-74). In answering this criticism, the World Food Program, in collaboration with the governments in which it operates, has recently changed its food aid strategy by introducing the P4P (Purchase for Progress) programme, buying part of the food aid directly from local small and medium scale farmers and farmers' organizations in order not to distort the local food market system.

The extent to which the state can influence food security, agriculture and farmers' livelihoods varies according to the institutional approach of each state, the developmental strategy chosen and the political structure in relation to society. However, it is clear that the success of policies cannot be guaranteed if the expectations of relevant communities are not addressed, as it will be noted in the following chapters and in the analysis of the agricultural policies of the Tanzanian state. This study looks at farmers as a social class, and tries to understand how the state can affect their food security. The reasons why this study focuses on this group of people and the evolution of the figure of the farmer worldwide will be explained below.

2.5. Farmers and food security within the global food regime

Farmers are central to the topic of food security both as producers and consumers of food. In particular, small scale farmers produce nearly 70% of the total world food supply (FAO, 2013, p.22). However, most of them are unable to produce enough food or earn sufficient income to meet their own household needs because of a scarcity of land, and lack of inputs and capital, as explained by the UK Food Group (2010, p.1). Hence, as the IAASTD notes, the majority of farmers worldwide are also net food buyers. Worldwide, most farming communities are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity and they represent the most food insecure people despite being food producers (IAASTD, 2009). The UK Food Group notes that the majority of the hungry in developing countries are from rural areas and come from marginalised farming families (UK Food Group, 2010). In addition, a study of the World Food Programme underlines how rural households are more prone to food insecurity than urban ones, since the more the household depends on agriculture to satisfy its needs, the more vulnerable it is to food insecurity (WFP, 2013). Moreover, agricultural households are the ones where diversification of food is lowest and where the share of income spent on food is the highest, more than 75% (WFP, 2013).

The relationship between farmers and food has evolved over time, as a consequence of the changes in the food system, and academic discussions have followed concerning the evolution of farming itself. For instance, in analysing the figure of the farmer within the globalised food system, scholars have debated whether farmers in rural Africa are integrated into the capitalist economy or not (see Hyden, 1983; Bernstein, 2001, 2004, 2010), and whether the term ‘peasant’ is

still appropriate to describe farmers in this part of the world. Such contextualisation of the role of farmers within the modern economy is important to understand how farmers impact on food security and how they are affected by state policy and international agreements on the matter. With reference to the African context where the case study of the thesis is located, this section will present some of the arguments on the evolution of farmers and the differentiation of the food system.

Concerning the transition to capitalism, this study agrees that it is not complete in Africa and that 'the capitalist mode of production has not yet fully penetrated the continent' (Thomson, 2010, p.87). In particular, the agricultural sector seems to be resistant to capital, as demonstrated by the fact that only 10% of farming is in the hands of large companies and that small scale farmers worldwide still produce the majority of food, even though agribusinesses are dominant in the processing and supply side of the food chain (Lewontin, 2000, p.93-106).

Likewise, in referring to the general African context, Hyden argues that farmers are not 'capitalistic' in the sense that they work only to satisfy their needs. According to the writer, the peasant mode of production, driven by the 'economy of affection' – defined as an informal network of interactions and mutual support between individuals united by kinship, community, religion or other affinities - limits the rise of a productive local bourgeoisie, greater effectiveness in the public sector, effective distribution of resources, and behavioural changes in society where individuals would feel confident to act in political and economic life (Hyden, 1980, pp.194-198). The economy of affection, defined as a peculiarity of African societies, suffers from the lack of specialisation, little division of labour, little exchange of products, and no interdependence between farmers (ibid., p.7). In short, the peasant mode of

production limits the development of the free market, which is seen by Hyden as a positive force, able to spur development (Hyden, 1980, p.22 and 1983, pp.197-198). Similarly, Chabal underlines how tradition may be playing a role in the failure of the process of modernization that could promote a better life for the people in Africa (2009, pp.170-171). According to Hyden, Africa is therefore still in transition from a pre-capitalist peasant mode to capitalism, and is perhaps 'the only continent where the peasants have not yet been captured by other social classes' and where 'capitalism failed to capture the peasants' (1980, pp.9-11 and 1983, pp.212 and 250).

From a slightly different perspective, Bernstein (1990, 2004 and 2010) sees farmers as both capitalists and workers, or better, petty commodity producers, because they own or have access to the means of production and they use their labour. Thomson (2010) agrees that most farmers, especially in Africa, still own their land, but adds that farmers seem to have limited contact with the capitalist market, from which they depend only for products that cannot be produced by them. Nonetheless, Bernstein believes that by the end of the colonial period farmers were indeed fully encompassed in the process of capitalist commodity production (2004, p.129), even though he also stresses the ability of peasants to change and adapt to new circumstances in order to still have an impact in current economic and political processes (2001 and in Crow, 1990, pp.69-80; also William, 1982, p.387).

In conclusion, it is true that the peasantry class has been historically disempowered and destabilised all over the world, converted in new off-farm labour activities, as a consequence of capitalism. However, the ability of farmers to adapt to a changing food system and to retain their role at the centre of this regime must be recognized, besides also stressing the differences between the several African states in which the

transition to a capitalist mode of production in agriculture has happened at a different pace. Yet, a general differentiation of the class of farmers can be identified, as a consequence of the changes in the food system and the commoditization of agriculture. In recognizing this differentiation, the term ‘farmer’ instead of ‘peasant’ is commonly used in this dissertation, as a term which takes into consideration a wider range of different typology of farmers.

Barker (1989) provides a classification of the farming class:

- pure self-provisioners – which sell no crop and are mainly self-sufficient with little local exchange;
- small-scale commodity producers – which use family labour to produce crops for sale, not to meet their own needs directly;
- peasant farmers – which farm the land, mainly with family labour, using simple equipment, providing directly for many of their needs and selling some of their production;
- wage workers – they sell their labour as their main source of income and engage in agriculture only as a minor side-line;
- capitalist farmers – they sell almost all their crop and hire most of their labour.

Yet, in reality, these categories are not well defined nor easily applicable. For example, the pure self-provisioners are increasingly falling into the peasant farmer category, given the widespread use of monetary values as a form of exchange, which makes the production and the provision of food a selling-buying activity, even at the

local level. Moreover, the division between small-scale commodity producers and peasant farmers is often not clear. In fact, given the lack of storage space and the need for income, peasant farmers often act as small scale commodity producers, selling their products to buy it later at smaller quantities, as also confirmed by the results of the empirical fieldwork in Tanzania (see chapter 5). Moreover, the farming techniques are often the same in the two categories, and the activities of small scale commodity producers may be restricted by a limited access to market. Wage workers are often employed on a seasonal basis and usually involve people with no access to land, but could also be represented by farmers that, beside farming their own land, also work as wage workers for other (capitalist) farmers in order to gain additional income. The figure of the capitalist farmer is more clearly defined as it differs greatly from the majority of farmers in rural areas by the acres owned and the farming methods used, which are usually mechanised. They hire labour, and they are often considered food secure, having enough food to feed their families throughout the year and to sell it to make a secure income.

In addition to - and perhaps also because of - a greater differentiation, it has become increasingly difficult for farmers to unify and raise their voice, and for the agricultural issue to make it to the frontline of national policies (Kelsall, 2002). According to Kelsall (2002), class differentiation could work as a dis-unifying element within certain communities, in the sense that poorer and smaller farmers may find it harder to join efforts with other categories of farmers, both because they have different needs and as they look at each other as belonging to different social groups. As a consequence, this may affect food security in the sense that the wider interests of farmers lack representation on the political level and agricultural policies may be misleading or favour the interests of the wealthier and more

powerful category of farmers in the country, usually the capitalist farmers. The influence of group differentiation with regards to the creation of a politically unified class of farmers in the specific case of Tanzania will be analysed in chapter 7. The next section will look at the general literature on farmer movements in Africa and their political relevance.

2.6. Farmer Movements in Africa – a complex historical perspective

Despite class differentiation, in certain parts of the world farmers have been able to get together and create movements that have become powerful at national and international level. This has been the case of the food sovereignty movement, for example, which has mobilised farmers all over the world, and brought their voices at international level. At least in democratic states, political decisions are highly influenced by local movements and resistance (McMichael, 2009), as demonstrated by the success of the anti-GMOs movements in Europe (Shurman and Munro, 2010) and the increasing importance of movements such as “La Via Campesina” in South America (Rosset, 2003; McMichael, 2007; Holt-Giménez, 2009). Nonetheless, as it will be explained in this section, farmer movements in Africa seem to generally differ.

This section refers to farmer movements in Africa, following the line of many scholars that look at Africa as a complex but unified reality. Nonetheless, it is important to state that the 54 states in the African continent differ greatly in terms of their history of independence and hence some general arguments reported below about ‘African movements’ may be more appropriate for some states rather than for others. An in-depth analysis of the case of Tanzania will therefore be provided in chapter 7.

In general, it is recognised that the colonial history and the lack of a land property scheme in many African countries following independence have been influential in characterising rural movements (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). Given these constraints faced by civil society, most of the literature that analyses rural movements in Africa highlights their weak character, and the difficulties of creating strong social movements able to unify society and influence politics in a substantial way. Dwyer and Zeilig, for example, acknowledge that

‘these movements, formidable though they have been, have not ultimately coalesced into a sustained force for social change akin to the labor movements of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century western Europe, which permanently transformed the lives of that continent’s working class. Africans, in contrast, have seen their living standards decline and many of their societies deteriorate into political repression and, in some cases, virtual anarchy’ (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012, p.2).

While Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) find the reasons behind the failure of African movements in the complexity of the state structure and the effects of globalisation which hinder the creation of a strong civil society, Bratton and de Walle (1992) and Fatton (1995) find the cause of the unstable democracy in Africa in a disempowered, politically weak civil society. Therefore, according to these scholars the empowerment of civil society is the key to the consolidation of democracy, but presents numerous challenges, among which are the heterogeneous nature of society, the fear of military intervention, and the influence of ‘predatory rule’. According to Diamantino Nhampossa (no date), representative of the National Union of Peasant Farmers (UNAC) in Mozambique, the difficulties of

creating a strong farmers' movement specifically lie in the complexity of peasantries, the high level of illiteracy, the low political consciousness, and the lack of basic services and infrastructures that keep the rural population isolated from the rest of the country with the big urban centres.

Recalling the idea previously mentioned of farmer differentiation affecting the creation of a unified farmer group in society, Kelsall stresses how the 'fluid identities', meaning the heterogeneous character of farming communities caused by the current depeasantization, may limit farmers' ability to aggregate and to act collectively (Kelsall, 2002, pp. 64-65 and 163). On a similar note, Claude Welch, writing at the end of the 1970s, found in the complexity of society characterised by different religious beliefs and traditional practices, the reason behind the lack of evident political action in rural communities (1977, p.4). Further obstacles to political activism according to Kelsall are: the lack of information and transparency, hence an ineffective communication system between the state and rural areas, and the lack of time, since as a consequence of economic liberalisation farmers have to look for other sources of income and off farm activities (2002, pp.56-57 and p.63).

But are African movements really 'weak' or are they just 'different'? And does the lack of strong movements mean that rural communities are 'passive'? Challenging the depiction of African movements as weak, other scholars stress the fact that democracy is a Western phenomenon that does not necessarily describe Africa's realities where individuals see themselves as members of communities rather than members of the state, hence the idea of rallying together against what they regard as a distant entity, the state, makes little sense to them. Chabal (2009), for example,

underlines how traditional theories - such as the development, Marxist, dependency, socialist, indigenous, neo-patrimonial and democratic ones - suffer from a Western perspective on the matter, and an effort to read Africa by applying the same rules and values leads to only partially correct conclusions. Instead of focusing on explaining whether Africa is or is not different from the rest of the world, Chabal stresses the need for the political behaviour of society to be analysed under the lens of tradition and the attachment to public virtue values, recalling the idea of economy of affection developed by Hyden (1980). Larmer also stresses the importance of analysing popular movements 'in situ' and in depth, considering the specific circumstances and underlining the diverse nature of movements in Africa. He further claims that 'it has normally been the case that Western observers have been unable to see past their own expectations and norms, to understand the real extent of [African] social movements' achievements' (Larmer, 2010, p.260).

From a different perspective, the presence of an authoritarian state could be the reason behind the lack of strong movements, since people can be afraid to show dissent (Mamdani et al., 1988). As a matter of fact, social movements in post-colonial Africa were repressed and unions were dissolved in many states (Larmer, 2010). In this case, civil society may choose different strategies for their protests, for example they may opt for the 'exit' option (as opposed to the 'voice' option) as a coping mechanism, removing themselves from a direct confrontation with the power elites (Hirschman, 1978, Scott, 1998). Such arguments support the idea of peasants expressing their discontent through indirect action such as rejecting policies and/or through several social coping mechanisms. In any case, societal responses to policies need to be analysed and understood according to the political and historical contexts in which they are expressed (Scott, 1986, Isaacman, 1993

and Harrison, 2002).

In fact, it is important to note that farmers in many parts of Africa may have physical limits to express their dissatisfaction in a direct way, for example to participate in public protests or meetings where they could address their issues to politicians. Being often scattered through the countryside with little access to market and information channels and with little assets to reach bigger villages and towns, they often have difficulties to organise as a group and mobilise to participate in the political life of their country. At the same time,

'as the relatively disadvantaged peasants and sub-regions show lower expectations and make less far-reaching demands, they allow central state authorities greater latitude in expenditure policies than do other classes and subregional interests' (Rothchild, 1997, p.185).

There are potentially multiple causes that result in 'disadvantaged peasants' showing lower expectations and making less far-reaching demands. One of these are the physic limits rural people face, and the restricted 'political consciousness' of which Diamantino Nhampossa talks (no date). Nevertheless, distrust, disillusion and scepticism towards the state and politics may be behind the 'lower expectations'. As we will see in the next chapter and in the context of Tanzania, this could be a consequence of the state neglecting rural areas over time and/or the failures of state policies (Chazan et al., 1999, p.125).

The idea of social movements being generally weaker in Africa thus needs contextualisation and further analysis, especially considering the more recent uprising in Northern Africa. Perhaps it would be more adequate to talk about media neglect, as underlined by Bryceson (2009), Brandes and Engels (2011), and Dwyer

and Zeilig (2012), which reckon that media attention worldwide has provided little coverage to what has been happening in the African continent. Of a similar opinion, Mamdani et al. (1988) and Joseph (1993) affirm that rural movements in Africa have been left out from the political discourse, neglected by both the media and the states. In fact, besides the most recent movements, there have been others in the past that should have been given more attention at global level, as Larmer remarks (2010). The scholar identifies a phase of social movement activism following pre-independence and post-independence, in the years after the adoption of structural adjustments and the consequential weakening of state control, which gave the opportunity for new autonomous movements in most countries in Africa. Another phase of social movements is identified in the onset of pro-democracy movements in the early 1990s, where in several sub-Saharan African countries citizens protested to demand civic reforms and the end of political repression (Bratton and de Walle, 1992; Larmer, 2010).

During the 1990s the expansion of international and local NGOs also fostered the creation of new movements (Chazan, 1994; Brandes and Engels, 2011). For example, the pastoralist movements in Tanzania have been supported by NGOs like Oxfam (Fernando, 2012). However, the unity of these movements ‘commonly masked profound divisions regarding the outcomes they wish to see from this process of democratisation’ and raises the issue of dependency upon international NGOs and funding agencies (Larmer, 2010, p.256). According to Larmer (2010), one of the consequences of this dependency and the influence it exercises could lead to the depoliticisation of social conflict. These aspects will be further analysed in chapter 7 with special reference to the case of Tanzania.

In conclusion, because of several constraints faced by civil society - such as lack of access to information, disillusion towards the state, weak structure and unclear objectives and methods, fear towards state response to protest -, social movements in Africa have generally been politically weaker than movements in other continents, for example in South America. They have not been successful in changing the political structure of the state and in affecting agricultural policy, especially if compared with movements in South America. This weakness is also the result of a general neglect manifested by political elites and by the media, both at national and international level. Nonetheless, it is indispensable to analyse social movements in socio-economic, political and cultural perspective, highlighting that the historical evolution of social movements may differ in single African states and that forms of protests are often manifested in an indirect and hidden way, as we will see in the case of Tanzania.

2.7. Conclusion

In this chapter the literature around the term ‘food security’ has been introduced, underlining the evolution of the term over time. When referring to food security, this study borrows the definition developed by the FAO in 2006, which defines food security as

‘a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such access’ (FAO, 2006).

In addition, in line with the analysis provided by Amartya Sen (1981), a household perspective is employed, and food insecurity is also analysed according to the

ability of the household to purchase the food available, hence food insecurity is looked upon as related to a condition of poverty and unequal distribution. Furthermore, the personal perceptions of being food secure/insecure and the possibility to have a diversified diet are greatly taken into consideration as suggested by Maxwell (1992 and 1996), Maxwell and Devereux (2001), the IAASTD (2009). Issues of sustainability, power and control over natural resources are also considered in this study, embracing some of the reflections provided by the movement for food sovereignty.

By embracing a comprehensive definition of the term food security, with all the connotations mentioned above, this study stresses the important role of two major subjects in the matter of food security: the state and the farmers. A focus on farmers, as both producers and consumers of food, is essential if issues such as quality and food diversification, sustainability, control and power are to be analysed. Moreover, in countries such as Tanzania, where they represent the majority of the population and are at high risk of food insecurity, farmers are to be considered central in analysis of food security.

The important role of the state in the issue is given by the right to food literature, where the state is considered central in promoting food security and in creating the right conditions for its citizens to achieve food security. Despite the commoditisation of food and the expansion of a global food regime as described by McMichael (2009) and Friedman (1993), a contextualisation is needed in order to analyse the food insecurity condition of a determined country and find political solutions to overcome it. The state is still a major player, and the relationship that the state has with rural communities can be determinant to the success or failure of

policies aimed at improving food security, especially if in the country analysed the majority of its population is composed of farmers.

The commoditisation of food is not the only factor affecting food security amongst farmers. As we will see, with the case of Tanzania, there could be different reasons behind food insecurity, and the political relationship between the state and farmers is one of them. This is why a contextualisation of the food system in the country analysed is essential and an analysis of the political state-farmers relationship is central in this study.

By looking at the issue as a political one, and being the relationship between state and farmers the core of the study, an analysis of political responses to policies from farming communities is inevitable. Besides looking at the ways state's action can affect food security, this chapter also looked at the ways farmers can react to discontent or unsatisfactory policies. With special reference to Southern and Eastern Africa, it was noted the lack of strong farmers' movements, which has been interpreted as a form of disempowerment (Bratton and De Walle, 1992; Fatton, 1995), apathy (Kelsall, 2002) or individualism (Hyden, 1980) by several scholars. Nevertheless, as it will be analysed in depth in the following chapters, and in particular in chapter 7 with reference to Tanzania, this study underlines the different forms contestation can assume, which needs to be analysed in perspective according to the historical and social development of a determined country. The following chapter will clarify this political aspect, by analysing food security in relation to the political dynamics of the state-farmers relationship.

Chapter 3 - The state-society relationship

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter the evolution of the term ‘food security’ and its connection with both farmers and the state was described, introducing the research question and providing the academic context in which this study is located. Moreover, the political aspects of food security were remarked upon, stressing the importance of the state in promoting and creating the right conditions for assuring food security to its citizens within the power dynamics that exist in the global food system. Nevertheless, while farmers are central to the debate, and the state has an important role in promoting the development of food security in rural areas, there are many impediments that keep many farmer communities in a condition of food insecurity.

In the previous chapter, the case for analysing food insecurity through the political lenses of state-society relations was proven worth of being explored. The assumption is that such relationship affects food security for several reasons. For instance, a conflictual relationship between the state and farmers could contribute to the formulation of misdirected policies and/or complicate the implementation of policies aimed at achieving food security, whilst also limiting the ability of farmers to contest unwanted policies and their interaction with agricultural programs sponsored by state officials.

In order to explore this aspect of food security and address the research question, this chapter will introduce the literature on the state-society relationship, with particular reference to Africa. This literature will help understand how the terminology is employed in this study, and will provide important elements that will help us

understand why state-society relations matter when talking about food security. In the previous chapter it was anticipated that, as a starting point, the term ‘state’ is used with reference to the classical definition proposed by Weber, describing it as a separate entity which holds the power and exercises it over a community of citizens, which we will commonly call society. Yet there is great debate on the general definition of the terms ‘state’ and ‘society’, as there are different forms of state and different societies, and even more diverse relations between the two bodies. Starting with this premise, and conscious of the fact that it is easy to fall into the trap of generalisation, this chapter will present some of the theories of state-society relations, referring in particular to the Tanzanian context.

In using Weber’s definition of the term ‘state’ this study assumes that the state and the society are two separate subjects. But, what is the grade of separation between the two bodies? And does this separation impact on the ability of one to influence the other? The following section will discuss this in more details.

3.2. State and society: two separate entities?

There are no doubts that the relation between society and the state has a direct link upon the way the state exercises its power. Yet, it has also a direct link to the way society relates to the state and sees the state’s responsibilities in the various spheres of everyday life (Scott, 1998; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Lund, 2006). The different ways the state and society perceive each other condition the framing of policies on one side, and the democratic participation in political life, and hence the degree of state legitimation, on the other side. Hence, for the scope of this study, it is important to understand whether society feels like an inclusive part of the state or if instead it sees the state as a separated subject.

While Scott (1998) focuses mainly on analysing the dynamics of the relationship between the state and the society as separate entities, Li (2005) rejects the idea that the state is an autonomous entity, and underlines the importance of civil society, public figures, researchers and so on in influencing policy and changing dynamics of power within society. Hence, Scott's reading of the state and his analysis are mainly driven by a vision of the state as 'above' society. Li's vision differs in the claim that there is no space beyond the state (therefore society is part of the state), and no subjects outside power, in the sense that power is not exclusively in the hands of the state, since the latter is conditioned by numerous bodies that attempt to govern, including donor external agencies (Li, 2005, p.386, on this point also Lund, 2006, p.686 and Hyden and Bratton, 1992, p.6). Moreover, as Hyden and Bratton (1992), Lund (2006) and Li (1988) underline, the power is exercised from different bodies within the structure defined as 'state', and this power is conditioned by influences coming from civil society itself. Similarly, Migdal (1988) affirms that society and state are to be considered interconnected and the structure of one influences the action and the capabilities of the other. Nevertheless, he also remarks the separation of the two subjects, claiming that the state is an institution above society, which seeks to control.

While a definition of the state with reference to the specific case of Tanzania will be provided in the following chapter, it can be said that the Weberian definition of the term 'state' is employed as a general assumption in this study, and following Scott's approach, state and society are analysed as separate subjects where the state is above society; it is also recognized, however, as underlined by Li (1988) and Hyden and Bratton (1992) that the state is influenced by other subjects, for instance by international organizations, multinational companies, national industrial lobbies and

society itself. Moreover, different levels of power within the state structure are recognised, implying also that the engagement between them and the society could differ. The next section will clarify the dynamics of power behind the state-society relationship, explaining how state and society influence each other even in countries where the state is perceived as above society.

3.2.1. Vertical encompassment, personification of politics and neopatrimonialism in African politics

Following the debate on whether the state is within or outside society, most analysis of African politics agrees in describing the state-society relationship according to a pyramidal power structure, which sees a leader at the top, followed by a dominant political party at the national state level and lower state apparatus - such as districts and local administrative bodies - at the bottom, with limited autonomy. Exemplifying this is the theory of vertical encompassment: the tendency of the state to create an image of itself as being above society but at the same time seeking consent and legitimation by trying to include society (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002 and Scott, 1998). The way the state is presented to the citizens through the figure of state officials is a way to confirm the hierarchy of power and to stress the separation between them and members of society. Symbols and appearance are a way to distinguish the space, and stress the authority, of the state. For instance, this approach can be traced in the attitude of high officials of wearing expensive clothes, owning expensive cars and so on (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002 also Lund, 2006, p.690-694).

Yet, while we would expect such tendencies to have a negative impact on the relationship between state and society, according to Daloz, and within the economy

of affection described by Hyden (see chapter 2), this ostentation of wealth and prestige of goods is what African society has come to expect from the state and acts as a factor of political legitimacy (Dalo, 2003, p.281). Hence, the vertical encompassment notion can only be fully understood if we take as a starting point the existence of what Hyden defines as 'economy of affection' in most African rural societies. Dalo claims that the legitimacy of the African elites is strictly connected to the ability of such elites to 'nourish the clientele on which their power rests', and therefore, 'leaders are never wholly dissociated from their supporters' (Dalo, 2003, p.278; Chabal and Dalo, 1999, p.15). In these circumstances, the ostentation of wealth confirms the leader's capacity to supply and satisfy its network of dependants (Dalo, 2003, p.281). As a consequence, politicians tend to acquire the maximum visibility and popularity by distributing (some of) the wealth acquired. At the same time, by doing so, state officials acquire more political power, hence higher ability to extract resources (Dalo, 2003, p.280). It could also happen that politicians, in their attempt to embrace society's expectations, take personal credit for policies welcomed by the community in order to keep high popular support. For example, the building of a hospital or of a school may be presented more as a 'present' of that particular politician rather than a result of the operation of the government (Chabal, 2009, pp.77-84).

In other words, in the dynamics of vertical encompassment we see a state that distinguishes itself from society, but that at the same time tries to gain popularity and consent. Yet, consent is not only sought for mere electorate reasons, but also for social and anthropological reasons. As Hyden (1980 and 1983) and Chabal (2009, pp.43-57) underline, the social structure and culture of many African communities is characterised by kinship and extended family support, where wealthier individuals

are expected to take care and help poorer members of their families. It could be said that 'individual rationality is essentially based on communal logic', meaning that individuals behave in a way that is in line with social and religious foundations and 'relations of power are predicated on the shared belief that the political is communal' (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.156). As a consequence, 'political action is in large degree driven by what we might call the imperative of exchange' or the 'expectations of reciprocity' (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.157). In saying this, the authors stress the vertical links within the political system, and how politics can assume personalised forms and affect the nature of political relations. State officials are not only seeking personal power and resources, but also people's affection, respectability and status.

Under these circumstances, the separation between the state and the society becomes more faded, with the two entities appearing connected and the public and the private interests being confused, so that in certain circumstances nepotism, clientelism and abuse of public resources for private benefits can be considered acceptable (Daloz, 2003, p.278; Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.9; on this see also Bach and Gazibo, 2013). These aspects of African politics, exemplified in the attempt of state officials to create an informal patron-client relationship with other members of society, have been conceptualised as neopatrimonialism by several scholars, who also talk about a generalised 'personification of politics' observed in several African countries over time (Médard, 1991, pp.323-353). In analysing the effects of these practices, Bayart (1993) claims that they are at the basis of the 'incompleteness' of the state in Africa. According to him, beyond practices of clientelism, political elites tend to manipulate conflicts and political disorders in order to personally accumulate resources that belong to the state, and raise the attention of the international community in order to

ensure a continuous inflow of financial aid into the country. As a consequence, the African state is 'incomplete' as 'it functions as a rhizome of personal networks and assures the centralization of power through the agencies of family, alliance and friendship, in the manner of ancient kingdoms' (Bayart, 1993, pp.261-262). In the book *The Criminalisation of the State in Africa* he goes even further, outlining how these forms of corruptions and the use of public office for personal enrichment are now becoming more dangerous and reaching global criminal networks as a consequence of the process of liberalisation. State criminalisation is assuming the forms of large scale frauds and plundering of natural resources, drug trade, growth of private armies, and so on (Bayart et al. 1999).

While according to Daloz (2003) neopatrimonial practices may work in favour of individual state officials in maintaining their popularity within their electoral constituencies, the effects of these practices on the general perception of the state can be deleterious. Migdal claims that neopatrimonialism may actually undermine the vision of the state since, by allowing corruptive practices, clientelism, and the affirmation of 'strongmen', some state leaders undermine their own state agencies, reducing in this way the power and the credibility of the state in the face of citizens (Migdal, 1988, pp.206-258; Moore, 2001; and Lund, 2006, p.687-689). This great 'informalisation' of the state could also lead to arbitrariness and exploitation from public officials (the rule-makers) at the expenses of common citizens (the rule-takers) (Chabal 2009, p.151). Furthermore, the failure of the state to provide basic services to its people leaves a gap that is often filled by informal economies giving opportunities to public officials to abuse their power and use public resources to their own advantage (ibid., p.132). In these circumstances, through neopatrimonialism, clientelism and corruption, it is possible for Africans elites 'to enrich themselves

whilst the continent is failing to develop' (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p. xxi and 14). A similar take on neopatrimonialism is expressed by Fatton (1992) which, through an analysis of African politics based on state-society hegemonic power dynamics, claims that rent-seeking tendencies and clientelism 'have devastating effects on the rest of society' as the ruling class is predatory (from here the notion of 'predatory rule') and tends to maximise its individual wealth irrespective of the rest of society (Fatton, 1992, p.3).

Nevertheless, according to Fatton neopatrimonialism and the personification of politics cannot be understood by an analysis of culture and society structure linked to the 'imperative of exchange' and 'economy of affection' as defined by Hyden (1980 and 1983), Daloz (2003) and Chabal (2009). This is because, according to him, consent is not voluntary but indirectly imposed by the ruling elite to society. He talks about a 'very fragile pact of consensual domination' between the state and society which requires:

'...the ruling class to develop non-violent strategies of control that can draw the subaltern classes into accepting lopsided political and economic relations for pragmatic reasons. However unequal these relations may be, they entail certain norms of reciprocity based on exchanges of favour and resources. The ruling class must convince subaltern classes that such reciprocity represents a credible contract without which their already limited life-chances would be limited even more' (Fatton, 1992, p.4).

Fatton's analysis questions the nature of societal consent, and perhaps his theory reflects the reality of the dynamics of state-society relations in some African countries. But it is very difficult to generalise and embrace one theory as a general

rule for all African countries. We can assume that neopatrimonial and personification of politics is common to many African countries, and that it has negative effects on society, as underlined by various scholars, and this will help us understand some aspects of the state-society relationship in the context of Tanzania, as we will see in the next chapters. Moreover, societal responses to such attitudes may vary and much depends on the nature of the state. For instance Fatton's fragile pact of consensual domination implies the presence of 'a hard structure of class dominance bent on continuous extractions from relatively powerless people' (Fatton, 1992, pp.20-22). Nevertheless, this scholar also notes that, in the long term, such structure of the state alienates society, which tends to choose the 'exit option' and keep its distance from politics. Hence it becomes very difficult for the state to gain full control over rural society and impose its pact of consensual domination (ibid., 1992). For this and other reasons, not all scholars agree in defining the 'African state' as strong. In analysing power dynamics in African politics, many scholars have interrogated themselves on the role and 'strength' of the state and its ability to control society. In the following section these arguments will be presented and will show how a different understanding of the state may lead to a different interpretation of the state-society relationship.

3.2.2. Weak, failed states?

As noted above, in order to understand the state-society relationship, some authors have focused on analysing state capabilities and performance. Many of them have subsequently defined the general African state as in crisis, abnormal and/or unsuccessful (for instance Migdal, 1988; Forrest, 1988; Rothchild and Chazan, 1988; Faaland and Parkinson, 1991; Fatton, 1992; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Chazan et al.,

1999; Wai, 2012). For instance, the failure of the 'African state' has been identified with the inability of the state to comply with certain qualities (or abilities) recalling the Weberian idea of state. According to Migdal (1988) an efficient state should have the following characteristics:

- a) capacity to penetrate society;
- b) regulate social relationships;
- c) extract resources;
- d) appropriate use of resources (Migdal, 1988, p.4).

Likewise, Forrest (1988) claims that the inability of African states to penetrate society - an aspect also stressed by other scholars such as Fatton, (1992) Bayart (1993) and Herbst (2000) - is a symptom of postcolonial African states' failure to achieve 'hardness'. For both Migdal (1988) and Forrest (1988), the quest for 'hardness' is qualified by the ability of the state to have structural autonomy, to penetrate society and acquire hegemony over intermediary and local level politics, to extract resources and to gain political legitimacy. Therefore, many post-colonial African states are described as weak (or 'soft' by Forrest, 1988), as they lack sufficient capabilities to have a full control of society, especially in remote areas. The reasons why the state has difficulties to control certain parts of society are different. Political instability and the difficulties in encompassing and controlling a divided and diverse society are the basis of state failure according to Jackson and Rosberg (1982). For Faaland and Parkinson, instead, the general scarce ability of independent African states to implement long term reforms is determinant in characterising state failure (Faaland and Parkinson, 1991, pp.247-274). According to

Migdal (1988) and Forrest (1988) the fragmentation of social control is attributable to both the consequences of the colonial rule and to the spread of the world economy that has required many African states to limit public expenditure and hence reduce their physical presence and their control over some sectors, such as the agricultural one. Rothchild and Chazan (1988) agree in blaming the unsmooth process of transition from colonisation to independence as one of the causes of state failure. Because of this transition, and the dependence on colonial power in the post-independence period, many African states struggle to develop a fully democratic system, able to represent and give voice to rural isolated areas (Rothchild and Chazan, 1988, Azarya, 1988).

Historical reasons are also very relevant in Herbst's understanding of the state in Africa. He claims that the inability of African leaders to preserve order, hence state failure, 'occurs most often and most dramatically in Africa' rather than elsewhere, because of the particular nature of the state and its boundaries (Herbst, 2000). According to Herbst, relatively young African states have great difficulties in exercising their power because of the difficulties in reaching and controlling rural culturally variegated and isolated areas scattered throughout the national territories. He stresses the need to develop alternative policies in line with the different African realities, perhaps advanced by African scholars themselves, and hypothesises the creation of new nation-states that could promote development and consolidate the sovereignty of single states.

In short, rather than looking at the difficulties of the state-society relationship through the lens of a lack of communication, involvement and understanding, the

authors mentioned above emphasize the state's lack of (or weak) military force to control society, measuring the weakness of the state by its ability to coerce society.

From a different perspective, for other scholars the failure of the state in Africa is attributable not to a lack of strength, but, on the contrary, to the use of authoritarian measures to gain control over society. For instance, according to Rothchild and Chazan (1988) despite the different historical and political formation of the several African states, (see *The Diversity of African Politics*, in Chazan et al., 1999, pp.5-34) there are some common characteristics which allow to talk of the failure of the African state in general terms: extensiveness of public sector with increasing bureaucracy and state control, patrimonial and clientelistic qualities, the emergence of a political élite class and the lack of communication with society. Likewise, for Hyden (1992) bad politics is characterised by:

- a) the personalized nature of rule;
- b) the frequent violation of human rights;
- c) the lack of delegation by central authorities; and
- d) the tendency for individuals to withdraw from politics.

Therefore, the use of coercive measures (military force) and extensive bureaucracy are used by the state to control every aspect of social life. While this would be regarded as a strength by scholars such as Migdal and Forrest, for Hyden and Bratton the use of coercive measures and the tendency to control every aspects of society are understood as a weakness of many African states, because they results in society's disengagement from politics (Hyden and Bratton, 1992). This pessimistic vision of the state in Africa recalls the idea supported in Hyden's 1983

book *No Shortcut to Progress*, where the limits of the post-colonial African state to 'progress' (intended in the economic sense)¹⁵ were blamed upon the state's internal problems and the limits of the 'peasant mode of production'. This referred to rural producers' tendency towards subsistence production and the economy of affection mentioned in chapter 2 (Hyden, 1983, p.194). The title of this book shows Hyden's conviction that change should happen gradually, and of the historical and cultural circumstances of a specific country that must be considered in analysing state-society relationships.

According to these scholars, at the root of the decision of several post-colonial states to achieve control over their respective societies through the use of coercion there is a profound distrust of the state towards its citizens (on this also Scott, 1998). For example, in the context of agriculture, most African state-driven policies to modernise the agricultural sector were characterised by a sense of cynicism towards traditional agricultural practices of local farmers and a complete faith in scientific agriculture and modern methods promoted by Western countries that led to the green revolutions in several parts of the world (Scott, 1998, pp.226, 231). Thus, in order to push for the adoption of these practices, many states turned to the use of coercion and strict control, assuming - perhaps rightly - that the rural communities would have otherwise refused to change their mode of production (which in many cases they did anyway, as we will see analysing the case of Tanzania in the next chapter).

However, these accounts are interesting as they highlight the connection between state action and society's political engagement. For instance, one of the consequences of centralisation and increasing state control was that it led to de-

¹⁵ At the base of progress, in Hyden's vision, are economic relations, which also determine the historical context of a country (1983, p. 191).

politicisation and social atomisation according to Hyden and Bratton (1992) and Scott (1998). In Hyden's words, 'the final implication of Africa's 'bad' post-independence politics is the tendency for individuals to evade rather than engage the political authorities' (Hyden, 1992, p.24). This attitude, according to the author, is the consequence of the fear of citizens to contest state policies (ibid., p.25). Bernstein also stresses how a state with high objectives but scarce resources to pursue them may tend to extend its control over society through expansion of bureaucracy (an 'overextended' state), and as a result fail to encompass society in any effective way (1981, p.57).

It is clear however that different states have different characteristics, and a different kind of relationship between the state and society. For this reason, in Hyden and Bratton's (1992) *Governance and Politics in Africa* several African states are analysed and grouped in four types of regimes according to nature of state and society responses: communitarian, characterised by the pressures of a great varieties of social organizations and different ethnic groups to the state; libertarian, market-based, where citizens see themselves as autonomous individuals; corporatist, where institutions are determinant factors in policy making; and statist (the state is the main deciding actor) (Hyden and Bratton, 1992, pp.16-20). Each regime represents a different way the state poses itself to society, and consequently a different way for society to engage with the state.

The possibility of a crisis is common to all regimes, implying that there is no right or advanced way to governance, but each model determines either a higher or lower risk of governance crisis (ibid., p.20). According to these classifications and the analyses brought forward with different empirical examples, the authors argue that

communitarian regimes, mostly to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, are the ones most prone to governance crisis because of the informal character of relations between the public and the private spheres, and the state's difficulties to deal with all the pressures coming from different groups and to fulfil all the expectations raised from different parts of society. Hyden and Bratton also found that in communitarian states the governance structures tend to be more fragmented and less structured, and society participation and association tend to be weak.

In summary, it can be said that there are different readings of the African state, characterised by mainly two approaches: the state is too weak to control its society, or it is too coercive to involve its society in a constructive way. These two approaches are not necessarily contradictory. In fact, the use of the force could perhaps be an answer to the difficulties to control society and to satisfy the different requests and needs coming from different ethnic and social groups. This, added to the practice of clientelism and corruption, of which we talked in the previous section, may lead to society disengaging from the state for mainly two reasons: fear and/or distrust. A loss of credibility leads citizens to look at other ways to develop their economic interests, for example in parallel markets (Hyden, 1983, p.201). Once the society disengages from the state, politicians lose the ability to influence society and to successfully implement policies which are contrasted by the rural communities (Hyden, 1983, p.202). Neopatrimonialist theories are useful to analyse and understand society dissatisfaction and disengagement with the state. Nevertheless, this study recognizes that there are some issues with the use of this literature. The next section will review some of the criticism to the neopatrimonialism and state failure literature and will clarify the position of this study in merit of such criticism.

Society engagement/disengagement options will be analysed in more details in section 3.3.

3.2.3. Criticisms of the neopatrimonialist approach and the state failure literature

Most of the criticism of the literature on neopatrimonialism and state failure focuses on two aspects: the use of Western ideas of state in the African context, and the generalization of African countries. For example, Allen underlines the difficulties in talking about a common path of African states, since within Africa there are many different form of politics and political systems (Allen, 1995). According to the scholar, studies that look at Africa as a single reality lack consistency and cannot really talk in the name of the entire continent, because they represent only one of the many crucial political processes within African politics (ibid., p.317). Despite Bayart's claim to distance his work from the paradigm of Africa as being a unique reality and from giving an African-pessimistic reading, in *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (1999) in particular, he actually refers to 'Africa' in general terms. For instance, according to Wai

‘while claiming to interpret Africa on its own terms, Bayart reproduces and reinforces some of the most offensive, obtuse and cynically prejudicial stereotypes, which not only ridicules and disparages the continent's political and social formations, but in fact calls into questions the very humanity of the African person’ (Wai, 2012, p.38).

Hence, Wai defines African states as ‘unfinished political projects’ (2012, p.34) and strongly criticises the neopatrimonialist literature in general, saying that:

‘neo-patrimonialist literature on African states [...] not only constructs a mechanistic conception of state rationality based on the experience of the Western liberal state as the expression of the universal, but also denies the specificity of the continent’s historical experience, by either denying its independent conceptual existence or vulgarising its social and political formation and realities, dismissing them as aberrant, deviant, deformed and of lesser quality’ (Wai, 2012, p.27).

Nevertheless, in his account on how neopatrimonialist and state failure theories are Western-centric and misleading, and in blaming scholars for ‘creating a reality in the service of the hegemonic power’ by using these theories (ibid., 2012), Wai does not seem to propose any alternative readings that would allow us to analyse African states in a more accurate way. The same goes to DeGrassi (2008), who criticises neopatrimonialist literature for not being rigorous, using a limited number of case studies and generalising; but then concludes: ‘Certainly, I am not arguing that no African state is neopatrimonial’ (DeGrassi, 2008, p.122).

Perhaps it is true that the application of the word ‘state’ to African realities raise controversies, since it is a construct of Western political philosophy, but at the same time the denial of the status of ‘statehood’ to African countries negates the power struggle presents in African societies. Power struggles are common to Africa and everywhere else in the world, according to Bayart, who prefers to use the Foucaultian understanding of governmentality and power in his analysis of the African state (Bayart, 1993, p.263, and 1999). Therefore, the concept of state becomes useful if the intent is to analyse the power struggle between those who hold the power (policy-makers) and those on which the power is exercised (policy-

takers),¹⁶ even though we recognize that the African state may present different features from those usually attached to the term state in Western countries. Furthermore, the use of certain terms such as state and society, and the use of neopatrimonialist analysis offer the advantage to describe the African continent showing a general trend, facilitating its analysis and understanding. This does not imply that all the African states have the same characteristics. This is recognized also by Hyden and Bratton (1992), which actually identify at least four state regimes in Africa, as it was noted in the previous section.

Certainly, the risk of analysing African states following a western logic, as stressed by Wai (2012), exists and cannot be negated. To obviate this risk some authors such as Chabal and Daloz (1999) try to propose a different approach. These authors try to distinguish themselves from the two most common approaches in understanding African states. One is the approach that takes a Western perspective as a starting point, taking for granted the validity of concepts such as corruption, state, society, development and the thinking of African societies as traditional and reticent to change. The other is the one that considers Africa's politics on the basis of generalized African state dysfunctions and which mostly blames external forces for these failures (*ibid.*, p.144). According to Chabal and Daloz, African development is following a different path from the one followed in different parts of the world, hence in order to understand the mechanism of politics within African countries we need to use a different perspective and analyse political issues by framing them in their cultural and historical context. For example, in studying modernity and tradition, the question, according to these authors, is not whether Africa is more traditional than others, but how tradition and modernity live together. Moreover,

¹⁶ The notion of policy-makers and policy-takers has been outlined by Streeck (2010).

according to these scholars, if the Weberian definition of state and power had to be interpreted strictly, it would actually provide a good key of reading of African states, giving justice to the African contexts, since it defines rationality ‘in terms of what individuals and political actors believe for themselves to be rational, and not in terms of what outside observers might consider to be the case’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.151). This perspective is particularly interesting, and, as we will see in the following chapters, could help contextualise and understand some attitudes and behaviours of the members of society in relation to their engagement to politics and their vision of the state. For instance, concerning neopatrimonial attitudes, the approach suggested by Chabal and Daloz (1999) would allow us to explore how such tendencies are welcomed from the society and how they are portrayed by state officials. By locating neopatrimonialism in its particular social context it is easier to both assess its consequences and address its causes.

Actually, for some authors, neopatrimonialism in the African context is not necessarily negative. According to Kelsall (2013), for example, it is true that neopatrimonialism is present in many African countries, but neopatrimonial literature should not consider it as a problem, interpreting it through the lenses of the Western concept of democracy. According to Kelsall, neopatrimonialism is not an insurmountable problem, and since it is slow to change it should be taken into consideration in formulating and implementing a different kind of governance tailored to the realities of many African states. This kind of governance should not necessarily be based on the liberal ‘good-governance’ model, but should take into account the character of state-society relationships based on the model of the economy of affection. From this perspective, Allen illustrates some examples of countries in Africa that, despite being highly centralised and having clientelist

relations, were stable and more successful than others (Allen, 1995, p.16). In short, both Kelsall and Allen claim that neopatrimonialism, in some conditions, can even assist development (ibid., 1995, Kelsall, 2012). For instance, Kelsall talks about ‘developmental patrimonialism’ in the cases of Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Malawi (Kelsall, 2012, pp.18-48), claiming that the secret to success is more on how clientelism and rent-seeking are organized (ibid., 2013).

In short, besides the two different takes on neopatrimonialism presented in the previous paragraph, the majority of the criticism of neopatrimonial and state failure literature lies in the conviction that African countries are different from each other, have their own peculiar histories, and are ruled by different socio-cultural systems, hence they need to be analysed under different parameters than those used to analyse Western countries. This idea is however also defended by those same scholars such as Chabal, Daloz, Hyden, Chazan, Rothchild, and Kelsall who also talk about neopatrimonialist features characterising many African realities. They analyse African realities through the lenses of the ‘economy of affection’ or ‘expectation of reciprocity’ and community values, while at the same time also underlining the presence of clientelism and personification of politics. This study embraces the literature brought forward by these authors to analyse state-society relationship in Tanzania.

In light of these analyses of the African state, the next section will review some literature on societal responses in relation to the state, which will provide essential elements to analyse how the society (in particular rural society) engage with the state.

3.3. Societal responses and interaction with the state: the processes of engagement and disengagement

So far this chapter has presented the state-society relationship from the state's perspective, discussing the ways the state positions itself toward society. This section will analyse in more detail societal responses and the political engagement of individuals in relation to the state. Recalling the concept of state and society as separate entities as described at the start of this chapter, society is used in this dissertation in contradistinction to the state, to indicate a group of people (rule-takers) under a common government.

To analyse the relationship between the state and the society, and the ways this influences policies and eventually food security in rural areas, Azaria's definition of incorporation and disengagement are employed. Azarya indicates these processes as the most common responses of society to state actions (1988, pp.6-9). With the term incorporation, he describes the process whereby the population is involved and take part actively in state processes and decisions in order to share its resources. There is great cooperation between the state and society, which wishes to stay as close to the government as possible. According to the scholar this interaction is positive and, thanks to the communication between the two subjects and the involvement of society into policy framing, it boosts economic output, facilitates the emergence of new entrepreneurship, and creates an attractive environment for foreign investments. Generally, in an incorporated society, local politics is strictly related to and dependent on the central government, but can also have a relevant influence upon state's decisions. As a consequence, regional and income inequalities are also likely to widen, favouring the areas or regions of the country where local politicians are

more influential (Azarya, 1988, p.7). Furthermore, an incorporated society doesn't necessarily mean a more politically active society, as we will see later on.

On the other hand, disengagement is described as the process in which society manifests scepticism and keeps its distance from the state, which is considered inefficient in satisfying the population's needs. In other words, according to Olorunsola the society would disengage (withdraw) from the state because it lacks confidence in the capabilities and willingness of the state to improve the condition of society (Olorunsola, 1988, pp.189-207). As we will see with reference to Tanzania, the disillusion of citizens could be the consequence of continued policy failure and high expectations previously raised and not fulfilled (Ayoade, 1988, pp. 100-118). On this, Ayoade underlines how the decline in authority in many African states is attributable to the failure of the post-colonial states' leaders in meeting people's expectations, and in creating a strong unified and autonomous state in the years after independence. The failure to provide the expected and promised benefits on a large scale, and to satisfy what Ayoade defines as the 'Santa Claus' syndrome, created a gap between the state and the society, with the alienation of people from the state. Schwartz has also described society's alienation by using the term 'estrangement', which, according to the scholar, is caused by the 'perception that one does not identify oneself with the political system' (Schwartz, 1973, p.7).

Disillusion is also at the basis of Barker's analysis of society's disengagement from politics. One of the scholar's considerations in his analysis is that 'state politics does not tap the political energies of rural communities'. In other words, by imposing a specific model of agricultural modernization the state takes little account of the realities of rural areas meaning that the state's policies reflect inadequately the

exigencies of rural communities that struggle to conciliate tradition and modernity (Barker, 1989, p.201). Another reason for disengagement is linked to a desire among social groups for autonomy from state control. For instance, according to Hyden, rural resistance to state policy reflects peasants' efforts to preserve their way of life and affirm their autonomy, besides also revealing the difficulties of the state to communicate to rural masses (Hyden, 1980, p.16). According to the scholar, the state struggles to capture the farming class, which seems indifferent to politicians and unwilling to cooperate with the state, seen as 'an alien body in the society' that lacks the instruments to make effective changes (Hyden, 1980, pp. 86-91 and 1983, p. 201). As Hyden explains, 'the worst thing to happen [...] is not the economic stagnation [...] but the tendency for the state to be further cut loose from society'; such tendency, according to this scholar, is an obstacle to progress and development (ibid., p. 202).

In addition, society may decide not to cooperate with the state because it does not trust its advice. For example, the new modern agricultural methods indicated and pursued by government's under the rubric of the green revolution were often not suitable for local conditions, resulting in 'ecological failures' and were often misleading or disregarding towards the reality of the conditions of rural populations (Scott, 1998; Barker, 1989). Thus, certain kind of policies could have a negative impact on local communities. For example, policies aimed at relocating people may disorientate and make them more vulnerable to state power and control, weakening them, or could foster tensions between society and the state or within society itself (Scott, 1998, p. 235; Li, 2005, p.391). Such policies, therefore, are doomed to failure, as they are welcomed with only scepticism and distrust.

While active cooperation or passive support are usually typical of incorporated societies, where there is a respective trust between state and society, in a disengaged community individuals can oppose the state by being politically active, or by showing complete disinterest. The modalities of disengagement from politics vary, and can be understood through different behaviours, as Schwartz (1973), Fatton (1992) and Scott (1985) illustrate. As we saw in the previous chapter, a direct way to confront the state is commonly perceived as being through direct protests, creation of strong representative movements and active political participation.

However, disengagement can be expressed in more indirect ways, through scarce participation in elections, expressing a low opinion of state officials, exhibiting a general disinterest in the political affairs of the country, boycotting or not complying with state advice, etc. Disengagement can also assume the forms of political detachment in several ways, for example by relying on other bodies to satisfy some public needs usually covered by the state (for instance relying on external agents that operate in the country such as NGOs and international organizations to provide health assistance or education) or by following tribal traditions and costumes more than the national set of rules (Chazan, 1988, p. 130). Yet, disengagement, according to Azarya, 'does not include active opposition to the regime if the objective is to replace the rulers and/or change government policies', in the sense that disengagement is more characterised by political apathy and disinterest rather than direct confrontation (Azarya, 1988, p.8). The society does not aim to change the state, but rather to keep a distance from it and to get increasingly detached from it. Therefore, these indirect ways to confront the state are useful in an analysis of society in many African countries, especially in the ones where direct confrontation is sporadically witnessed. Fatton and Scott, for example, argue that the subordinate

class (in this case the farming class) has often resisted exploitation in indirect ways; hence the lack of direct action should not be interpreted as apathy towards politics, but as a different way for society to react to discontent (Fatton, 1992, p.31-32; Scott, 1985, p.335).

The state can react to incorporation or disengagement in different ways. Usually the state encourages incorporation and fights disengagement, but it may also prefer to limit the level of society involvement in the state affairs if it wishes to avoid pressures from the society on various fronts or if it lacks the capability to keep control over extended responsibilities and resources (Azarya, 1988, pp.15-18). It can be the state, therefore, which disengages from the society, especially when it feels too much pressure from citizens or particular groups (Olorunsola, 1988, p.190). As Chazan points out, in an attempt to reach independence from citizens or pressure groups, the state can limit or contrast the involvement of society into political affairs (1988, p.123).

Incorporation and disengagement represent two different ways that society and the state relate to each other, although it is important to note that such dynamics are not fixed, and the level of political incorporation or disengagement of society can change. Nevertheless, the precarious balance of state-society relationships that exists in many African countries and contributes to internal societal atomization needs to be accounted for and analysed as it influences the policies adopted by the state and, as a consequence, several aspects of citizens' everyday life, including food security (Chazan, 1988, p.130).

3.4. The State-society relationship within the global food system

From the analyses of the African state illustrated in this chapter, it is clear that many states in Africa suffer from several issues that limit their ability to successfully develop and fight poverty and hunger. One of these issues is surely the relationship that these states have with their respective societies: relationships that seem more characterised by societal disengagement rather than incorporation, as we will see in the specific case of Tanzania in the following chapters. Hence, the question is how to resolve the controversial relationship between the state and the society in order to create an environment of mutual cooperation and the framing of more effective policies.

The incorporation or disengagement of society are not fixed phenomena and could change over time, for example with the advent of globalisation and as a consequence of the democratisation process. While the next chapter will analyse the role of democratisation and globalisation in the specific case of Tanzania, in general many scholars agree that the process of democratization is essential to society's participation in politics and to improving the relationship between the state and society. Hyden, for example, underlines the importance of strengthening the civic public realm and having a higher involvement of citizens in policy making in order to achieve progress and economic growth (1992, p. 25, and 1983, p.209). Similarly, Joseph claims that a democratization process would lead to higher accountability of the government process and consequently would renew social participation in politics (Joseph, 1990). Moreover, he sees democracy as the only way the state can gain the trust of its citizens and involve them in the political life of the country.

While many African countries present some aspects of a democratic system and have introduced multiparty systems, the democratisation process is long. According to Bayart, the 'move to multiparty politics is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy', since political elites in most countries are able to retain power even in multiparty elections, keeping 'farmers and the rural youth at a respectable distance from the throne', and making of democracy the incarnation of the postcolonial 'passive revolution' (a term borrowed from Gramsci) and the symbol of the anti-politics machine (as described by Ferguson) (Bayart, 1993). According to Bayart, common citizens are kept out of politics against their will and are manipulated by the several political elites. Other scholars disagree with this characterisation of multiparty politics. They argue that the introduction of a multiparty system may not necessarily lead to any substantial changes in the quality of governance, though it may change the level of clientelism since more political parties compete for votes (Kelsall, 2004, p.34, 54, 55; Chabal, 2009, p.104). Moreover, in some countries democracy has not led to the expected economic development, leading to further disillusion and mistrust from citizens towards politics (Chabal, 2009, p.141).

The process of liberalisation also impacted the relationship between state and society in several ways. According to Hyden, the internationalisation of the world economy could be a facilitating force in the development process since it creates new economic opportunities (Hyden, 1983, p.204). Of a different opinion, Fatton blames capitalism as being only a way for elites to enrich themselves at the expenses of citizens. He describes capitalism in Africa as a 'peripheral and bastardized form of capitalism that has failed to create a 'higher' mode of production capable of superseding the precolonial and colonial heritage' (Fatton, 1992, p.7). This scholar claimed that the implementation of SAPs has exacerbated conditions among the

poorest part of the population while providing opportunities for enrichment to ruling elites. In particular, 'Structural Adjustment Programs have aggravated Africa's subordination to international financial resources, further eroding the ever-tenuous sovereignty of African states' (ibid., p.127). Likewise, Kelsall defines the adoption of the SAPs and of the good governance agenda as the result of the common assumption that African states are neopatrimonial. He goes on to suggest that at the heart of these schemes is a belief that African states cannot develop effective economic reforms by themselves and for this reason need to be 'guided' by developed nations to 'develop' the continent and promote good governance (Kelsall, 2004, pp.12-17). In other words, the good governance agenda, according to Kelsall, is only a 'way to try to make African states more like Western states' (ibid., p.13).

Furthermore, there are concerns about the internationalisation of the economy having a negative impact on the sovereignty of nation states, although it is recognized that different states are affected by the globalisation of the economy in different ways. For Weber, in contrast to Marx or Smith, the state is at the centre of the process of transformation towards a capitalist society. Fatton, while criticising the neoliberal agenda, also recognises that states still can have a central decisive role, and that domestic policies matter decisively as they set the parameters and the extent of which states will be dependent and incorporated in the international economy (1992, pp.120-121). Other scholars argue that states have lost power as they are liable to global agreements and influenced by global markets. Hence, the state is a victim of the globalisation system and the relationship between state and society assumes little relevance in analysing power dynamics (Speiser and Handy, 2005). Nevertheless, in the particular case of Tanzania, this study supports Fatton's analysis, and claims that the Tanzanian state, despite being encompassed in the global food system, still

retains a certain level of autonomy and is able to condition the political life of its own country.

It is true, however, that the effects of liberalisation on the relationship between state and society are difficult to unpick. According to Fatton, the opening of the state to globalisation could have a negative effect in the state-society relationship. In Fatton's view, the globalisation of the economy tends to create the formation of a transnational capitalist class and a relationship of collaboration amongst ruling elites, where they get mutual benefits at the expense of society (on this also Sklair, 2002). In short, globalisation favours the powerful and wealthy while it is detrimental to the poorest part of society. Moreover, as a consequence of internal and external influences and pressures, the state is in continuous change and formation, and the distinction between state and society is less clear (Lund, 2006, pp.686, 697-699). Of a different opinion, Ferguson and Gupta claim that globalisation and economic liberalisation represent a way to empower the citizens to 'discipline themselves', because they devolve state's responsibilities to other entities such as multinational corporations and international organisations which respond to donors' interests (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p.989).

This last point deserves attention. What does it mean that citizens can 'discipline themselves'? Does it imply that otherwise they are not 'disciplined'? Furthermore, it is more likely that the devolution of a state's responsibilities, besides furthering the distance between the state and the society, opens the door to possible cases of manipulation of citizens, for example from multinational companies which promise the building of roads, schools and hospital in exchange of land. Besides the expansion of multinational corporations, including agribusinesses, the effects of the

expansion of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) funded by external countries should be assessed. Because of the nature of these organisations, they act in a transnational regime, where the space is not clearly defined, and their work is strictly linked to the donors' will (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p.994). While the presence of these entities may represent an opportunity for citizens to be more involved in local development policies, and perhaps to have a voice and be represented at the higher levels of politics, actually, in the context of transnational governmentality (as defined by Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, pp.989-990), it is increasingly difficult for the society to have a say in the policies that affects them.

Therefore, in some circumstances, the claim that democratisation and liberalisation - linked to the phenomenon of globalisation and expansion of civil society - led to more pluralism and societal participation in politics is misleading. There are reasons to believe that in the context of transnational governmentality the state is still sovereign, but it has become increasingly difficult for society to have a direct impact on politics because of external and internal influences. This has raised doubts about the legitimacy and accountability of the state; a state that on certain occasions seems more inclined to please external donors than its internal citizens, as social movements in the various global governance meetings have pointed out in the various G8, World Bank and IMF meetings.

In the context of agriculture and rural society, in several countries the process of liberalisation has had negative effects on rural communities, since the states have developed closer ties with large scale farmers and neglected small scale ones, considering them 'ignorant':

'large capitalist farmers maintain a privileged relationship with state officialdom and superior access to state-controlled financial credit and farm inputs and to civil service personnel, resulting in social conflict with the less-advantaged classes in their midst'. (Chazan et al., 1999, p.122)

State distrust towards rural communities and the withdrawal from the provision of social assistance (both in agriculture and in social services as a consequence of the adoption of the neoliberal agenda) has surely contributed to straining the relationship between the state and rural societies. Nonetheless, as we will see in the following chapters, liberalisation has affected developing states in different ways and through different modalities, and it would be difficult to talk about a common liberalisation path for all African countries.

3.5. Conclusion

In light with what has been said in chapter 2 concerning the role of the state in promoting food security and the importance of policies to be framed around the needs of rural communities in order to succeed, this chapter has analysed the dynamics of state-society relationships in order to understand the reasons why food security is not being attained in many African countries. In particular, the theoretical background offered in this chapter provides essential reflections to understand how certain policies are formulated by the state and the way they are welcomed from the society at which they are directed. For instance what has been described as 'society disengagement' can help understand some of the attitudes resulted from the empirical data collected in Tanzania during the fieldwork for this study, as we will see in the following chapters.

What has emerged in this chapter is that the relationship between state and society is a complex one, and varies according to the historical and cultural background of each country. For the scope of this study we will embrace the general principle expressed by Scott (1998) according to which state and society are two separate entities. It is recognised, however, that the state is a complex structure, in which different levels of power are present and hence it is conditioned by internal and external pressures (Li, 1988; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; and Lund, 2006). State and society, despite being two separate entities, influence each other.

It is in these conditions that the relationship between the state and the society assumes political relevance. In this study this relationship is analysed through the lens of vertical encompassment, which implies that the state is an entity above society (vertical dimension of power), but at the same time tries to gain consent and popularity amongst society through forms of personification of politics, clientelism and neopatrimonialism (as identified by Médard, 1991; Bayart, 1993; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Daloz, 2003). In short, the state appears as a friendly master. Nevertheless, the various levels of power within the state have a variable relationship with society, so that the officials belonging to the local level of power results closer to society, while the officials at the higher ranks of power are usually felt as outsiders by the society.

This intriguing relationship has been explained by looking at the structure of some African societies by authors such as Hyden (1980 and 1983), Chabal (2009) and Chabal and Daloz (1999). These authors have identified what drives the relationship between the state and the society in the dynamics of the 'economy of affection' and 'expectation of reciprocity'. These two aspects, which summarise the importance of

kinship and community ties for the African societies analysed, explains why in local politics the public and the private spheres are confused and why clientelism is pervasive, and in some respect expected and accepted.

Nevertheless, this structure of relationship inevitably leads society to consider the high levels of the state as 'an outsider' and to develop a conscious detachment from national politics. In fact, while neopatrimonialism in the form of clientelism and corruption is practiced with the intent to gain consent, it has negative repercussions for the country as a whole (Fatton, 1992). As a consequence, the citizens lose faith in the ability of the state to improve their conditions and to implement major successful policies at national level (Migdal, 1988; Moore, 2001; Lund, 2006; Chabal, 2009). In these circumstances, the state fails to embrace or encompass society in an effective way and to implement successful policies. The societal disengagement from politics, as defined by Schwartz (1973), Hyden (1980), Azarya (1988), Olorunsola (1988), Ayoade (1988), Barker (1989), and Scott (1998) is hence studied as a consequence of distrust and discontent towards the state and the result of previous historical failures, which will be analysed in the following chapter.

Moreover, in this chapter it was mentioned that the processes of democratisation and liberalisation do not seem to have had a positive effect in improving the relationship between the state and society. These phenomena, however, needs to be analysed within the context of the country analysed, since many African countries can be considered to be still in transition towards both democratisation and liberalisation. Clearly, however, the changes at international level are to be considered when analysing the relationship between a state and its society, especially since these imply the emergence of new actors that can affect the state internal dynamics of

power. The following chapter will underline the origins of the relationship between the state and society in Tanzania, introducing the case study and setting the background in which this relationship has evolved over the years.

Chapter 4 - State-society relations and agricultural policy in Tanzania

4.1. Introduction

The previous two chapters presented the theoretical framework in which this study is located. In particular, the previous chapter underlined the connection between the state-society relationship and the formation and outcome of policies in the African context.

This chapter will introduce the case study of this research, defining the state and the evolution of its relationship with society in the specific context of Tanzania. By introducing this case study, we will be able to locate this research in its socio-historical context, which will help understand the results of the empirical data illustrated in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Besides a clarifying section on what the state is in Tanzania, this chapter will provide the historical background of the country, with reference to the agrarian change and the evolution of the state-farmer relationship since Tanzanian independence in 1961. The reason why this thesis looks at the state-society relationship since independence is related to the fact that it is after independence that the state institutions of Tanzania were consolidated and the policies implemented by the new state widely affected rural communities. It is certainly true that colonialism set the basis to the creation of a certain kind of peasantry in the country, but the internal contradictions of the independent state led to the greatest changes in the countryside and are at the origin of a controversial relationship between the farming rural masses and the state.

In the independent state, especially under the guidance of Julius Nyerere, the imperative for the state was to establish a close connection with the peasantry; a connection that would allow the state to control the countryside and to impose a certain development path. Nevertheless, as we will see, the application of *Ujamaa* (Nyerere's vision of socialism) resulted in a burdensome relationship between the farmers and the state for different reasons: a misreading and misinterpretation of Tanzanian society by the ruling elite, a top-down policy approach, and the adoption of coercive measures. But what do we exactly refer to when talking about the Tanzanian state? In the section below details on the nature of the state in Tanzania will be presented.

4.2. The Tanzanian state

As claimed in the previous chapter, during this study the term *state* is used to indicate the political entity that is recognised as the expression of power and rule by a determined group of citizens. Nevertheless, the role and the perception of the state varies according to the kind of regime, the level of social involvement in politics and decision-making and also cultural practices. Therefore, in this section the state will be defined in the Tanzanian context. Theories of incorporation and disengagement (explained in the previous chapter) are used to define the character of the state in Tanzania and understand the dynamics of social engagement in politics. Furthermore, considerations on the importance of political and economic changes over the years are provided to offer an indication of the evolution of the state expansion and the switch in the balance of powers.

According to Snyder it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the state and society in Tanzania, as many households have members that work in the public

sector, and may take part in village political life in different ways. For example in many villages, and even in parts of the city of Dar es Salaam, for every ten households there is a representative which is supposed to attend village meetings and bring forward the requests, suggestions and concerns of the households he/she represents (Mitchell, 1991, Munro, 1996, Snyder, 2008). The scholar Matthew Costello sees this as a negative factor, as it increases bureaucracy and clientelist practices, leading to politics being 'swallowed' by the administrative machine (Costello, 1996). Yet, the incredible expansion of bureaucracy over the years since independence should not be interpreted as the weakening of politics into the administrative routine, but rather it should be analysed as one of the elements that characterises Tanzanian politics and the relationship between the state and its citizens.

In fact, it is exactly the distribution of power at the administrative level that has shaped the image of the state in the eyes of the Tanzanian society. While the distinction between society and state may be blurred, the distinction between lower level state apparatus and higher ones is instead very clear, marking the fact that the state in Tanzania is on different levels: local, district and central. Often, lower level state apparatus, in particular local officials, are captured by the forces of civil society; hence they are closer to society than to central state forces. In fact, generally local officials are elected by citizens and are 'peasants like everybody else' with variable effectiveness (Becker, 2009, p.92). On the other side, at district and regional level, officials are usually appointed, and may not be locals to the area where they are appointed. According to Becker the distance between higher level officials and common citizens is also an aesthetic one, and for example 'the hallmark of a higher official was a four-wheel drive car, which stood out a lot in a region where private

car ownership was very unusual' (ibid., p.92). Moreover, often they had very little in common with local people, for example it could happen that

'in a Muslim town they were mostly Christian: Like their income, their power derived from the capital; they had no local roots and did not seek to acquire them' (ibid., p.92).

As a consequence, most regional and district officials are seen as 'outsiders' from villagers, while local officials are seen as a part of the society and not necessarily identified with the state, as it will be noted in chapter 6, while analysing the interviews undertaken during the fieldwork.

At the same time, the diffident approach of farmers towards the state is also the reaction to a certain state's attitude and perception of the figure of the farmer. For instance, in the case of Tanzania, as we will see in chapter 6, many officials interviewed often referred to farmers with negative connotations, using adjectives such as 'backwards', 'stubborn', 'lazy', and 'ignorant'. In particular, farmers in Coast Region are regarded as un-productive, not worth investing in and 'not serious about agriculture' (see chapter 6 for a full report of these interviews). These general stereotypes would be of little importance to the analysis of this research if it was not for the fact that they are behind some important political decisions that shaped the current conditions of farmers in this area. For instance, Coast region has been excluded from the regions where the agricultural subsidy is implemented because, according to an official in the Department for Food Security in the Ministry of Agriculture interviewed in August 2013, people in Coast region 'are not really farmers, they produce too little'. Hence, the state's perception of farmers influences political decisions and has an impact on farming households of specific areas. As a

consequence, the state is increasingly perceived as a separate entity disconnected and far from its people's needs.

Yet, it should be noted that the perception and the relationship with the state has evolved over time, and has not been homogeneous in the different parts of the country. Some areas, better represented at the political level (for instance Kilimanjaro), reacted better to certain policies than other areas, usually more isolated. It may be also for this reason that some negative stereotypes are mostly addressed to a certain kind of farmer in specific areas of the country. Truly, the making of the Tanzanian nation-state has not been an easy task in the post-colonial days, given the presence of so many tribes, different languages and cultures. That was the reason why Nyerere pointed to the adoption of Kiswahili as a common language for all Tanzanians, with the hope of unifying a very diverse population and promoting the country's stability. Nevertheless, as shown in this chapter, since independence, the state portrayed an image of itself as being above society, under an attitude often described as patronising and paternalistic, following a top-down approach to the implementation of policies. The aim was to lead the process of nationalisation, under a pan-African socialism that aimed at unifying the different tribes and communities. However, the distrust towards rural society and the exigency of transforming the socialist state led to the state assuming full control of society (Spalding, 1996a). As we will see, the harsh ruling of the cooperative associations and the consequent abolishment of these, the extended civil service and government official presence in the villages, and the long bureaucratic processes, prove that the young Tanzanian state was concerned about possible loss of power and aimed at gaining full control over society, at times resorting to coercive measures (William,

D.V. 1982). This certainly contributed to creating an image of the state as ‘above’ society.

An historical perspective is also adopted by Stein (1985), who provides a definition of the Tanzanian state as an outcome of the colonial past and the nature of class relations, as opposed to the ‘paternal’ socialist state image provided by writers such as Mwansasu and Pratt (1979). By analysing the nature and the expansion of the ruling bureaucratic class seeking to extract surplus from producers in the post-independence years, Stein explains the expansion of the state and its increasing control over the economy. The reading of the state under an economic Marxist angle also helps understand how the state created an image of itself as ‘above’ society:

‘Socialism’ to this class was synonymous with the intervention of the state in economic affairs. It meant that the state was the only agent that could bring modernisation and development to the ‘backward’ elements of society. It set the state as an organ apart from and above the direct producers’ (Stein, 1985, p.123).

Nevertheless, this definition seems reductive. As a matter of fact, this vision does not explain the efforts of the young Tanzanian state towards rural and social development, and does not give justice to the progress Tanzania saw in the social sector in the post-independence years. In the eyes of citizens, the state, increasingly identified with the figure of Nyerere was not seen merely as the ‘exploiter’, at least in the post-independence years. As Sundet underlines,

‘The state’s attempts to expand its control over the agricultural sector must be seen as an integral part of the overall development strategy, not

simply as a manifestation of a class conflict between bureaucrats and the peasantry' (Sundet, 1994, p.41).

Nevertheless, given its post-colonial and avowedly socialist political path, the Tanzanian state has been the object of several studies in which the state formation has mostly been analysed through the lens of class struggle (for example Saul, 1974; Shivji, 1975; Boesen and Raikes, 1976; von Freyhold, 1977; Samoff, 1979; Resnick, 1981; Stein, 1985). That said, one of the objectives Nyerere expressed on different occasions was to create a 'Pan-African Socialism', an innovative construct that would 'skip' the class struggle unifying the citizens under the communal way of life. Therefore, analyses of the Tanzanian state under a Marxian framework need to take into consideration this particular form of socialism that Nyerere wanted for Tanzania (on this also Leys, 1976, Forrest, 1987, Bayart, 1993).

The next section will describe in details Nyerere's influence and his vision of Pan-African socialism for Tanzania. In particular, the following sections will look at the roots of this controversial relationship between the state and the farmers in Tanzania as the historical events, either because of a patronising and control-driven approach or because of a distant and neglecting one, seem to have contributed to detach society from the state even further. This is particularly true for the rural population, where public services are often scarce and people struggle to have access to basic needs. Nonetheless, this disconnection should not be read as passivity towards politics, as Kelsall (2004) puts it, but should be analysed according to the process of development of the idea of the state in the Tanzanian context. While farmers have often being portrayed as helpless, passive, difficult to be 'captured' by the state (Hyden, 1980; Forrest, 1988), and while they 'struggle to participate in political processes within arenas defined by state institutions', they also 'continue to pursue a

polycentric, informal political practice at the local level' (Becker, 2009, p.76). Although we will see in chapter 7 the characteristics and the limits of this participation, in general it can be said that the political nature of rural society is best expressed at the local level, with which it can relate, rather than with the higher state apparatus. Therefore, in my analysis, the references to 'the Tanzanian state' indicate that part of the state felt as 'outsider' by rural society, represented by the high state apparatus and its representatives (from regional level upwards).

In the next section, the origins of the detachment between the state and the society will be explained by looking at the process of democratisation and the impact that the first years after independence had on shaping the idea of state and of society.

4.3. The democratisation process in Tanzania: independence, the affirmation of the single party system and the influence of Julius Nyerere

Inequality and differentiation between farmers were present since before the colonial era,¹⁷ but under colonial rule they grew considerably, as several European-owned plantation industries were expanding consistently, in particular in some areas of the country (Bukoba, Kilimanjaro, Sukuma, Usambara, Iringa). Population growth and the introduction of new crops such as maize and rice that gradually started to replace sorghum, bananas and millet were the major causes of agricultural change in the countryside during colonialism. Nonetheless, farmers did not lose their autonomy and 'nowhere [...] had commercial crops done more than supplement subsistence agriculture', as primary importance was given, by both farmers and the colonial government, to subsistence food production (Iliffe, 1971, p.32). Although colonial

¹⁷ Tanganyika became part of the German East Africa and was under the control of the German Empire from 1885 until the end of the First World War, when the League of Nations conceded Britain a mandate to control the area (Gentili, 1979).

powers both under German and British rule were aware that a need of modernisation of farming methods was needed, they did not impose modern agricultural schemes upon farmers (ibid., pp.33-39). In reality, the initial attempt of the German Empire of dispossessing and appropriating local land was contrasted by the indigenous population and gave rise to the *Maji-Maji* rebellion in 1905,¹⁸ forcing the colonial power to change their colonial policy and give more autonomy to the indigenous farmers and space to traditional rulers (Taylor, 1963; Gentili, 1979). The British mandate, started in 1920, followed a similar line of indirect rule. In 1926, the system of *Native Authorities* was created, where indigenous authorities, under the supervision of the colony rule, were officially recognised as administrators of their local areas (Gentili, 1979). Nevertheless, this did not placate the insurgence of the first independence spirits. In 1929 the first political organisation, the TAA (Tanganyika African Association) was created by a small educated élite, which claimed self-reliance and criticised the colonial system. With the intent to prevent possible rebellions, the British government substituted the *Native Authorities* system with a more inclusive system, where Tanganyikans were allowed to be part of the bureaucratic apparatus and participate in democratic elections for the legislative council and – with some limitations – for the executive one (Pratt, 1976, p.28).

Nevertheless, the nationalist movements grew stronger with the years, culminating in another protest against dispossession of land in 1951. In the name of individual land ownership, in 1951 the local Meru people were evicted from Engare Nanyuki, in

¹⁸ The Maji-Maji rebellion was, according to Taylor (1963), the most widespread revolt East Africa had never seen before. Started in 1905, from a group of tribes near the Rufiji River, it quickly extended to other tribes and other areas, against the oppressive German rule. The German response was harsh: 'by 1907, when the death of one of ... the original insurgents, Abdulla Mpanda, brought an end to the revolt, devastation was almost complete... The inhabitants had been robbed, killed, and enslaved by the German askaris; crops and villages had been destroyed and cattle carried off. Casualties from warfare and famine numbered about 120,000 people' (Taylor, 1963, p.19).

favour of wealthy European farmers, who had covered the land for settlement (Iliffe, p.38; Kelsall, 2002, pp.26-31). The 'Meru land case' became a national rather than tribal issue and a cause employed by those citizens pressing for decolonisation. In 1954 the TAA became the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU), guided by the charismatic figure of Julius Nyerere, and including members from different social groups (Havnevik and Isinika, 2010). The movement embraced the land issues raised under the Meru case and promised self-reliance, pan-African socialism and rural development and prosperity. Initially, the Britain government tried to counter the popularity of TANU by supporting another party, the UTP (United Tanganyika Party), mostly represented by Europeans and Asians. But in the elections of the legislative council of 1960 TANU, with the motto 'freedom and development', won 70 out of the 71 seats, forcing Britain to accept the declaration of independence, which was proclaimed on the 9th December, 1961 (Gentili, 2010). Nyerere was consequently elected Prime Minister, and became the President of Tanganyika the following year, in December 1962. Under his leadership the government implemented some reforms that limited the power of labour unions and the right to strike, but also increased the minimum wage.

The first years after independence were certainly not easy ones, with several crises, such as in 1964 when the army mutinied asking for higher wages and the substitution of British officials with Tanganyikan ones. Nyerere's stated aim was to lead his country in a peaceful transition towards what he called a 'pan-African socialist society', including the process of union with Zanzibar and the creation of an East African community. However, he faced some challenges, such as the dependence on the former colonial powers: for instance, eventually he had to call the British government to intervene to resolve the army mutiny. Moreover, the presence of

colonial plantations producing food to export under capitalist schemes was in contrast to his villagization project and self-reliance spirit. The clash between the will of being an independent and socialist country and the influence that colonial power still had in the country's politics eventually caused a diplomatic crisis with West Germany in 1964, following the unification of Tanganyika with Zanzibar and Pemba, which had close ties with East Germany. West Germany did not see this unification with benevolent eyes, afraid of the potential new influence of East Germany on state affairs. Therefore, West Germany stopped providing assistance to Tanzania, followed in 1968 by Britain, a cause of the strong stance taken by Nyerere on Britain's role in Rhodesia and on the supply of British arms to South Africa (Coulson, 1982, pp.141-143).

Nyerere insisted that TANU was to be the only party in the country, since it aimed to represent the interests of all Tanzanians, and in 1965 the first National Assembly one-party elections were held, where 101 MPs (candidates chosen by the party and belonging to the party) were elected. At the Presidential elections, held in the same year, Nyerere was re-confirmed as President (two candidates chosen by the party were running for election - for a detailed account of 1965 elections see Bienen, 1967, chapter 12). Under the single party system, the decisions were made at centre level, following a top-down approach, and local politicians were under strict control of the central government and had to respond to TANU party officials (Kelsall, 2002, pp.609, 614; and Heald, 2005, p.278). Therefore little opposition was allowed, although it is interesting to notice how, according to Kelsall, 'few organised groups seemed to *want* to express views outside the party' and 'few people before the 1990s showed much interest in party competition' with Zanzibar being an exception (Kelsall, 2002, p.608; and Pinkney, 2005, p.105). According to Scott, political élites

were often weak in contesting the party's policy because they assumed that in order for development to take off, certain policies had to be implemented, added to which was the high admiration Nyerere received from his people (Scott, 1998, p.246). In short, during the first years of independence the young state tried to create a strong political party the population could relate to, in order to keep their support, but at the same time this was a way to set the basis to extend state control over the different areas of the country. Following the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar the two ruling parties, the TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party were later merged, out of which eventually the Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) was created in 1977.

Initially, TANU/CCM had the support of the large majority of the population. Later on, however, this started to attenuate: forms of dissent started to emerge, for example, farmers against the process of villagization, or trade unions against the labour legislation (Pinkney, 2005, p.106). In the late 1970s, open resistance and protests were evident in the rise of the military Sungusungu movement in the west cotton zone as a consequence of villagization and in particular the increasing commoditization of cotton (Mapolu in Shivji, 1986, p.129; Campbell, 1987, pp.35-41). As we will see in the following section, villagization was one of the policies that contributed most to the growing tensions between the state and farmers, despite the fact that opposition in the countryside was contained by the ability of the state to establish a facade of democratic village representation (with a supposed process of decentralisation) in conjunction with the charisma of Nyerere, the 'Mwalimu' (teacher) and father of the country¹⁹ (Kelsall, 2002, p.609).

¹⁹ For example, Heald (2005) stresses how in reality the Sungusungu protest was cleverly contained by the action of the state, that quickly recognized the movement, opened a constructive dialogue and informally allowed these communities to continue practising their

Nyerere's philosophy of Ujamaa - a word 'created' by the President himself to indicate socialism, self-reliance and rural development - deeply shaped the political history of Tanzania during the post-independence years, and his passionate speeches greatly impacted the way citizens came to see and relate to the state. Nyerere's belief that Africans were socialist by nature made him stress the values of working and living together in a peaceful way following three main principles: reciprocal respect, common property and obligation to work in order to develop an equal society and improve people's livelihoods (Hyden, 1980; Coulson, 1982; Shivji, 1995; Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003). The idea was to reach development by recognizing African traditional values, and promote a cooperative society whilst skipping the capitalist stage of development and the class struggle as identified by Marx (Thomson, 2010). Two of his main objectives were to promote primary education and the use of the Swahili as national language, and improve the provision of health care in the countryside. Thanks to his commitment to develop the countryside by providing these services, he managed to get the approval of a large part of the population.

Yet, notwithstanding the successes in expanding social services to rural communities and 'unifying' the many tribes that lived in Tanzania, many scholars have criticized his ideology. Ibhawoh and Dibua for example, argue that the Ujamaa ideology was more utopian than practical and shared the same premises of the developmentalism that considers African farmers as poor victims of underdevelopment that need to be saved and emancipated (Ibawoh and Dibua, 2003, pp.61-70). As a result,

‘...the Ujamaa’s commitment to the modernization paradigm [...] resulted in a situation where improving the conditions of peasants meant

traditional set of laws and punishments, even proclaiming it as the village security organism (in 1983, Heald, 2005, p.180).

alienating them from their cultural and social realities in favour of transplanted Western ways of life' (ibid., p.61).

Yeager blames Nyerere for having created a society where personal freedoms and incentives have been negated, limiting the modernisation and development of society (Yeager, 1989). Analysing the ideological nature of Ujamaa, Shivji underlines how Ujamaa, despite being widely legitimized by citizens, stands on rights such as equality that are not recognized by rural citizens, or better are 'alien and not organic' to their perceptions (Shivji, 1995, pp.153, 158). It can be recognised, in summary, that the Ujamaa ideology reflected the characteristics of a top-down approach, despite the benevolent intentions of Nyerere. Indeed, the ability of Nyerere to talk to the masses and to portray himself as a good father to his people denied the very need for a social compact movement and frustrated the emergence of any norm of contestation. This is especially true in the countryside, since Nyerere claimed that rural development was at the top of his priorities and was particularly paternalistic towards rural dwellers.

In fact, the importance of rural development and self-reliance was confirmed in the Arusha Declaration in 1967. This declaration stressed the interventionist role of the state, the principles of a socialist state based on self-reliance, absence of exploitation, the value of hard work and the importance of the state in protecting human rights, including the right of expression (Havnevik, 2010). It is clear however that behind the adoption of the Arusha Declaration there were strategic political and economic reasons, especially the need to maximise the use of scarce resources and encourage hard work in the countryside (Olorunsola, 1988, pp.190-195). The outcomes of the declaration can be seen in the processes of *decentralization* and *villagization*.

The decentralization process was a way to manage more efficiently the villages through the strengthening of the civil service and a supposed promotion of citizens' participation to the village life and the decision-making process. However, as noted before, these policies seem to have made rural participation even more difficult, by abolishing or reforming some important channels of political participation such as the elected district councils in 1972 (Olorunsola, 1988, p.192). If the objective was to get closer to the peasantries, as Hyden claims, it was more to control them than to involve them in the political life of the villages, to which farmers rather showed indifference (Hyden, 1980, pp.134-141, 153). The reform of the village council election, with the creation of the village assembly, was supposedly intended to promote self-government in the villages. In fact, the influence of the central party and the irregularities in the decision-making process within the assembly were clear, since the final decisions were often implemented only if approved by district or central government, making of decentralisation only a façade of local participation and democracy (Olorunsola, 1988, p.193).

Furthermore, decentralization, by stressing the inefficiency of local district councils, gave occasion to the central government to step in and take control in primary education, health and infrastructures services provision (Olorunsola, 1988, p.193). Hence, ironically, the result of decentralisation was an increase of state central control in the countryside and a way to ensure the continued influence of the ruling class on the peasantries (Coulson, 1982, p.254, Ninsin, 1988, pp.234-265). What is more, the continuous expansion of state control and bureaucracy (the numbers of people employed in the civil service grew consistently from independence until the 1980s) implied a constant increase in the administrative costs of this political regime (Chazan et al., 1999, p.51-53).

Given the importance of the villagization policy in shaping the countryside and in affecting the way farmers and state relate to each other, the section below will discuss this in detail.

4.4. Villagization

With the process of villagization, Nyerere wanted to apply the principles of Ujamaa in the countryside, in order to discourage farmers from assuming tendencies linked to the economy of affection (explained in chapter 2) and the capitalist influence in Tanzania (Hyden, 1980, p.97). According to Nyerere, Ujamaa's three pillars - respect, common property and obligation to work - implied the transformation from individual to communal agricultural production and the concentration of the government's efforts on developing the peasants' economy by increasing national food production (Hyden, 1980, p.101). After a proposal in 1962, the government officially nationalised all land in 1963 with the 'Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act' (Rwengasira, 2012, p.69). Also in 1962, a 'Village Settlement Agency' helped the creation of new settlements, as suggested by the World Bank (Hyden, 1980, pp.70-71). Even on this occasion, the hostility with which the land reform was met by local opposition leaders, many of which were petty-capitalist farmers, was placated by way of persuasion by the government (ibid., 1980). Again, Nyerere's charisma convinced the majority of the population to accept the imposed policies in the name of the common good and development of the nation.

Another controversial policy was the abolition of cooperatives. In theory, cooperatives would fit in the Ujamaa model and were highly regarded by Nyerere as the basis of a more ethical society. Indeed, there were already a good number of

cooperatives operating in the country since before independence (Lyimo, 2012, pp.41, 44). Nonetheless, Nyerere's idea of cooperation went further: he wanted to create a community that would work and live together with no interest in profit making. In order to do so, cooperatives had to be a part of community life, where every aspect of the daily routine was to be shared. To gain farmers' support in achieving this transition, initially the state helped the cooperatives by providing inputs, but inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement of funds grew consistently (Coulson, 1982, p.152; Lyimo, 2012, pp.44-45). As a consequence, and in order to control them, the state decided to progressively nationalise all forms of cooperatives in the country, thinking that an increase of bureaucracy and control would increase efficiency. Therefore, cooperatives were officially abolished in 1976 and replaced by crop authorities that put the agricultural production, sale and distribution under the control of the central government (Lyimo, 2012, pp.66-78).

In reality, and in line with Nyerere's conception of socialism and cooperation, the abolishment of cooperatives was also a way to contrast the creation of a wealthy group of farmers at the head of the cooperatives (Bryceson, 1993, p.62).²⁰ For the same reasons, also private retail outlets were abolished, and substituted by Ujamaa shops (Hyden, 1980, pp.132-134). What is important to note is that since the shops were not replaced immediately, a shortage of goods in rural areas was experienced, increasing people's discontent. Moreover, farmers were forced to sell their produce through parastatal corporations such as the National Milling Corporation and the National Agricultural Production Board, where the price was decided by the state. As a consequence, many producers felt that the state was 'playing against them' and

²⁰On this, also Scott (1998, pp.233-234) talking about the clash between the state and the Ruvuma Development Association, a cooperative scheme in Songea region that rebelled against the state policy and got banned as an illegal organisation in 1968.

diverted to the black market to sell their produce (Bryceson, 1993, pp.53-60). Furthermore, Nyerere was very critical towards large-scale farmers and people owning more than a certain amount of land. Soon the vision of individualistic acquisition of wealth and the possession of large plots of land was condemned and seen as shameful by the majority of the population (Hyden, 1980, p.138; Coulson, 1982, p.145). The campaign against capitalist farming reached its peak between 1970 and 1972, and as a consequence many European farmers, cultivating mostly in Arusha and Kilimanjaro, left the country (Hyden, 1980, pp.102-104).

According to Scott there were bureaucratic (concerning the state's attempt to control rural population) but also aesthetic reasons behind the implementation of the villagization policy (Scott, 1998, pp.225-241). The attempt was to miniaturize, to create model villages that symbolize order and efficiency and could be easily monitored (ibid., 1998, pp.226-227 and 237-238). Importantly, during the first years the settlement schemes were brought forward by persuasion, Nyerere being averse to the use of the force and relying on the willingness of farmers to follow his advice. Farmers were persuaded to settle in communal villages with the promise that living in villages would facilitate the provision of services and modernization in agriculture techniques, including electrification and tractors (Scott, 1998, p.230). Nonetheless, many farmers were reluctant to relocate and, in 1973, the government had to make villagization compulsory, with the deployment of a large number of government officials and in some cases even the army to force people out of their original homes and relocate them to the new villages. This is a very important event, which reinforced the conflictual relationship between the Tanzanian state and rural communities.

While at the start the government concentrated its efforts on promoting its socialist image of society based on the wellbeing of its citizen, and on the provision of basic services such as food, education and health, after the failures of voluntary settlement schemes, the increasing government expenditure and the removal of all forms of assistance from West Germany and Britain, the state assumed a more authoritarian tone. The need to increase agricultural production, including export crop production became imperative for economic reasons. The villagization policy therefore recalled the colonial method where resettlement and mechanization were used to create large plantations to stimulate cultivation for the world market, despite the fact that the Pan African Socialism of Nyerere had its roots in anti-colonial movements (Bernstein, 1981, pp.49-50; Bryceson, 1993, p.62; Scott, 1998, pp.227, 239; Chazan et al., 1999, pp.161, 168, 169).

As previously mentioned, initially mechanisation was promoted in order to secure farmer's consensus and compliance. However, this was often done in a non-efficient way, for example often farmers would rely on the machines and plough a plot of land too large for their capacity to take care of it effectively. Other times too much or too little mechanisation was provided compared to the workforce or the production objectives given to the community, or too many or too little people compared to the acres of the land to cultivate (Hyden, 1980, p.72). The modalities to which modernisation was promoted by the state were proven ineffective and had a negative impact to the relationship between the state and farmers. According to Hyden it is exactly because of the help received that farmers developed high expectations and were less inclined to cooperate with the state, complicating even further the state-society relationship, since 'extending social amenities to the rural population without

ties inflates expectations and prohibits government from interacting effectively with the peasants' (ibid., 1980, p.123).

In short, the policy failed to reach rural communities. The Farmers' Training Centres²¹ for example, were only beneficial to those with an interest in modern farming and who were more inclined to participate (ibid., 1980, p.77). The idea was that the 'best farmers' would be an example for others, but the majority of farmers seemed to be reticent in taking advice. The agricultural staff were also inclined to help the few farmers with an interest in modern agricultural practices, since most peasants resisted the imposition of outside control over their life and work and were not inclined to follow the advice of extension officers, which they did not trust (ibid., 1980, pp.74-78). It was also increasingly difficult for extension agents to supervise the communal plot and implement sanctions on those who were not collaborating. The villagers had their own private plot, but were supposed to work in a cooperative way in a communal village plot owned by the community as a whole the products of which were sold directly to the state. However, work in the communal plots was resented by farmers that saw no benefit coming from it and would prefer to concentrate their efforts in their personal plot. Therefore, to better identify the farmers that were spending little time in the communal plot, many extension agents would often prefer to split the communal plot for each household (Sumra, 1979, p.205; Coulson, 1982, p.42; and Scott, 1998, p.240).

²¹ The functions of these centres were reviewed in 1972 when they became part of the Ministry of Education and basically lost their specific target in farming education. The abolition of these centres was a mistake, sustains Msambichaka (1987, p.127), as education in farming methods is what Tanzania lacks most.

Ujamaa villages are generally considered to be both ecological and economic failures by many scholars (Sumra, 1979; Temu, 1979; Hyden, 1980; Bernstein, 1981; Harriss, 1982; Raikes, 1982; Coulson, 1982; Ellis, 1988; Bryceson, 1993; Sijm, 1997; Scott, 1998). Local knowledge and practices were dismissed, and the sites chosen were often far from fuel-wood and water, characterised by semi-arid unproductive land, lending further support to the argument that the extension of state control rather than socialism per se was the main objective of the process (Scott, 1998, pp.234-239, 246). In name of modernisation, extension officers forced monoculture even in small plots - against the fact that monoculture is considered to be successful mostly under large-scale mechanized farming - contributing to lower yields. The real reason for this choice was in fact to ease inspection and calculation tasks (ibid., 1998, p.243). People had to get used to different soil, different climates, and different crops to cultivate with little experience in handling the new machinery and techniques provided (Hyden, 1980, p.71). Moreover, in some areas (for example in Handeni district) people continued cultivating the same crop, despite the fact that the new soil was not suitable for it (Sumra, 1979, p.204). In addition, there was a general social distress, as people did not know each other and often came from different tribes. For these reasons illnesses were also common, especially in the years immediately following the implementation of the villagization scheme (Coulson, 1982, pp.258-261). As summarised by Temu, bad planning, over-mechanisation, lack of voluntary participation and a general failure by the settlers to view the schemes as their own contributed to the failure of the villagization project (Temu, 1979, p.199).

Furthermore, the failure of the state to provide adequate basic public services was the consequence of the inability of the government to monitor and invest the right

amount of money into the public sphere. Mismanagement, corruption, and misallocation of funds resulted in great fiscal deficits and the excessive control of the state led to inefficiency, causing shortages of goods to buy and low availability of seeds and fertilisers in rural areas (Ellis, 1988). Sijm also argues that the Ujamaa policies and in particular villagization hindered agricultural development as it discouraged the production of food crops, and resulted in a growing tension between the peasantry and the state (Raikes, 1982; Sijm, 1997, pp.210-223; Scott, 1998, p.239). In fact, between 1973 and 1975 the state had to import large amounts of food, and food crop production only recovered in 1977-78 (Bryceson, 1993, p.9). On a nutritional note, the settlement schemes did not improve diets, as farmers would plant crops with a ready market and not crops needed to diversify their diets. An inefficient marketing system was also one of the reasons that limited farmers' enthusiasm to produce surplus (Sumra, 1979, p.205). Likewise, Hyden stresses farmers' rejection of government control in agriculture in contributing to the decline in agricultural production (Hyden, 1980).

Msambichaka also agrees that the agricultural policies of the late 1970s were wrongly focusing on the production of export crop at the expenses of food crops. According to him, fewer foodstuff varieties were promoted by government policy: rice, wheat and maize, despite crops like bananas, cassava, sorghum and millet were still highly consumed by Tanzanians (Msambichaka, 1987, pp.117-144). Export only production focused on sisal, coffee and cotton and took the place of many food crops, especially in areas such as Kilimanjaro, Kagera and Mwanza. Notwithstanding, the export crop sector performance was also poor (ibid., 1987, p.121). Msambichaka blames the state pricing policies that were adverse for farmers who by this stage were mostly relying on parallel markets to sell their produce.

Despite this article being published in 1987, for this scholar the differences between regions were already quite evident, both concerning the government investment in infrastructure and mechanisation. Also problems of limited inputs and capital were already apparent. In line with the vision of agricultural development of those years (increased food production through modernisation) Msambichaka was a supporter of modernisation via the use of chemical fertiliser, gradual mechanisation and improved seeds, and blamed the government for neglecting irrigation (ibid., 1987, p.132). In fact, by 1980 only 144,000 ha were under irrigation (ibid., 1987, p.133).

4.4.1. Behind failure: the impact of villagization on the relationship between farmers and the state

As we have seen, many scholars stress the impact of villagization on agriculture and on farming communities. However, few scholars analyse the impact that this had on the relationship between the farmers and the state. Despite Nyerere's popularity, and despite his stated benevolent intentions to bring development to the countryside, it seems clear that he failed to reach the peasantry. The reason behind this may need to be found behind a misleading understanding of farming communities from the state. Little voluntary participation in politics can be interpreted as the consequence of a will of farming communities to escape state control over their way of life, as Hyden explains (1980). This autonomous attitude of farming communities was an obstacle to the creation of a socialist state, hence the state looked at farmers as a problem. The solution was for the socialist state to gain control over agricultural production and land in order to promote modernization and increase productivity by using advanced technology (Harriss, 1982, pp.350-398). Nevertheless, under the 'modernisation' mirage, the state imposed technology upon farmers without much analysis of social

context. According to Harriss (1982) and Raikes (1982), even in the post-independence years, farmers were perceived by state officials as resistant to change, therefore their concerns were disregarded. Control was also justified from the government in order to fight the 'passive resistance' of farmers who were trying to resist modernization by applying innovations incorrectly (Raikes, 1982).

The forced villagization was therefore an answer to the unsatisfactory participation of peasants in the government's call for the voluntary creation of cooperative work schemes in the countryside. Incentives such as public services like schools, clinics, and irrigation schemes (often unsuccessful, such as in Kahe near Kilimanjaro and in Mbarali near Mbeya) were provided by the government in order to persuade farming communities to cooperate with the state (Coulson, 1982, p.159; Olorunsola, 1988, p.191). In 1967, with the Arusha Declaration and later with the decentralisation initiative in 1972, the government appointed government personnel to the regions in order to control agricultural production and to combat growing rural class formation (Raikes, 1982, p.371). Therefore, it can be said that the expansion of public services and the developmental legislation was a way to legitimize government's action in the eyes of the population, and to allow the expansion of civil services in villages in order to weaken the peasantry and to limit people's ability to challenge government's decisions (Bernstein, 1981, p.44; Shivji, 1995, p.156). In short, if farmers were not willing to cooperate with the state, they had to be controlled in order to guarantee state's stability.

Seen in this light, villagization was 'a desperate reaction to peasant resistance' as Coulson describes it; a way to disorientate farmers hoping that this would result in them being more open to change and to the introduction of new crops and farming

methods (Hyden, 1980, pp.25, 72, 111; Coulson, 1982, p.162). Importantly, the process was brought forward by the conviction of Nyerere that farmers did not understand what was good for them and needed to be 'educated' (Bernstein, 1981, p.45; Scott, 1998, pp.231, 234). In his public speeches, Nyerere showed his deep disappointment by saying that 'People who refused to accept development changes were stupid, if not ignorant or stubborn' (The Daily News, November 7, 1973, in Havnevik, 1993, p.205). Nyerere, as a virtual embodiment of the Tanzanian state, showed little faith in rural communities, considering them ignorant and backward. This is extremely important in looking at the farmer-state relationship, as it demonstrates that not only were farmers alienating themselves from political processes, refusing to cooperate and accept state control over their activities, but also the state was de-linking itself from society, shaping itself as a separate entity. The personification of politics, under the figure of Nyerere, and the identification with the political party (first TANU, then CCM), can also be said to be one of the major elements that contributed to shape the idea of the state as a separate entity (Chazan et al., 1999, pp.52-53 and 168-169). This tendency also contributed to boost clientelist practices, since officials were eager to earn the trust and collaboration of rural communities.

Of further interest is the analysis of Spalding, who claims that the failure of the policies put in place by Nyerere needs to be found in a misreading by Nyerere of Tanzania's reality and society. By analysing different tribes (the Makonde, the Ndendeuli and the Shambala) throughout Tanzania, this scholar underlines how the qualities and characteristics of Tanzanian societies are not uniform or monolithic, but they rather suggest an individualistic political culture, centred on the family under a hierarchical structure (Spalding, 1996, p.93). She argues that:

‘... outside the family unit, there was little ‘egalitarian’ social organisation as Nyerere intends it. Villages did not hold their land in common, and food or seeds were borrowed if shortages were found, rather than given as a right. In some communities, cooperation was used for agricultural chores, but the produce of the fields was strictly the family’s. It appears that Nyerere’s picture of a primitive African or Tanzanian socialism is not supported by evidence.’ (ibid., 1996, p.104).

Moreover, Spalding notices how, even before independence, farmers were able to make independent choices and experience autonomy in subsistence and lifestyle preferences, not being used to obey a central authority (ibid., 1996, p.103). The autonomous and independent character of peasantries is also underlined by Hyden (1980, p.16). According to both Spalding and Hyden, individualistic attitudes can be traced in the unwillingness to cooperate that seems to characterise farmers in Tanzania. Nevertheless, while individualistic attitudes may lead to think that farmers encompass modern capitalist rationality, Hyden specifies how farmers’ individualism is actually ‘not really capitalist but one stemming from peasant autonomy and reluctance to co-operate with others’ (Hyden, 1980, p.131). In conclusion, Nyerere’s conviction that Africans have always been socialists by tradition (Nyerere, 1962) is, according to Spalding (1996) and Hyden (1980) mistaken and contributed to policy failure.

In general, the logic behind the modalities in which officials and extension agents implemented the villagization policy followed a top down approach: it was in fact more driven by the need of offering numerical results to the central authority in a short period of time (in order to gain better paid government positions) than to listen

to people's opinions and exigencies in the countryside (Bernstein, 1981, p.45; Scott, 1998, pp.243-245). As a consequence this is at the basis of its failure, as it hastened the relationship between rural people and the state, creating, as Scott says, 'an alienated, sceptical, demoralised, and uncooperative peasantry for which Tanzania would pay a huge price, both financially and politically' (Scott, 1998, p.237). Olorunsola (1988), Coulson (1982) and Hyden (1980) also affirm that Tanzania's state-centric policies of the after-independence years seem to have alienated farmers, who continued to resist collective farming (Hyden, 1980, p.193). As explained by Scott, 'if people find the new arrangement, however efficient in principle, to be hostile to their dignity, their plans and their tastes, they can *make* it an inefficient arrangement' (Scott, 1998, p.227). Essentially, the villagization project did not succeed because it did not meet farmers' needs and expectations and because farmers felt that their autonomy was under threat. As Kelsall (2003, p.75) notices, farmers

'do not appear to feel morally bound to obey the law or to work within formal political institutions in cases where they perceive their interests - howsoever these might be defined - to be constrained or threatened' (Kelsall, 2003, p.75).

To confirm this thesis, and to understand the counter-effects of state-centric policies in Tanzania, it is important to note that in the areas where the state was less aggressive in exercising its control - for example in Tanga with the TANU Youth League cooperative initiative, and with the Ruvuma Development Association - the schemes performed generally better and farmers were more inclined to cooperate (Hyden, 1980, pp.74, 75). The success of these schemes has therefore to be found in the 'autonomy and reciprocity within the context of an economy of affection': a

collaboration between farmers where the limits and the premises of the 'peasant mode' (traditional farming habits) were respected (ibid., 1980, p.75).

In the same way, some areas in which people were already living in populous villages, agricultural production was satisfactory, and villagers were represented in the political élites were spared from forced villagization, for example West Lake, Meru, Kilimanjaro, and the slopes of Mount Rungwe (Coulson, 1982, p.249 and Scott, 1998, p.236). To test whether the different approach in the after independence years determined a different outcome in terms of the current relationship between farmers and state in Tanzania, this research looks at two distinctive regions: Kilimanjaro and Coast. As we will see in the following chapters, it appears that in general the aggressive top down approach assumed by the state in Tanzania hastened the breakdown in the putative relationship between the farmers and the independent Tanzanian state. Nevertheless, the villagization was only but one of the agricultural policies implemented by the state since independence, and more recent policies have also complicated the relationship between the state and rural society even in areas where originally the state was less aggressive.

4.5. State, agriculture and society in the post-Nyerere era

If socialist agricultural policies failed to achieve the expected results in terms of economic and social development, could a political and economic shift towards market liberalism improve the agricultural sector and reinvigorate the relationship between state and rural society?

As a matter of fact, in 1979, with the war in Uganda and the world oil crisis, the economy of Tanzania was clearly struggling, destabilizing the food market and supply and putting into crisis the National Milling Corporation (Bryceson, 1993,

pp.88-90). Soon it became very difficult to pursue the development goals without the help of external finance. In 1984, therefore, the government gradually started to liberalise the economy following the advice of the IMF in order to obtain financial assistance (Bryceson, 1993, p.31). In 1986, Nyerere resigned as President, signalling the start of a new phase where Ujamaa was destined to be only a memory. With Ali Hassan Mwinyi from 1986, and the adoption of structural adjustment programs (1986-1996) the liberalisation process was fully under way and the fall of the centralised system and parastatals provided opportunities for the political elites to enrich themselves and to become part of the newly privatised companies as executive or board members.

Furthermore, as a consequence of liberalisation, agriculture stopped being at the centre of governmental policy as attention was instead diverted towards guaranteeing the growth of industrialisation and the extension of private property and liberal market rule. The lack of state support, and the state's withdrawal from agricultural marketing as a consequence of the adoption of structural adjustments programs (SAPs) under an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) with the IMF in 1986, led to rural areas being neglected in favour of urban areas, to the privatisation of food and cash crop marketing, and, ultimately, to declining per capita production of food grains (Sijm, 1997; Meertens, 2000; Skarstein, 2005; Cooksey, 2011). In addition, subsidies for agricultural inputs were removed in 1991, causing a continued decline of productivity levels per capita for important food crops such as maize and rice and export crops such as coffee and cotton (Msambichaka and Naho, 1995; Meertens, 2000, pp.337-342). Although the government partially reintroduced the subsidies again in 2003 to stave off a decline in food production and support the production of major food crops, food poverty declined only marginally in rural areas from 1991 to

2007 and the agricultural share of GDP has been in decline since 2000, demonstrating the limits of liberalisation to improve conditions and food security in rural areas (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009, p.13; TGNP, 2011).

Moreover, the removal of price control and subsidies on food crops and agricultural inputs affected negatively rural remote areas where farmers had to face increasing costs of production (Meertens, 2000). Road infrastructures remained scarce and the great majority of villages were left isolated and with limited food and market access. In fact, according to Meertens, farmers in rural remote areas were the worst affected by policies of liberalisation: they were receiving even lower payments for their produce, since they had to accept the conditions and the price offered to them by traders, which were very few in this area because of the scarce infrastructures (ibid., 2000, p.342). What is more, another consequence of liberalisation was the increasing volatility of prices in the market, especially maize, the most important staple food in Tanzania (Kilima et al., 2004; Chile and Talukder, 2014). This surely contributed to the harsh food insecurity conditions of a large part of the population, especially in the countryside and in isolated rural areas, where low prices and insecurity pushed producers to sell a large amount of their produce at harvest time to raise available cash for other needs (ibid., 2004).

Nonetheless, and perhaps as a consequence of the difficulties faced in the countryside, after the failure of the cooperative farms during Nyerere, farmers looked at the new opportunities of enrichment offered by the liberal model and looked at education as a way to escape the countryside (Kelsall, 2002, p.210). On the other side, with liberalisation, basic social services such as schooling and health assistance became more expensive, pushing farming households to seek off-farm

income and affecting their ability to farm their land (Ponte, 2000, p.1017; also Skarstein, 2005). As a consequence of these reforms, Ponte argues that rural household had to adapt to an increasing commercialisation of rural life, where off-farm activities were more important as a source of income than during the pre-liberalisation period, and where hired labour was increasingly employed for farming activities (Ponte, 1998, 2000).

This contributed to the process of de-agrarianisation, despite, as Bryceson notices, a counter-tendency (migration from towns to rural areas) can be noted in periods when there is a decline of food supply to urban areas, such as in 1979 and 1988 (Bryceson, 1993, pp.152-153). In short, poorer rural households became more vulnerable under market liberalisation, and inequalities became more evident because of weakened social networks and the declining government provision of public services (Ponte, 2000).

It is important to recognize that political élites have always been reticent in reducing the control of the state over agricultural market (especially over the export crop one), despite the reforms put in place since the mid-1980s (Cooksey, 2011). For instance, periodic bans on maize export are still employed during a food crisis, for internal food security reasons. The same goes with rice import tariffs and a strategic grain reserve. Although the reserve only deals with a very limited amount of grain production compared to the total production of the country, it still symbolises the reticence of the state to fully liberalise the sector (Minot, 2010). Cooksey also underlines how important it is to consider the different outcomes in different parts of Tanzania and for various farming and livestock categories; for instance, farmers living closer to the cities and the areas with better road connection could access the

market easier to sell their produce than farmers in more rural and isolated areas (Cooksey, 2011; also Ponte, 1998). It is clear however that in general the process of economic liberalisation created the right conditions for farmer differentiation in the countryside, opening opportunities for a few wealthier farmers with capital and assets to invest, but worsening the conditions of the majority of small scale farmers with no capital and little land.

Even the introduction of the multi-party system does not seem to have brought major changes in politics or to have improved the already weak relationship between the state and society. Under the suggestion of Nyerere - which remained the President of the CCM party until his death in 1999 - and the pressures of external donors, the multi-party system was introduced in 1992 and the first multi-party election was held in 1995 and welcomed with great approval from the international community, which thought of it as a great step forward for democracy (Pinkney, 2005, p.107). Yet, over the years the CCM has remained the ruling party and the opposition parties lack a proper political manifesto and the financial resources to lead a proper electoral campaign. Citizens' turnout to elections in Tanzania has been generally lower than 50%, and has declined over the years recording the lowest rate of 37.53% in the last parliamentary elections of 2010 (the turnout for Presidential election was at 40.71%) (IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2015. On this also Kappia, 2013). According to two studies, one by Fikiri (2010) and one by Kappia (2013), the reasons of low electoral turnout at the 2010 elections are to be found in a lack of trust of the election results (corruption and fear for the elections being rigged), lack of transparency in the electoral process and lack of commitment by political leaders in power. Lack of interest in politics also emerged, where 'over a quarter of respondents mentioned politicians were not honest, responsible, accountable and not

committed’ (Kappia, 2013, p.151). Moreover, Fikiri (2010) claims that administrative officials ‘often use their powers to mobilize citizen and public workers to vote for the ruling party and commanding the police to threaten voters or favour the ruling party in their operations’ (Fikiri, 2010, p.21). Coercion was also recorded in previous elections of 1995, 2000 and 2005, according to Makulilo (2009, p.443). This adds to episodes of violence being recorded during elections against opposition parties and their supporters, making of fear a further reason of low participation to elections (Fikiri, 2010, reports some interesting episodes, p.34)²². Low election turnout further indicates the complexities of the relationship between state and society. Since Nyerere, it can be said that the separation between state and society has in some respects grown, as we will better see in chapter 6, where the effects of more recent agricultural policies will be analysed in depth (Pinkney, 2005, pp.108-109).

According to a study by Massoi and Norman (2009), even the decentralisation of power from central state to regional and village apparatus failed to involve the community. For instance, in 1984 the Local Government system was reintroduced, and was followed by the ‘decentralization by devolution policy’ in 1996, which allowed local governments to formulate policies in line with the needs of the village and collect the revenues to implement them. According to Massoi and Norman, ‘currently the contribution of decentralization by devolution in planning process at the grassroots level is minimal and ineffective’ because of the inability of the councils to involve the community (Massoi and Norman, 2009). Actually, according to Kelsall (2002), under the social and political circumstances of the country, decentralisation represented a further potential for clientelism, corruption and

²² For example, in 2001, following protests over the elections results, there were clashes with the polices which caused at least 38 deaths (Fikiri, 2010, p.34).

instability, which have the effect of maintaining an unfair system in which only the richest part of the population benefits to the detriment of the poorest and weakest parts (Kelsall, 2002, p.213). As Kelsall argues, ‘there is reason to think that the old bureaucratic-centralist pattern of politics is being replaced by an increasingly patrimonial system’, where it is increasingly difficult for ordinary citizens to become involved in the policy making (Kelsall, 2002, p.608). Especially in rural areas, political participation is low, and often citizens’ claims are completely dismissed and do not reach the district and national level (Kelsall, 2002, also Pinkney, 2005, pp.110 and 112).

While the effects of liberalization on agriculture have been widely analyzed by different scholars, it is difficult to find in them an account of how the relationship between the farmers and the state has evolved since the mid-1980s. Given the increase in inequality and class differentiation, conflicts and distrust grew within society itself, and this can be seen in the diffidence manifested by farmers towards extension officers, as will be explained in detail in chapter 6. Perhaps, while the analyses of Nyerere’s period suggested that farmers were showing indifference and trying to retain their autonomy from a state that was imposing its presence, in more recent times, farmers’ indifference is more characterised by discontent and disappointment towards a state that had failed to implement effective agricultural policies to improve the agricultural sector and their livelihoods. Chapter 6 and 7 will analyse in depth the reasons behind this discontent and how it is manifested. In general, in Tanzania, discontent usually translates in low participation to politics and distrust in public officials at district and central level. According to Kelsall, the difficulties in imposing their will on district leaders and to organize in groups is mostly due to people’s lack of time due to the changes as a consequence of

liberalisation. Hence, Kelsall claims that the main factors affecting participation are: (1) the process of de-agrarianisation that pushes people to look for other sources of income; (2) scarce information; and (3) the presence of 'fragmented economic identities', or better the presence of heterogeneous social identities that characterises rural communities in Tanzania (Kelsall, 2004, p.70). With this last claim, Kelsall refers to a supposed absence of a tradition of cooperation, which, according to this scholar, limits people's ability to act and express disagreement towards government's action (ibid., 2004, pp.70-71). The validity of this claim will be analysed in depth with reference to the results of the empirical data collected for this research and exposed in the following chapters.

Another aspect worth mentioning and part of the globalisation process is the increasing presence of international organisations that operate in different parts of the country and that has been regarded by the international community as a positive opportunity for the affirmation of the democratic process. The Tanzanian government is tied by many international and national initiatives²³ stressing the importance of good governance and attempting to fight corruption and to increase efficiency (Kelsall, 2002). Nonetheless, these agreements increased Tanzanian dependency on external aid and pushed national policy to follow a set of directions coming from foreign donors, limiting the sovereignty of the state and complicating even further its relationship with society. By signing a whole raft of economic agreements with different donors, the Tanzanian government confirms its will to promote the democratisation process in the country; but on the other side it compromises on its ability to pursue more autonomous policies, clearly setting the

²³ For example, the reform of the civil service, the Public Sector Reform Programme - PSRP, the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility - PRGF, the Programmatic Structural Adjustment Credit - PSAC-I and the Local Government Reform Programme -LGRP.

path of the country towards full economic liberalisation (Shivji, 2006, p.11). Besides this, the state's ability in coordinating these projects and enforcing the laws in a climate of general increased bureaucracy is debatable (Kelsall, 2002; Pinkney, 2005, p.109). Also, it is debatable whether the form of capitalism pursued by the state under the direction and influence of foreign donors is legitimate and democratic and what effects this has on the relationship between the state and its citizens (Pinkney, 2005, p.115). This will be analysed in detail in chapter 6, where it will be noted that most of the agricultural reforms implemented by the Tanzanian state are financially supported by different international organisations.

The liberalisation process has not only facilitated the influences of international organisations via cooperation with the state, but has also opened opportunities for the expansion of foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the country (Pinkney, 2005, p.110). The number of NGOs has grown considerably over the years, reaching more than 2700 NGOs in 2000 (URT, 2000c). Nevertheless, while their presence has improved the provision of basic services in rural and isolated areas of the country, the most influential and largest NGOs are mainly sponsored by foreign countries, to which they are accountable. Therefore, at times their projects reflect Western logic and ideals more than addressing the real needs of Tanzanian population. For example,

‘donors are more sympathetic to tourists who want to photograph wild animals than to peasants who want to eat them, and to 'elitist' groups which want to strengthen women's rights rather than to village communities that might take a more traditional view’ (Pinkney, 2005, pp.112-113).

As a result, the voice of the people is often unheard, and the presence of foreign-sponsored NGOs maintains Tanzanian dependency to foreign influences, weakening the autonomy of the state, as people tend to rely on these organisms for the provision of basic services instead of addressing their requests to the central state authority, as we will see in more detail in chapter 7.

As mentioned previously, the gap left by the state in providing certain public services has been increasingly covered by international and local non-governmental organisations – a phenomenon referred to by many scholars as ‘transnational governmentality’ as explained in the previous chapter – and communities are increasingly looking at them as the first point of reference for their basic needs. This has not only created a certain aid-dependency but also amplified the distance between the society and the state. For instance, in one of the villages interviewed, the village of Kwala, Kibaha district, many people expressed concern about the cessation of the activities of the USA NGO ‘Newton-Tanzania Collaborative’. This was the only NGO concerned with a wide range of community development projects in this particular village during 2004-2012.²⁴ A local council member admitted he was ‘worried for the absence of projects and International NGOs, where could people ask for their needs and express their concern? Who would help the village to develop?’ (E.M, Kwala, 2012). Similar concerns were expressed by the secondary school headmaster, worried about the future of the library, the computer lessons and the maintenance of the rain water harvesting system. Furthermore, as we will see in the following chapters, most of the villagers interviewed believed that it was useless

²⁴ The organisation Newton-Tanzania Collaborative decided to end its activities in 2012, because of the lack of funds and the difficulties to officially register their activities at national level. Many authors wrote on the difficulties for NGOs to register and the high control and limits they face from the Tanzanian state (i.e. Mushi, 2001).

to ask for the help of the government to sustain these projects and seemed more inclined to rely on international organisations.

What is more, often members of these organisations were asked to supervise public meetings, bring suggestions on the implementation of village governmental sponsored projects, and even keep an eye on the public funds donated for specific projects. In a way, several episodes witnessed during the empirical fieldwork point to the conclusion that villagers seem to trust foreigners more than their local administrators. Corruption is expected and in some ways justified; often it is even ‘covered’ by other members of society. This is probably why villagers preferred to delegate watchdog responsibilities to foreigners rather than dealing with them themselves (and risking conflicts within the community).

For instance, in 2013, in the village of Kwala, the government had promised to assist with the building of a ‘teachers’ compound’ at the secondary school. In order for the state to support the project, the school had to raise a determined amount of money to initiate the project. For this objective, a council was created in the school, with representatives from the secondary school, the primary school and the village council. The money to start the project was publicly raised from private donations of parents, teachers and villagers in 2013. The council, and in particular the secondary school representatives, asked Luca Scarpa, the director of Newton-Tanzania Collaborative (the NGO operating in the village at the time) to help supervise the project as they were afraid that the money raised would have not been used in an efficient way. The NGO hence helped writing a contract with the builders, buying the materials and devolving some responsibilities to the various members of the council, including two village council members that were supposed to count the

number of bricks the builder was making and the number of cement sacks used and remaining every day. Apparently things were proceeding well: the builders were building bricks, and the supervisors were not reporting any anomalies. But when eventually the money was over and the builders stopped working because there was no more cement available, the number of bricks was much lower than what it should have been and did not even suffice to build the foundations of the building. Clearly something was going wrong, someone had either stolen the cement bags or the bricks, and the responsibilities could only be of the builders and/or the two supervisors, who denied any involvement and started blaming each other. The council, unwilling to press any charges against the people responsible for the loss and with the intention to continue with the project as if nothing had happened, suggested Newton Tanzania Collaborative to offer the money missing to finish the initial works and hide a possible public scandal. An attitude and a request that made the organisation doubt several of the members of the council. Eventually, the organisation accepted to offer the missing money, but on the condition that a declaration of what had happened would be made public, and the members of the council changed. The council refused categorically to do so, afraid to expose the members responsible to the public opinion, and to lose the trust of the villagers that had donated the money for the project. The council preferred to cover the people responsible for the loss rather than to press charges against them. A compromise was finally reached when the people responsible were asked by the council to reimburse the cement they had stolen. At the time of writing, neither the money nor the cement had been returned, nobody talked about the teachers' compound anymore, the bricks had been used to build a dormitory for the girls of the school, and the people

responsible for stealing the cement (and probably reselling it) still enjoyed the same positions in the public council.

Trying to make sense of this and similar episodes, it is interesting to note how villagers react to episodes of corruption. While corruption is recognised as an obstacle to the successful implementation of projects (see for instance villagers' lamenting episodes of corruption during elections), and it is fought by villagers by delegating responsibilities to foreigners, in Becker's words, 'the tolerance for local-level corruption suggests that it is fairly widespread', and may 'serve as a reminder of the entrenched mistrust of villagers against higher officials' (Becker, 2009, p.94). Besides, corruption is also sometimes used by local politicians to 'defend the village against party-government interference and to augment their personal power' (Forrest, 1988, p.430). Furthermore, it can be argued that because of historical reasons - colonialism first and the influence of other actors in internal policy making in the post-colonial era - the vision of the state and its role has never been clear, and the misuse of power from government officials and the widespread corruption could be due to ignorance rather than to selfishness (Becker, 2009). On a similar note, Costello affirms that the social role of the state was only partly understood by post-colonial administrators, and the distribution of authority was contested (1996, p.143). Chapter 6 will analyse in depth this aspect and the relationship between state and rural society in Tanzania.

To summarise this section, it can be argued that the process of liberalization, the change to a multiparty system and the increased presence of international organisations and NGOs resulted in the state losing power over society and therefore changed the image that the citizens have of the state. For instance, the progressive

withdrawal of the state from the economic and social spheres and the entrance of new actors in the scene may have blurred the image of the state in the society and complicated the already difficult relationship between the two, increasing the perception of the state as a separate entity. While scholars such as Cooksey debate the extent to which the process of liberalisation has been fulfilled in Tanzania, implying that the state still has a strong hold over the productive processes, it cannot be denied that the country's move towards a more democratic and liberalised political economy (under the banner of 'good governance') has been remarkable since the mid-1980s, thanks also to a sustained foreign aid assistance (Harrison et al., 2009). As a matter of fact, the retreat of state control from the social sector can easily be observed by looking at the health and education public services, that starting from the mid 1980s, saw a considerable cut in public expenditure. For instance, while education at all levels was free during Nyerere, tuition fees - even in primary schools - were re-introduced in 1984 for secondary schools and gradually for primary schools. Fees have been again removed, only in primary school, in 2001, although students are still asked for 'contributions' for toilets, school materials and so on. In short, there are no doubts that the Tanzanian state is following the route to liberalisation, although state control remains strong in some sectors, for example in those requiring land. As will be explained further on, most of the land officially belongs to the President of Tanzania, hence private companies have to go through long bureaucratic processes in order to obtain land and invest in the country. Moreover, the social and economic impact of the liberal market in some remote areas for agricultural producers also needs to be assessed.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the case study of this research, and highlighted the origins of the controversial relationship between the Tanzanian state and farmers.

The reading of the Tanzanian state provided by Snyder (2008), Becker (2009) and Costello (1996) confirms what has been said in chapter 3: at a local level, the public and the local spheres are confused: local state officials use public resources for their own benefits and to increase their public consent, and episodes of clientelism are frequent. This has negative effects on the effectiveness of the reforms, and episodes of mismanagement of public funds have been registered in several occasions in the past (see example of cooperatives provided earlier in this chapter).

The origins of the disengagement between the higher level of the state and rural society are to be found in the historical development of the country. For instance, in the years following independence, Nyerere tried to formalise state institutions by extending state control over rural areas. In particular, the Tanzanian government appointed officials to directly control certain sectors, for instance the agricultural one through the figure of the extension officer, but the difficulties to involve rural society into an effective collaboration with the state were already evident (Bernstein, 1981; Coulson, 1982; William, D.V., 1982; Sundet, 1994; Spalding, 1996; Scott, 1998; Chazan et al., 1999; Kelsall, 2002; Heald, 2005; Pinkney, 2005).

While the charismatic figure of Nyrere is central in Tanzanian history, as his achievements on the social sphere have been remarkable and he has promoted unity and stability, this chapter explained how the expansion of bureaucracy and control has had negative effects on the relationship between the state and society. In fact, the expansion of bureaucracy and control set an image of the state as above society, and

delineated a top-down approach that was not well accepted by rural communities seeking to keep their autonomy.

In particular, a paternalistic approach and a general distrust towards farmers pushed the Tanzanian state to make villagization compulsory in 1973. This policy had several negative effects on farmers and on the agricultural sector as indicated by many scholars (Sumra, 1979; Temu, 1979; Hyden, 1980; Coulson, 1982; Harriss, 1982; Raikes, 1982; Olorunsola, 1988; Ellis, 1988; Yeager, 1989; Bryceson, 1993; Scott, 1998; Sijm, 1997; Ibrawoh and Dibua, 2003). Furthermore, this chapter suggested that the villagization policy complicated the relationship between the state and rural communities, and contributed at creating an ‘alienated, sceptical, demoralised and uncooperative peasantry’ (Scott, 1998, p.237). Hence, the process of disengagement between state and society finds its origin in the years following independence, and in particular as a consequence of the policies of the early 1970s.

Nevertheless, villagization has only been one of the diverse agricultural policies implemented by the Tanzanian state, and, as it will be explained in the following chapters (in particular chapter 6), is certainly not the only one that has contributed to complicating the relationship between the state and the farmers. The wave of liberalisation in the 1980s with the election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as President opened the doors to a new phase, which, as it was noted, did not improve conditions in farming households (Sijm, 1997; Meertens, 2000; Ponte, 2000; Skarstein, 2005; Mashindano and Kaino, 2009; Cooksey, 2011). The increasing presence of NGOs and international organisations in the country as a consequence of liberalisation has had different effects: on one side it is certainly having a positive impact in the lives of many people, while on the other side it influences state’s policies and it is creating dependency, as it will be explained in more detail in chapter 6 and 7 (Pinkney, 2005;

Kelsall, 2002). In conclusion, it can be said that while it was expected that the processes of liberalisation, democratisation and expansion of civil society would foster people's participation in politics, this has not been so in Tanzania. Moreover, these processes did not contribute to ease the controversial relationship between the farmers and the state, and actually may have made this even more complex.

The next chapter will introduce the results of the empirical research in regards to the food security condition of the households interviewed in two regions of Tanzania: Coast and Kilimanjaro. By providing details about the farming households interviewed, the next chapter will also analyse the issues faced by farmers and explain the context in which agricultural policies are implemented.

Chapter 5 - Food security and agriculture in contemporary Tanzania

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter has introduced the case study of this research, offering an historical reading of the evolution of the state-society relationship in rural areas of Tanzania. As a key issue in the research question, this chapter will look deeper into the problem of food insecurity in Tanzania, by providing an insight into food consumed, patterns and habits of farming families in the light of the empirical results collected through interviews in 125 households in Coast and Kilimanjaro regions. Through an analysis of the households interviewed and their declarations on food consumed and the problems that farmers face in the countryside this chapter will identify and describe how insecurity is perceived. While the food security debate is usually centred on statistical data (for instance the MDG reports), this research, and this chapter in particular, will argue that numbers do not provide a clear enough picture on the matter, and in particular statistical data tell us very little about who the food insecure are, their feelings and perceptions, their coping strategies and the reasons behind this insecurity. Moreover, often the data gathering is so controversial that it gives a distorted understanding of the issue, posing doubts on its reliability (for instance see the example provided in chapter 6 on how the Tanzanian government identifies the food insecure households). As established in Chapter 2, food security is not only about calories intake or frequency of food consumption. People's understanding and perception of their condition is also important. As we will see, even when three meals per day are consumed there is often an absence of a

diversified food intake and therefore no guarantee that the household's dietary needs will be satisfied.

This chapter presents the first part of the results of the data collected through the interviews with the farming households, letting the voices of the people vulnerable to food insecurity emerge and tell their stories. These accounts confirm the importance of a qualitative approach and allow us to see what lies behind farming households and their struggle towards food security in rural Tanzania. In particular, the data gathered will reveal some details about the farming communities interviewed, the differentiation and interactions between households and their food and eating habits and patterns. These details will help us understand farmers' perceptions on food security in perspective and in relation to the environment where they live. As it will be noted, there are differences in farmers' feeling of insecurity according to the connections they have with the market and in relation to the wealth of neighbouring households. This confirms the idea that food security as a subjective perception is linked to the environment surrounding the household and to its economic condition, as underlined in particular by authors such as Sen (1981), and Devereux and Maxwell (2001). This is the reason why an asset analysis is introduced and will guide us in the analysis of the interviews (assets being the best estimate of households' wealth in situations where fixed salaries are unusual).

Finally, this chapter will present the reasons why farmers feel that they are not able to become food secure. The differences between the two regions where interviews have taken place are mostly due to cultural and geographical reasons, but nonetheless the attitudes of the people interviewed about their struggles towards food security share a common concern and feeling of dissatisfaction with politics and state action, as it will be elaborated in chapter 6.

5.2. Methodology

The complexity of the research question (*How has the relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence?*) requires an approach that puts together literatures from different disciplinary spheres. Therefore, this study makes use of several concepts that are widely deployed – food security, state-society relations -, but tries to do so by creating a connection between them and by applying this approach to a specific case, the one of Tanzania.

A qualitative approach has been judged to be the most appropriate in a study that mainly brings an empirical contribution to the literature on food security and state-society relationships and wishes to analyse subjective perceptions of farmers on the matters. In particular, 8 villages have been surveyed, where 223 interviews were collected, of which 88 to farmers in Coast region (around the village of Kwala, in Kibaha district) and 37 to farmers in Kilimanjaro region (around the village of Usangi, Mwanga district). A further 55 teenagers belonging to farming households were interviewed and observed as part of an agricultural project run in the secondary school of the village of Kwala (Coast region) to analyse approaches to the agricultural sector and group work by younger generations. 43 between representatives of agribusiness, NGOs and politicians at local, district and national level have also been interviewed.

Tanzania has a large variety of climatic areas. The regions where the interviews were conducted were chosen by taking into consideration their specific climatic characteristics, which they share with other areas of the country. The Kibaha district in Coast region, despite being in proximity of the coast, is arid with generally high

temperatures, condition shared also by other regions in the centre and in the south of the country. The Mwanga district in Kilimanjaro is, on the other side and similarly to other regions in the north of the country, characterised by more moderate temperatures and higher rainfall. By analysing two areas with different characteristics, the intention was to test how determinant were geographical and cultural conditions on farmers' answers. In fact, these two areas are also different in terms of culture and tribal composition. In Kibaha district, the main tribe is the Zaramo, mainly of Muslim religion, while in Mwanga district the majority of the population identifies itself in the Pare tribe, mainly Christian. The two areas were also chosen for their reputation among state officials (see section 6.6 for more details): the Zaramo people have an unfortunate reputation of being unproductive, while on the contrary the Chagga and the Pare tribes that live in the North of the country are seen as more active and entrepreneurial.

A general outlook of the areas surveyed, and the characteristics of the households' conditions in these areas, is presented in tables 1 and 2 in section 5.4 of this chapter. More in details, tables 3 and 4 will classify the farmers interviewed into three groups, in order to present the socio-economic aspects of the sample interviewed and to provide the contextual background in which the research is located. These tables provide several details of the areas, the culture and the socio-economic condition of the communities interviewed.

The sample chosen is representative of the majority of farmers in Tanzania: small scale (generally they do not cultivate more than two acres of land), living in rural villages and sharing similar economical constraints (distance from the market, lack of storage facilities and so on - see section 5.6 for more details). The farmers interviewed were selected in different ways: In some circumstances (for example in

the village of Mahundi in Coast region) the village chairperson offered to invite the farmers to be interviewed. He chose a representative sample of farmers: according to their wealth, the acre of land under cultivation and the average productivity. But most of the time the farmers were chosen by myself: in the evening I would walk around in the village and visit houses, asking people if I could interview them, while during the day I would visit the farms nearby the villages and ask the farmers that I met on the way to be interviewed. This allowed for the sample to be highly variegated. When possible, the sample includes both male and female farmers. The higher presence of male farmers amongst the interviewees is not intentional, and is the result of a series of factors: an higher eagerness of male farmers to be interviewed, a tendency to see males as head of the household and of the farm (and therefore the 'natural' referent to be interviewed), and, in some occasions, a higher involvement of the males in farming activities (whereas women would help in the farm but also run house duties and other economic activities in the village such as petty business and catering).

The politicians were chosen according to the relevance of their role for the scope of the study. Setting interviews with national level politicians has not been easy. It often required several un-answered emails, phone calls, physical visits to the ministries, filling of documents and missed appointments. In some cases, the politicians interviewed have not given consent to record and use the interviews in this thesis. Hence, while their answers have still shaped my understanding on the subject, they neither appear nor have been reported in the analysis. Interviews to district and local politicians and officials have been easier. Expecially at local level, politicians were easily reachable and willing to talk to me and to share their opinion.

My knowledge of the language spoken in the area and the fact that most farmers already knew me because of my previous experience as a teacher in the local secondary school of Kwala –one of the villages interviewed in Kibaha district-, made it easier to approach and to be welcomed by people. Furthermore, I was accompanied by a senior teacher –named Athumani Msangi- which had been working in the secondary school of the village for several years and was widely known and respected amongst the community members. Athumani also accompanied and helped me to conduct and translate the interviews in Mwanga district, in Kilimanjaro region. Thanks to the fact that he belongs to this area, many people knew him and were willing to talk to us here too.

The results of the interviews are supported, interpreted and explained thanks to almost two years of direct living experience in these villages. The living experience has been fundamental in enabling me to approach, communicate, and gain the trust of the communities interviewed, and therefore more honest declarations from the part of the interviewees and a better ability to analyse the interviews. Inevitably, this opens the questions of bias in the analysis, as I was emotionally attached to the communities and the place where I was living and I held the interviews, and I knew many of the farmers interviewed. Nevertheless, I tried to be as objective as possible, and to approach farmers without any expectation or pre-concepted hypothesis. My research has been, especially during the first year, a learning process in evolution, and with time more issues would attract my attention. It is not therefore surprising that I decided to conduct the interviews in Kilimanjaro region only after having surveyed Coast region: That was the time when I realised how deep the stereotypes on farmers were, and I was curious and eager to discover if there was some truth to them. Other topics, connected to the main research question, also came into analysis

and evolved only while I was conducting the interviews: such was for example the question on farmers-pastoralists conflict and the issue of cooperative associations.

The farmers were asked 14 semi-structured questions concerning:

- Family size
- Farm size
- Members of the family to farm
- Crops cultivated
- Diet patterns
- Cooking habits
- Food being purchased
- Satisfaction with food consumed
- Problems of farming
- Help received from the state
- Opinion on the current state agricultural policy
- Opinion on the extension service
- Collaboration with other farmers
- Plans for the future

To complement the research finding, a number of 43 officials and members of international organizations were also interviewed, in the English language. They were asked several questions, according to their level of expertise and role within the state. Mostly, the questions rotated around the following:

- Role and objectives of their organizations/branch of the state were they are employed
- Opinions on problems of agriculture and of farming households in rural areas

- What their organization/state department does to address these problems
- Opinions on differences between farming communities in different areas of the country
- Attitude of farmers towards state's projects
- Channels used to communicate with rural communities
- Opinion on best practices/policies to improve food security and nutrition in rural areas
- State collaboration with private sector and international organizations

The large amount of data gathered is the result of interviews that often lasted a day, and where words were accompanied by visits to houses and farms, cooking and sharing of meals, meeting all members of the households. These visits allowed me to gain a deep understanding of the habits and conditions of the households interviewed, and to analyse the information gathered in relation to their living conditions. Thus this study is the result of extensive research, life experience and academic reflections, which allowed me to reflect on the results of the interviews in relation to the theoretical literature on the topic.

Statistical data has also been used and discussed in light of the results coming from the interviews. The arguments of this study are supported by empirical data, theoretical research and observation of facts and events in the areas interviewed during 2010-2014.

The farmers interviewed have been anonymised, in order to protect them from being identified by governmental officials. A comprehensive list of interviewees, with date and location is provided in appendix 2 and 3.

5.3. The measurement of food security

In chapter 2 various approaches and definitions of the term food security were presented. Food security is generally being defined as the situation that exists when ‘all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life and are not an undue risk of losing such access’ (FAO, 2006). However, besides all the definition of the term, how do we measure food security in practice? The need to find an easy and quick method to measure food-related problems has led to the present use of quantitative data based on caloric intake of food per capita, the level of undernourishment and local food availability and consumption. These assessments, widely used and approved by international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Bank, are the determinant of most policy decisions both at national and international level. For example, the *National Nutrition Strategy*, the *Guideline for Councils for the preparation of Plan and Budget for Nutrition* (both written by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of Tanzania, 2010 and 2012) and the *Institutional Analysis of Nutrition in Tanzania* (Leach and Kilama, 2009) are completely based on statistical data of physical malnutrition, such as child stunting and wasting.

Hence, for a researcher interested in mapping food security in Tanzania, it would be very easy to find indicators on the level of undernourishment, food production, malnourishment in children and so on. For instance, the World Bank underlines that the percentage of undernourished people in Tanzania is equal to the 38.8% of the total population, and its absolute number has been on the rise since 2007 (World Bank indicators, 2014). This data is calculated merely based on dietary energy consumption (kcal per person) and does not tell anything about the kind of food

consumed, and the reasons behind malnourishment. Likewise, the FAO also talks about ‘the depth of the food deficit’ based on the availability of kcal per person, being calculated as 274 kcal per person in Tanzania (FAOSTAT, 2012). While in theory it is recognized that poverty and hunger are strictly related, and food security is not only about availability but also about distribution and the ability to purchase the food available, by describing the problem through the use of this data (that links malnutrition to food production per capita), the risk is to discard the complexity of the problem of hunger and provide only a superficial understanding of food insecurity.

Other indicators widely used to assess food insecurity are child stunting (height for age), wasting (weight for height) and underweight (weight for age). These data are considered to be particularly important, and they are generally recognised to be more reliable than adults’ undernourishment and malnourishment indicators, because the majority of the children born in a clinic get their weight and height measured. Furthermore, such indicators also provide an insight into malnourishment in pregnant women since undernourishment in children starts before the child is born, during pregnancy²⁵ (DeRose et al., 1998, pp. 37-39; TDHS, 2010). In Tanzania, the World Bank calculates stunting at 34.8%, underweight at 13.6% and wasting at 6.6% for children aged 0-5 (World Bank Indicators, 2015). Malnutrition in children is officially recognised to be a problem, with the Tanzanian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare admitting that malnutrition is directly or indirectly associated with more than 50% of child deaths, and that this is a top priority in government policy (TDHS, 2010, p.49). Alongside malnutrition exists data on food nutrient deficiency

²⁵ According to the TDHS there is a strong connection between the condition of women in the society and children food related issues. 85% of women are not involved in decisions concerning their own healthcare, and 93% have little or no say on household’s expenses, including food (TDHS, 2010).

disorders. The World Bank calculates that about 60% of children under 5 years old are anaemic (World Bank Indicators, 2015). Vitamin A, zinc, iron and iodine deficiency disorders are very high in Tanzania according to the Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) (2010), and the Ministry of Wealth and Social Welfare (2011), because of a lack of food diversification. In fact, The World Food Programme estimates that 70% of all energy is obtained from staples such as cereals, roots or tubers (WFP, 2013, p.16).²⁶

However useful, these data do not give us any details on how farming households are affected by food insecurity, what are their perceptions, how they distribute the food in the household, why they feel insecure and what their coping strategies are. The qualitative approach used in this study looks at these aspects in order to understand the issues farming households in the areas surveyed face every day. As explained in the introduction, a contextualised approach and a deeper understanding of food security through the voices of the people affected could lead to more effective policies and to actively involve the communities in the decision making. It could also explain the dynamics of power behind food insecurity, and the coping strategies chosen by farming households. As explained in chapter 1, the focus is on farming households for the reason that small-scale farmers represent the great majority of the population in Tanzania (Salami, Kamara, Brixiova, 2010, pp.12-13). Moreover, despite being food producers, farming households are the most affected by food insecurity, as underlined by the results of a survey ran from 2008 to 2011 by the World Food Programme (WFP, 2013). According to this WFP study, rural households are more prone to food insecurity than urban ones, and the more farming households depend on their own produce, the greater the vulnerability to food

²⁶ In *poor dietary intake* households this ratio reaches the 80% (WFP, 2013, p. 16).

insecurity. In fact, the highest incidence of food insecurity was found in the agriculture-based livelihood households, while households where the major economic activity was not related to agriculture were least likely to experience food insecurity. Furthermore, agricultural households are also the ones where the food expenditure share is the highest, reaching more than 75% of their total income, and the diversification of food consumption is lower (ibid., 2013, pp.26, 31-35).

Being farmers and feeling at the same time insecure and/or unable to fully provide for the family creates a complex social and, as we will see in the next chapter, political scenario, leading to anger or resignation depending on the circumstances. Such a scenario affects society on different levels, as it complicates the relationships between farmers and within households, and has repercussions on the individual farmers' personal self-esteem, eroding their confidence to change their condition. This will be better analysed in the next two chapters, where we will have a deeper look into farmers' political engagement and their responses to food insecurity. In this chapter, the following sections will try to contextualise the food debate and bring farmers' perceptions to the fore by analysing the results of the interviews conducted with 125 farming households (inhabited by a total of 584 people) in eight rural villages in Tanzania. The villages surveyed in the Coast region, around the village of Kwala, Kibaha District, are: Kwala, Mperamumbi, Msua, Dutumi, Mongomole and Mwembengozi. In Kilimanjaro region the villages surveyed around the area of Usangi, Mwanga district are: Kigare and Makandeni. Farmers from different social groups were interviewed around the villages and in the fields nearby. The analysis of food security that will emerge will compare the objective condition of food security (in line with the FAO definition and aspects of sustainability) and the subjective

perceptions of the people interviewed. In order to do so, the next section will first contextualise the socio-economic conditions of the households interviewed.

5.4. Household assets analysis

The villages surveyed for this study are mostly inhabited by farmers. However, as was mentioned in chapter 2, not all farmers are the same, and the villages are characterised by a certain degree of social differentiation. Inequality is not striking visible in these villages, but it is there and needs to be accounted for because it has an impact on how farmers perceive their food and poverty condition, and on how farmers replied to the questions. There are two major claims made in this section: first, that there is a strong connection between poverty and food security, as explained by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF, 2007) and Amartya Sen (1981, see chapter 2). Second, that the subjective dimension of food security is conditioned by how the person interviewed relates itself to other members of society.

Hence, to assess and measure food security in the villages surveyed, this section starts with an assets analysis (as a measure of the household's wealth), a table which will indicate the criteria used to classify the households interviewed according to the wealth owned. This classification will allow us to make some considerations around the connection between poverty and food security. For instance, a farming household may face food insecurity because of a bad harvest. It may or may not have different options: if it owns some assets it could decide to sell part of them to face a temporary food insecurity period, with the optimism that the next harvest will be better. If it does not have any assets it may reduce the amount of food consumed in the household, withdraw the children from school to save on tuition fees, sell the land

and so on. Its insecurity will probably be higher if it does not have any assets and it is forced to give away an important part of its assets such as the land. Such hypothetical scenario could change the household's livelihood greatly, trapping it in a condition of poverty and insecurity from which it is difficult to recover.

The asset analysis presented in the tables below is more reliable than income-related indicators because the majority of people in rural areas depend on agriculture and informal exchanges for their livelihoods and do not have a constant income. This is why international organisations such as the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) have employed this methodology to analyse agro-pastoral communities in north Tanzania (2007). Following the *Rural Appraisal methodology* model used by the UNCDF (2007, pp.61-66), the assets are grouped in four categories according to the nature of the capital available/owned: social, financial, physical and natural. The elaboration of these tables has been possible thanks to details coming from the interviews and my personal observation of the communities where the interviews have taken place. Given the differences found in the two different regions interviewed (Coast and Kilimanjaro), two different asset analysis are provided. The differences between the two regions are further explained later on in this section. Besides the differences in the two regions, it needs to be noted that this classification does not mean that all the households in a determined region have the same characteristics, but it provides a general outlook of the average household and the assets available in each region. Hence, following the criteria of the tables below, the households interviewed will then be classified in poor and very poor, resilient and wealthy (see table 3 and 4). The connection between their socio-economic status and food security will then be analysed.

Table 1. Households Asset analysis (Coast Region)

Social Capital	<p>Extended large families.</p> <p>Good integration between different communities and good social values (mutual cooperation). Regular village meetings are held. In some of the villages there are some microfinance service initiatives voluntarily organized by various members of the community. In these initiatives a common fund is saved and managed in order to help the members in difficult situation throughout the year.</p> <p>Education levels are very low among household members. The majority may have finished Primary School, but the rate of absentees in school is very high.</p> <p>Children most often go to the farm or seek other forms of income to help the family.</p>
Financial Capital	<p>No capacity to save.</p> <p>Some livestock consist in poultries and more rarely goats. No jewellery, except in some pastoralist tribes such as Maasai and Barbaig, where body ornaments of low value and decoration are considered important.</p> <p>Some off-farm employment is often sought. These include: for women activities such as cooking and selling cooked food in the village, sewing, fetching water for others (especially if the water resources are far), and digging other people's farms. Children's off farm jobs include working as house-girls (or house-boys) for other families, which consist in looking after smaller children, cooking and cleaning the house of wealthier families (such as teachers or doctors). Other off-farm jobs typically covered by men include driving people from the villages to the main road (town of Chalinze and Vigwaza) by using motorbikes, working as barbers, brewers, charcoal cutters/makers or shop owners.</p>

Physical Capital	<p>Irrigation system is non-existent.</p> <p>No use of chemical fertilizers (or very rare) and/or improved seeds.</p> <p>Some cattle manure available locally.</p> <p>No mechanization of agriculture. All the work is hand- driven. This is due to lack of capital to invest into agriculture.</p> <p>No electricity, no piped water, no telephone lines, no gas pipes, increasing use of mobile phones charged through local shops that have electricity.</p> <p>No road infrastructures. Most of the villages are accessed from dirt sandy roads with motorcycles or bicycles. International companies have not as yet shown any interest in investing or buying land in this area.</p>
Natural Capital	<p>Land: households hold small parcels of arid to semi-arid land, mainly acquired through inheritance.</p> <p>Water is scarce, especially during the months May-October.</p> <p>Lack of water: most of the land is characterized by soil erosion. Soil is mostly sandy, no rocks or clay to retain water underneath the land. In some areas water well systems have revealed to be ineffective as a way to get water, therefore most of the water is collected from canals or river nearby.</p> <p>Grazing areas for cattle is extended.</p> <p>Trees are increasingly cut to produce charcoal.</p>

Table 2. Households Asset analysis (Kilimanjaro Region)

Social Capital	<p>Mostly elders, women and children. Good sense of community. Village meetings held regularly and every 10 households elect a 'leader' (decided democratically).</p> <p>Microfinance initiatives common within groups of women from the same ethnic or religious group. Education levels are higher compared to other parts of Tanzania, with most of the children getting a Secondary School education.</p>
Financial Capital	<p>No or little capacity for savings. The great majority of households are supported by extended family members that work in nearby cities/towns. The majority of</p>

	households have cows (kept inside the house and fed) for cultural and traditional reasons. Owning chickens is also common. Owning a car is rare. Very few households rely on agriculture to meet their needs, while the majority seek other forms of employment, in particular collecting and selling grasses to feed the cows, collecting and selling firewood. Other common jobs are builders, driver, petty business services etc.
Physical Capital	Irrigation in agriculture has proven difficult; despite this water is available at the household level. No use of chemical fertilizer, cattle manure is commonly used. Some pesticide used especially for coffee and banana plants (more rare). No mechanisation in agriculture, due to lack of capital and to logistical difficulties (many villages are located in the slopes of the mountains). Electricity is getting more common thanks to a recent government plan to increase the diffusion of electrical cables in the area. Piped water is available to most households. Poor road infrastructure, the villages are accessed through dirt roads by bus, bicycles and motorbikes. Land acquisition in this area is extremely difficult, as land is passed on using a hereditary system, and it is not culturally acceptable to sell land to foreigners.
Natural Capital	Land: every household has a piece of land, acquired mainly through inheritance, often, however, the piece of land is very small. Water is available, but the water streams are under stress as water usage in the villages has increased over the years. Soil erosion is also common because of deforestation (the main source of energy is firewood). The soil has lost fertility over the years, as it is used intensively by generations. Rains are scarce and unreliable. Maize cultivation is therefore getting harder and unsuccessful.

5.4.1. Households classification in the two regions interviewed

As a general preamble, we can say that the majority of the people interviewed can be defined as asset-poor (or ‘entitlement-poor’) small scale farmers (around or less than

two hectares cultivated), who farm but are often net purchasers of food. In fact, most households lack the resources either to produce enough food to consume or to generate enough income to satisfy their food requirements. However, it is interesting to note that social differentiation occurs and affects the households' vulnerability to food insecurity. To assess this, the households have been grouped according to their possession of capital as compared to the general tables provided in the tables above. Beside providing an indication of households' vulnerability to food insecurity, this classification also offers a detailed description of the sample interviewed. Generally, we find that group 2 households (resilient) are often vulnerable to food insecurity while group 3 (poor or very poor) are highly vulnerable (or currently food insecure). The majority of the wealthier households interviewed (group 1) can be generally considered food secure, but can still experience seasonal food insecurity. However, as we will see with some examples from the interviews, while there is a clear connection between possession of entitlements and food security, the connection between the subjective perceptions of food security and the possession of entitlements is not always so straightforward. As a consequence, the connection between an objective condition of food security and personal perceptions may vary. The classification is based on objective observations (such as house condition) and declarations from the participants interviewed.

Following these criteria, the households have been classified into 13 wealthy households (Group 1), 69 poor but resilient households (Group 2) and 43 poor and very poor households (Group 3). The classification for Coast region will be presented and explained first.

Table 3. Classification for Coast region

Assets	Group 1 (wealthy)	Group 2 (poor but resilient)	Group 3 (poor and very poor)
House	Brick walls, iron roof, electricity, water tap close to the house	Sometimes brick or Mud walls (sometimes covered with plaster), iron roof	Mud house walls, thatch roof
Land owned	10-15 acres or more	2-10 acres	Less than 2 acres – with some exceptions (sometimes land owned is not a clear indication of wealth, especially when the family has the capability to cultivate only parts of it).
Education	Most have Secondary Education or higher	Most have standard 7 education (primary school)	Some primary education or never been to school
Other assets	Sewing machine, refrigerator, bicycles, motorbike, tractor, TV	Sewing machine, Bicycle, radio	Little or no assets
Other activities	May own shops, bars, trading, milling, transport services	Small businesses, beer brewing, charcoal production, food trading and catering	No other activities, sometimes they farm for other people
Number of households	11	43	34

The majority of the households interviewed in Coast region has a limited availability of capital, which makes them vulnerable to food insecurity, especially during pre-harvest seasons. The results of the research suggest that there is a close connection between the wealth of the household and its food security condition. Only eleven of the households interviewed, the ones categorized as wealthy, can be considered food secure throughout all year. They reported consuming three meals per day, and their diet is diversified, with consumption of rice, meat and fruit and vegetables. The households classified as poor but resilient are the households that reported consuming between two to three meals per day, and their diet is mostly characterised by the consumption of ugali, amaranth and beans. There is clearly a lack of diversification in their diet, which points to a poor food security and a high vulnerability to food insecurity in the pre-harvest periods. The last group, the poorest, is also the group most vulnerable to food insecurity. Most households reported consuming only two meals throughout the day, one of which is breakfast (tea with sugar and mandazi or chapatti) and the other, usually consumed in the evening, is represented by ugali with amaranth or beans. The households classified in group 3 have difficulties to find other forms of income rather than that provided by their activity as farmers, because of the old age of the components of the households, or logistic reason: they live far from the villages in isolated areas or they are unable to reach the village and the market nearby because of a lack of transportation. For this reason, they mostly depend on their land and their produce (and informal exchanges with farmers nearby) and are very vulnerable to food insecurity, especially during years of bad harvest.

The differences between the Coast and the Kilimanjaro region require a further classification for the households interviewed in the northern region of Kilimanjaro. The reasoning behind these differences will also be explained following the table.

Table 4. Classification for Kilimanjaro region

Assets	Group 1 (wealthy)	Group 2 (poor but resilient)	Group 3 (poor and very poor)
House	Cement, painted house, gate, electricity, water tap, biogas	Brick or mud house, may have electricity, water tap	Mud house walls, no electricity
Land owned	More than 6 acres	1-6 acres	Less than 1 or 2 acres or land borrowed
Education	A level, University	Secondary school	Primary school or less
Other assets	Car, TV, motorbike	Bicycle, cows, chickens, sewing machine etc.	Little or no assets
Other activities	Retired from other job, holding pension, big farms with employers.	Petty business, sell milk, drivers, builders	No other activities or work for other people, sell firewood or grass for cows
Number of households	2	26	9

The differences between the two regions interviewed can partly be explained by climatic and cultural factors. For instance, in Kilimanjaro Region it is very common to have laminated roofs because of the cold weather, electricity is more common because the connection is cheaper (there are more electricity points of connection available) and water is mostly available in all households given the availability (on the slope of the mountains) and the pipe systems built by the villagers. On the other

side, land is scarcer in Kilimanjaro region – the presence of national reserves, higher population density, and less arable land available on the slope of mountains -, therefore farmers usually own a smaller piece of land than farmers in Coast region, where the land is abundant, albeit less fertile. The ownership of animals such as cows is very common in farming households in Kilimanjaro region, because it is considered customary by the Kipare tribe. In Coast region this is very rare: Sukuma tribe farmers sometimes have cows and donkeys, but farmers belonging to other tribes in this region do not. As a consequence, in Kilimanjaro region the availability of manure is usually not a problem and the consumption of milk and meat is higher within the households. Another difference concerns the level of education within the households, which is usually higher in Kilimanjaro, for both historical and cultural reasons.

Moreover, concerning food consumption, most of the people in Kilimanjaro region reported eating three times per day. However, the ability to consume three meals per day is given by the fact that in most households the younger members of the family have jobs in the nearby cities and they are expected to help/provide for the rest of the household - usually parents and younger siblings - that live in the villages on the slopes of the mountains. As a consequence, the prevalence of elders as part of the population in the villages surveyed in Kilimanjaro is higher than in those surveyed in Coast region, where migration to Dar es Salaam has proven difficult, given the generally lower education level of people living and the higher distance to the city.

In relation to the food consumption habits registered, the wealthiest group can be considered food secure all year, and their diet is characterised by the consumption of cereals, fruits, vegetables and meat. The farmers classified as poor but resilient (group 2) experience seasonal food insecurity, although they still manage to consume

three meals per day most of the time, and to sporadically integrate their diet with meat and vegetables beside the common consumption of ugali and bananas. The poorest group reported consuming only two meals per day most of the time, breakfast (tea or coffee with sugar and bread or chapatti) and an evening meal composed of ugali and bananas or beans.

In comparing the two regions, both in terms of assets owned and food consumed, the first impression is that the households in Kilimanjaro region are better off than the ones in Coast region. However, a deeper analysis reveals a great vulnerability to food insecurity also in the households interviewed in Kilimanjaro region. For instance, the 'three meals per day' pattern reported in this region is not necessarily an indicator of food security in these areas. In fact, the majority of the households interviewed that reported to be eating three meals per day rely on outside help to satisfy their food needs, which makes them very vulnerable and does not give any indication of food security on the long term. Furthermore, the presence of electricity or/and a house made of bricks is also often a result of the help received from younger members of the households employed in the cities (Moshi and Arusha in particular), so it is not directly an indicator of the specific wealth of the household. In other words, the aesthetic condition of the houses in which some households live in Kilimanjaro region are not directly or necessarily connected with their food security condition. A connection that, in comparison, was instead clearer in Coast region.

Given these differences, the wealth of the households is considered on its relative dimension and in some circumstances some factors have been more determinant to influence the classification of a household in a group instead of in the other. Clearly, there are many other factors that may make certain households more vulnerable to food insecurity than others; for example, the old age of its members, the distance to

the farm and/or the market, the specific composition of the household (a high number of young children or sickness within the household, for example), help received from the state or NGOs etc. The classification, when possible, takes account of all these factors. A few snapshots of particular individuals are presented in Appendix 3 to provide examples of the classification.

5.5. Food related issues and patterns in the households interviewed

But how does food insecurity manifest itself in practical terms? And what are the eating patterns of the households interviewed? This section analyses dietary habits within these households and the problems related to food consumption reported, for instance the lack of food diversification. Moreover, food preferences and food security as related to personal perceptions and satisfaction are analysed.

5.5.1. Food consumption and food diversification

According to the FAO the most consumed commodities in Tanzania (quantity measured with Kcal/capita/day) are the following:

Table 5. Commodities consumed in Tanzania (FAOSTAT, 2009)

Commodities Utilized	1000 Metric tons (domestic utilization)	Per capita supply (kcal/day)
Cassava	5183	225
Maize	2528	519
Bananas	2253	85
Sweet potatoes	1312	79
Rice (millet equivalent)	873	195
Wheat	728	127
Beans	617	131

Potatoes	533	24
Meat	419	48
Sugar (raw equivalent)	377	86

This data is confirmed by other studies on nutrition in Tanzania; for example, Mazengo et al. (1997) report that the ten foods most frequently eaten by rural and urban subjects of their survey in Ilala district (Coast region) are, in order of frequency: Ugali, tea with sugar, coconut, sweet potatoes, rice, cassava, cassava leaves, vegetable oil, beans and bread.

The results of the interviews conducted in Coast and Kilimanjaro regions tend to confirm this tendency, with the foods the most consumed in the households interviewed being as below (as a percentage of households that regularly consume the indicated food):

Table 6. Commodities consumed in the households interviewed

Ugali (white maize flour)	96%	Sorghum/millet	2%
Tea with sugar	94%	yams	2%
Rice	40%	Sweet potatoes	2%
beans	30%	porridge	2%
Bananas	21%	milk	1%
vegetables	14%	Fish	1%
potatoes	6%	eggs	1%
meat	3%		

In almost all households the morning meal is represented by tea with sugar, and ugali is commonly eaten at both lunch and dinner in Kilimanjaro and Coast region (as shown in the table above, 96% of the households interviewed reported eating ugali regularly). However, an unbalanced diet based almost exclusively on the

consumption of ugali is often regarded as associated with Vitamin A, calcium and protein deficiency, as demonstrated by several studies (FAO - Latham, 1997, Part IV, Chapter 26, Table 33; On this also: Berry, ed., 1994, pp.76-77). Rice is consumed in largest percentage in Coast region, where 47% of the households interviewed reported eating it regularly, compared to Kilimanjaro, where only 24% of households consume it regularly. On the other side, only in less than 1% of households in Coast region bananas are consumed regularly, while they are a major staple food in Kilimanjaro region, consumed by the 70% of households. Nevertheless, diversification of food is clearly a problem in both regions.

Ugali is nowadays recognized as the main staple food in Tanzania, but it was not always the case. Traditional crops like sorghum, millet and bananas were widely consumed before the colonization period, although it is believed that these crops were already losing ground in favour of maize and rice cultivations since the nineteenth century, before the arrivals of the Germans in the 1880s (Iliffe, 1971). In fact, there are records of maize being cultivated in several parts of the country since the early 1880s, while rice may have been introduced even before, in the 1850s in Unyamwezi, a region around what is now known as the town of Tabora, in west Tanzania (ibid., pp.8-9). Moreover, the first colonial settlements were more interested in tobacco, sugar, coffee, and later, after 1898, sisal and cotton plantations (ibid., p.13). The shift in favour of maize and rice was probably fostered by a growing population, an increasing trade in the mid of the nineteenth century and maize being easier to cultivate and requiring less labour compared to smaller grains such as sorghum. Practical reasons aside, nowadays maize is often preferred to rice not only because of its cheaper prize on the market, but also because of individual preferences, as explained in the following section.

5.5.2. Food preferences and distribution within the household

Food preferences are discordant. A good number of people (usually younger) admitted that they usually eat ugali but would prefer to eat something else (rice for example). On a sample of 55 teenagers interviewed (belonging to farming households) aged between 13 and 18 years of age, only 14 prefer ugali to rice, although 90% of them usually eat ugali and beans at the school canteen and in their households. On the other side, in general older people interviewed claimed that they like to eat ugali and would not be willing to swap it with other crops (wheat or sorghum for example). A farmer in Kilimanjaro, for example, claimed, with a certain emphasis, that ‘food other than ugali is not food for me, if I only had bananas or potatoes to eat I would not survive! Ugali makes you strong!’ (R.A.Ms., 2013). Another farmer in the same region said:

‘the government wants us to plant sorghum instead of maize because the weather conditions are not good for maize, but how can we cultivate sorghum, there is no market for it, and what would we eat? In the past people used to eat more sorghum, but I am not sure my wife now knows how to even cook it’ (K.S., 2013).

Meat consumption is very rare in both regions interviewed, and it is considered a luxury, being mostly reserved to celebrations and special occasions, where a chicken or a goat is slaughtered - beef and goat meat is usually bought from local pastoralists in Coast region, while chicken meat usually comes from the household itself - and shared within the household, served with pilau rice.²⁷ However, in poorer households the focus is more on quantity of food served rather than on quality or diversification:

²⁷ Rice cooked with spices and often potatoes.

in other words, during celebrations, in poorer households ugali will be consumed in larger portions.

Cooking habits are also quite fixed: there is little variation in the way the food is cooked. This emerged from the interviews and was confirmed by my personal experience of living in the village of Kwala for about two years in different households. For example, potatoes are almost never boiled, but cooked with other vegetables in a stew or fried, vegetables such as peppers and aubergine are not grilled or cooked with rice, but they are usually cooked together in a sort of *ratatouille* style, eggs are used to make chapatti (similar to crepes) or chips mayai (an omelette with eggs and fried chips), but not boiled or fried alone and so on. The same goes to ugali, always cooked in the same way without adding any salt or spices. This attitude towards food does not facilitate the intake of a differentiated diet, and makes people more vulnerable and less resilient to food insecurity and price volatility of some crops in the market. Moreover, it ‘certainly contributes at the failure of certain government policies, such as those policies that try to introduce new staple crops’, as claimed by the food security and cooperatives officer in Mwanga district (2013).

Concerning cooking methods, the great majority of families interviewed - more than 80% - use firewood instead of the more expensive charcoal to cook their food. In coast region almost all the families interviewed cook outside, unless it rains. In Kilimanjaro, because of the colder climate, the households cook inside the house, using a stone made of clay. Only a few houses use biogas to cook, just three of the households interviewed in Kilimanjaro region. No farming household in the areas interviewed in Coast region has a biogas system, also because farmers do not usually own cows in this region. The extensive use of firewood is creating several problems

in both regions interviewed: as a consequence of deforestation, in Coast region there are several areas that suffer from aridity, while in Kilimanjaro region the erosion of the soil in some villages on the slopes of the mountains causes landslides during heavy rains, destroying several houses.

5.5.3. Food security and farmers' perceptions

Beside households' food consumption patterns, this study considers food security in its wider dimension, embracing the idea developed by Maxwell and Devereux (2001) that personal perceptions and people's feelings should also be considered in a household food security analysis (see chapter 2). Hence, in this section we will look at farmers' perceptions of food security and analyse them under their contextual perspective.

From the results of the interviews done for this study it emerges that the majority of the households interviewed - around 58% - reported consuming three meals per day, including breakfast consisting of tea with sugar. Yet almost 29% of the households only consume two meals per day (breakfast and evening meal), and 17% consumes between two to three meals per day, depending on the time of the year or/and ability to find food by other means. Moreover, from the interviews it emerges that the ability to consume three meals per day is not necessarily connected to agricultural performance/harvest. In fact, of the families interviewed the great majority has to find another source of income other than agriculture to be able to buy the food they need (coping strategies will be further analysed in Chapter 7), confirming that beside food supply and distribution, the ability to purchase the food available is important (Sen, 1981). Moreover, the fact that 58% of the households consume three meals per day is not a guarantee of diversification, quantity of the food consumed or

satisfaction. For example, J.R.S., a farmer that live with his wife and three children in the village of Msua (Coast region) claims that:

‘thank God most of the time we eat three times per day; however, my wife makes sure that we eat three times a day by sharing the food during the day, hence we feel a bit less hungry after the meal and we can continue with our activities, but we are almost never fully satisfied. Moreover, to be able to have two full meals in a day my wife is forced to buy maize flour all the time, while the kids would like to eat rice sometimes, but simply we cannot afford that’ (J.R.S., 2012).

Indeed, feeling food secure and consuming three meals per day are not necessarily connected. From the result of this study’s interviews it emerges that the majority of the households struggle to meet their dietary needs and feel food insecure. In particular, nearly 70% of the farming households describe themselves as ‘not having enough food’. Another 11% of the households describe themselves as having enough only in years of good harvest, while only 20% of the households claim that they have enough food to meet their dietary requirements.

However, interestingly, not all households that reported having enough food consume three meals per day, confirming the idea that perception and quantity of food consumed are not necessarily connected. Furthermore, within those households there are very few that rely exclusively on agriculture, confirming that the great majority of households that do rely on agriculture as a source of food or income are food insecure. In fact, of the 125 households interviewed only 11 households (9%) meet these conditions at the same time: being dependent on farming for a living, feeling that they have enough food and consuming three meals per day. Yet even in

these households there is no guarantee of food diversification and food security on the long term

Moreover, the households that define themselves as having enough food do not necessarily belong to the wealthier category (group I of tables 3 and 4 of this chapter), indicating that perceptions of security also depends on the contexts in which the household live. In short, the wealth of a house may indicate the vulnerability to food insecurity of a certain household, but that does not necessarily correspond to the personal perception of security of the household. For instance, some households may feel that they have enough food for the household for certain reasons: a limited number of people in the household, help from other family members or from the government - in the form of food aid or support to the elders - high expenditure on food as part of total income, little knowledge of the importance of differentiation and problems related to malnourishment, and/or they may be advantaged by the good location of their farm and hence have a higher production per acre than other farmers. For example Mongomole, in Coast region, is closer to the river than other areas, hence the soil is more productive and there is the possibility to cultivate vegetables as irrigation is possible. The farmers of this area, by selling the vegetables they produce at the local market have more cash income available at their disposal.

But the greatest differences in how people perceive their poverty and their food insecurity are found according to the community where such households are located. For instance, in the village of Kwala (Coast region), where social differentiation is higher and the contact with the 'outside world' is facilitated by the presence of an American NGO and the presence of electricity and tv in some shops on the main road of the village, people tend to be more critical, have higher ambitions and look at

themselves with a more negative attitude. On the other hand, people living in more isolated areas, such as a community I interviewed between Mperamumbi and Msua (Coast region, at about 10km from the village of Kwala on a dirt road), composed of 11 scattered very poor farming households that live out of agriculture and charcoal production, tend to see their situation through different lenses, and to be more fatalist and resigned about their condition. For example, S.M., around 40 years old (he is not sure about his age), welcomed me in his thatched hut where he lives with his wife and two young children, who both showed swollen stomachs. Compared to other households interviewed, my first impression was that this was one of the poorest. S.M. and his wife farm 1 ½ acre planted with millet, maize and rice, primarily for their own consumption. When asked if food was enough for his family, he replied: ‘sometimes food is enough, other time it is not enough, but what can we do, it is not a problem, we go to bed hungry and we think about that tomorrow’ (S.M., 2012). He said that they only eat twice a day. I also asked him why sometimes the food was not enough and if the lack of rain was a problem and he replied: ‘Rain is not a problem, it depends on God; if God gives us rain it rains otherwise there is no rain. The major problems are insects, birds and pastoralists’ (ibid.). A farmer that lives nearby, S. H., (a 32 year old woman with 4 children) has similar answers; she said that food is enough during harvesting time, but then ‘it finishes and we do not have enough’ (S.H., 2012). When asked why her farm cannot produce and what are the problems that she faces every day, she thought at it as if she has never thought of it before, and after few minutes she said: ‘We don’t have problems, this is how life works. Maybe... buying seeds is difficult’ (ibid., 2012). When asked about future plans, the farmers interviewed in this area had to think a lot before answering.

Hence, this demonstrates that the way farmers perceive their condition is related to the conditions of the households around them. Although farmers in Kwala were in some respects wealthier compared to the community of farmers in Mperamumbi, they tended to define themselves in much more negative terms than farmers in Mperamumbi. For example, in smaller and more remote communities (such as Mperamumbi), most households only consume two meals per day. Nevertheless, this is perceived to be normal, as it is a condition shared by all nearby households. Therefore, they feel most insecure when they cannot provide two meals per day for the household. On the other hand, in larger communities, such as in Kwala and Dutumi (Coast) and Kigare (Kilimanjaro), farmers may feel insecure if they are not able to provide a certain amount or a certain crop to the family, based on food preferences and on a frequency of three meals per day, comparing their condition to the conditions of wealthier households of the area. Differentiation is however not as defined as we may think, and is not the only determinant of a different perception of 'security' between farmers. In fact, as mentioned previously, in the seven villages surveyed there are only a few wealthy farmers able to make a living out of agriculture alone (only 11 households out of 125). Most of them are also extension officers, so despite agriculture remaining their main activity, they can also count on a state salary, and others do not live there on a regular basis (they usually have other houses in bigger towns nearby).

While differentiation could lead to clashes within society amongst members of different social status, in the villages surveyed this does not happen. Poorer farmers tend to compare their conditions to the condition of wealthier households, but from the interviews it emerged that wealthier farmers are usually seen with respect and admiration, as they are usually able to employ other farmers in their farms and they

let or borrow some agricultural inputs such as tractors and water pumps to the rest of the farmers. For instance, in the village of Kwala (Coast region), E.M. is not only the wealthiest amongst all farmers but amongst the wealthiest people in the village (wealthier than state officials, teachers and doctors). Graduated in UK, he comes from Kilimanjaro region, belongs from the Chagga tribe, but has lived in this village for more than 30 years. He owns his own tractor, motorbike and car - the only car in the village - and his house is the only house in the village with glass windows (usually houses in this region only have bars in their windows). He also has his own milling machine and sells most of the rice he produces. He is highly admired by the community, and involved in local decisions in several ways. For instance, he is always invited to official meetings and ceremonies and he has been nominated to be part of the Secondary School decision board. He is a role model for the younger generations²⁸, and farmers talk about him in a positive way, reporting how much he helps them (by hiring them to farm his land, or borrowing the tractor, or providing advice).

In this sense, differentiation is pushing poorer farmers in the village to make efforts towards improving their current situation of insecurity and their farming conditions. When asked about plans for the future, farming' households in the larger villages show more hope for a better future and tend to have bigger plans, such as 'get a loan to buy a water pump', 'have electricity in the house', 'be part of a farmers' group and ask for a loan to buy a tractor'. On the other side, the answers from households in smaller and more isolated communities concerning their plans for the future reflect a scarce faith in a change of their current situation, showing resignation to

²⁸ In a survey I conducted in Kwala Secondary School in 2012, on 55 students interviewed (aged 13-18 and all belong to farming families), few were the ones that want to pursue farming in the future (only 21), and within them 9 mentioned the name of E.M. as their inspiration.


plan to continue farming as they currently do or burn charcoal to get more income. These attitudes will be better discussed in Chapter 8, when analysing farmers’ responses and coping strategies against food insecurity. In the next section we will look at why the condition of food insecurity persists in many households interviewed.

5.6. Farmers’ challenges

Given the large number of farmers feeling that they do not have enough food, one of the questions aimed at exploring the reasons why that is the case. Looking at farming-related issues from a farmer’s perspective will help us understand why and how food insecurity is manifested and, more importantly, will help us identify some of the elements that lie behind and explain the failure of some agricultural policies and the fraught relationship between farmers and the state, which will be the focus of the next chapter.

The following table introduces the most common problems reported by the farmers interviewed.

Table 7. Problems reported by the farmers interviewed



In a country where agriculture is reliant on rain, changes in rain patterns heavily affect production. Rains are often late or scarce, and farmers claim to be ‘confused about the seasons’: they plant the seeds too late, or too early, increasing the risk of them being attacked by insects and armyworms. Other times the rains are too heavy and ruin the harvest, or create landslides, as reported in Kilimanjaro region. Strong wind is also a problem in Kilimanjaro region, where bananas plants are affected and sometimes uprooted.

Lack of inputs, such as hoes and rakes is a problem affecting many farmers. The shops to buy the inputs are far away, and many farmers lack the capital to purchase them. Farmers also blame the quality of seeds, often not productive, or expired and rotten. The majority of farmers buy seeds, and save their seeds very rarely (because of lack of storage and/or scarce harvest), being therefore very dependent on price fluctuation of seeds. The two major seed companies in the areas interviewed are the Tanzanian KIBO Seeds Co. Ltd. and Seed Co. Ltd., while The Agricultural Seeds Agency (ASA) is the agency that distributes seeds at a subsidized price by the government (although the subsidy is not valid in all regions of Tanzania, as we will see in the next chapter).

Furthermore, the seeds distributed at a cheaper price thanks to the subsidy policy are of dubious quality, as several farmers in Kilimanjaro region blamed the ASA for bringing the seeds too late and for providing rotten seeds. For instance, A. H. K., which plants maize, says:

‘Our government is not accountable and effective. Sometimes we want to plant during the season, but the government brings the seeds late, sometimes they get rotten on the way, for example the Irish Potato seeds.

Everybody blames other people, they blame each other. We elect people, but they do not do what we like them to do, especially about inputs. They told us that the seeds have arrived but when we go in the shop there is nothing. In private shops there are plenty of seeds, but the price is too high for us! This year they gave us some rotten seeds, we planted them but nothing came out! Nobody pays us back for the loss' (A.H.K., Kigare, 2013).


Another farmer, H.A.K. adds: 'Sometimes the seeds provided for by the government are useless for this area. They may grow, but are not good for the hills, so they don't reach full growth and don't produce any maize' (H.A.K., Kigare, 2013).

Very few farmers use fertilizer or pesticide because they cannot afford to purchase it, and this limits the agricultural outcome of their fields. In fact, the relatively wealthier farmers that use fertilizers have registered a considerable increase in production of about 30%, and an experimental agricultural project run in the secondary school of the village of Kwala lead to similar results. Nevertheless, 'knowledge on dosage and effective use of fertiliser is the key, otherwise plants will die and the soil will be impoverished', as reported by M.K. (Kwala, 2012). Use of manure is common in Kilimanjaro region, while in Coast region it is rare because of the hostilities between farmers and pastoralists (see chapter 7) and the difficulties and costs of transportation.

While some of the issues reported such as weather, lack of inputs, birds and wild animals' attacks, lack of capital (which translates in difficulties in getting a loan from banks) and poor infrastructure are common to most of the farmers interviewed, there are some important differences between Coast and Kilimanjaro regions. For

instance, as indicated in the table below, the conflict with pastoralists is a major problem only in Coast region, while no farmer in Kilimanjaro mentioned it. The same goes for the lack of mechanisation since in the villages surveyed in Kilimanjaro region it would be logistically impossible to use a tractor, hence lack of mechanisation is not considered to be a problem. Problems that emerge in Kilimanjaro, and are only marginal in Coast region, are related to the land: being too small, over-used (not fertile) or difficult to acquire due to land legislation and land inheritance customs.

Table 8. Coast and Kilimanjaro incidence of problems compared



Some of the issues reported are inherently political, while others are less political and more influenced by weather patterns and natural events. But, as explained in chapter 2, there are different ways the state could intervene to mitigate these

problems and improve the agricultural sector, the livelihoods of farmers and their food security condition. In the next chapter we will analyse this in detail, by looking at the most recent agricultural policies implemented by the Tanzanian state and how these policies have been received by rural communities.

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter has offered some insights into the problem of food insecurity in rural Tanzania. Official statistical data are considered useful but their limits are also recognised, especially considering the circumstances in which this data is gathered (an example is provided in chapter 6, section 6.5.1, where the methodology used to assess the level of food insecurity in rural parts of Tanzania is explained). The qualitative approach illustrated in this chapter, on the other hand, has allowed us to get a more detailed picture of the farming households interviewed, their food security condition and the problems they face on a daily basis.

On the basis of this data, this chapter has identified and classified the households interviewed following an asset analysis, which provides a general overview of the socio-economic conditions of each household. According to this classification the households have been so classified: 43 poor and very poor households (group 3 in the tables 3 and 4), 69 poor but resilient households (group 2) and 13 wealthy households (group 1).

The interviews confirm the scarce diversification in the diet of the households interviewed, with ugali being regularly consumed by 96% of the households. Certainly, there are economic reasons behind the choice of ugali instead of rice, but the personal preferences are diverse, in the sense that several people interviewed are used to having ugali and do not mind eating it every day, while others, especially

young people, would prefer to eat rice but cannot afford it. What is important to note in these declarations is that there is a lack of awareness on the importance of a diversified diet. Hence, especially given the changes in weather pattern which is making the cultivation of certain crops more difficult, it is essential that farmers are informed of the importance of a diversified diet and on how to integrate different crops that could have higher success of growth or could integrate or partly substitute maize (such as sorghum in Kilimanjaro region).

Furthermore, as suggested by Maxwell (1992) and Devereux and Maxwell (2001) the personal perceptions of food security are also given great space in the analysis provided in this chapter. As a matter of fact, more than half of the households interviewed consume three meals per day. Nevertheless, this frequency does not mean that they feel less food insecure or that they consume the quantity or the quality of food they would need to consume in order to feel satisfied. In fact, nearly 70% of the households interviewed claimed not to have enough food. The perception of security is also related to the condition of the households nearby, and are thus relative to the context in which the household live. Keeping in mind both perceptions and effective quantity of food consumed it is clear that the majority of the households interviewed which rely on agriculture are food insecure: only 11 households out of 125 who live of agriculture, feel food secure and eat three times per day, and still there is no guarantee of quality and diversification of food.

This chapter also looked at the problems that farmers face, illustrating the differences in Coast and Kilimanjaro region. Unreliable weather is one of the biggest issues reported, but we will see in the following chapters how other problems reported, for instance the conflict with pastoralists reported in Coast region, the lack of inputs, capital, transport, storage facilities and infrastructures reported in both

regions, are relevant for this study. In fact, these problems hinder the ability of the farmers to get the required entitlements (in the words of Sen, 1981) to acquire enough food to satisfy the needs of their households and improve their food security condition. Furthermore, many of the issues are inherently political and require a political response to be resolved. In the following chapter this aspect will be clarified and explained in depth.

Chapter 6 - The state-farmer relationship and its effects on food security in rural Tanzania

6.1. Introduction

While in the previous chapter the relationship between farmers and food was analysed, in this chapter the complex relationship between farmers and the state will be unpacked. Following what has been said in chapter 2 and 3 concerning the role of the state in the agricultural sector, this chapter will look at the Tanzanian state, through the actions of its officials either at the national or the local level, in improving agriculture and responding to farmers' needs, in light of current and past policies that shaped food security in the countryside. In particular, the effectiveness of the most recent *Kilimo Kwanza* (literally 'Agriculture First') policy will be evaluated by looking at primary and secondary literature, practical results, and farmers and officials' opinions. Further on, the chapter will try to understand the reasons why the recent agricultural policies have failed to improve small scale farmers' conditions. In order to do so, it is important to comprehend how such policies were received by rural communities and in which spirit they were originally formulated. Accounts of farmers' experiences with state officials, next to accounts of officials' opinions on farmers, will be provided in order to explore how the relationship between the two subjects may have conditioned the outcome of policies. Essentially, this chapter tries to understand how such a relationship has shaped food security in rural farming households in Tanzania.

The main argument of this chapter is that current and past agricultural policies in Tanzania have failed to improve food security in rural areas because they were not designed around the needs of small scale farmers. The state authorities' vision of

small scale farmers as unproductive or even ignorant, backward, lazy and stubborn, is behind the formulation of such policies, and pre-determined their failure. Farmers' distrust towards the state is, consequently, due to a series of dissatisfactions about the poor results of the state's interventions to improve rural livelihoods. The reciprocal cynicism between the two subjects - state and farmers - works as a cycle to prevent policies' success in improving food security in rural households in different ways: policies poorly reflect farmers' needs and the reality of the countryside, and farmers are not willing to cooperate towards making the policies successful because they do not feel included in the decision making. Moreover, a series of disillusionments, including those presented in chapter 4, has developed a sense of fatalism and powerlessness within farming communities towards formal politics, which limits their willingness to contest policies and deliver their requests to the state as the key political institution. A broken communication between the state and the farmers - in particular those living in isolated areas - seems therefore to be central in understanding why policies have failed to improve food security to a considerable degree in rural areas.

In the following paragraphs the recent agricultural policies of the state, looking at their stated objectives and their relative success, will be analysed. Following this, the impact of these policies on the farmers, and how these policies were welcomed by the communities, will be illustrated. Finally, theoretical considerations will help to define the state-society relationship in light of these events and the empirical data collected.

6.2. The role of the Tanzanian state in agriculture

In the previous chapter we identified some of the problems that farmers believe affect their livelihoods, in particular their ability to produce enough food to directly or indirectly sustain the needs of the household. But how much are these problems ‘political’, or dependent on political decisions? This section will try to answer this question by analysing the initiatives of the Tanzanian state and its officials to improve food security and agriculture in rural areas.

Chapter 2 identified some of the areas of intervention that highlight the importance of the state in improving agriculture and farmers’ livelihoods. These areas are:

- Agricultural research and development of new technologies;
- Know-how transfer to rural areas and diffusion of good agricultural practices and knowledge via extension services;
- Irrigation and transport infrastructures;
- Direct intervention: marketing boards and price interventions;
- Land legislation;
- Food aid.

Many of these interventions would actually prevent or mitigate many of the problems that farmers identified and presented in Chapter 5. For example, the problem of weather unreliability could be alleviated by increasing the availability of irrigation systems, providing better infrastructures to transport water to the fields and promoting awareness about weather forecasts via a more efficient communication

between the national weather forecast service and the farmers.²⁹ Problems of land could be addressed by the state apparatus via more clear land legislation and systematic implementation of policies, while better agricultural practices could be diffused by an improved communication between farmers and the state via the extension service.

Tanzania represents an interesting case study because the post-colonial state has embraced and recognized its role in assisting farmers and developing the agricultural sector. Although there was a general neglect of agriculture during the 1980s and 1990s due to the adoption of structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation (see chapter 4), Tanzanian state officials have always remarked on the importance of agriculture for the development of the country since independence. For instance, Nyerere's vision of a socialist Tanzania was based upon rural development and agriculture. In 1982, worried about the constant international pressures towards liberalisation and modernisation in the global economic climate, he said:

‘Because of the importance of agriculture in our development, one would expect that agriculture and the needs of the agricultural producers would be the beginning and the central reference point of all our economic planning. Instead, we have treated agriculture as if it was something peripheral, or just another activity in the country [...]. We are neglecting

²⁹ This is being done from some private companies in Tanzania. Since 2013 the Finnish company Sibesonke Ltd., for example, partnered with mobile companies in Tanzania such as TIGO, Vodacom and Zantel, and in cooperation with the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, is assisting farmers by providing market centred information system via mobile SMS such as: weather forecasts, agronomy best practices and market prices for the major crops grown in the country. The initiatives, TIGO Kilimo, Z-Kilimo and MFarming are designed to allow the Ministries to better reach the 33 million Tanzanian farmers with relevant up-to-date farming content on mobile phones. Sibesonke provides both the cross-network technology platform and the business model. The overall target is to substantially increase farming productivity and food security in the region in a financially sustainable way (<http://www.sibesonke.com/Ministry-cooperation-Tanzania.html> and Yankami, 2013, p.8-10).

agriculture. If we are not, every ministry without exception, and every parastatal and every party meeting would be working on direct and indirect needs of the agricultural producers. We must now give it the central place in all our development planning. For agriculture is indeed the foundation of all our progress.’ (Nyerere, 1982).

The importance of agriculture has also been remarked by the several policies implemented over the years, especially during Nyerere’s government and more recently with Mkapa (1995-2005) and Kikwete (2005-present). The post independence policies such as the Arusha Declaration, the *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (villagization), *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona* (Life and Death Efforts to Improve Agriculture) and *Chakula ni Uhai* (Food is Life) characterised the Nyerere years and aimed at developing rural areas and improving the agricultural sector by emphasising the importance of hard work and community values. From 1985, Mwinyi supported economic reform and a change towards liberalisation, favouring the industrial and transport sectors, but neglecting sectors such as agriculture, education and health (Havnevik, 1993). In 1990, an Investment Act was passed by the Parliament (but started being implemented in the mid 1990s), and was meant to increase and facilitate investments in the sectors of agriculture, cattle breeding and tourism.

Mkapa followed the path initiated by Mwinyi, and actually accelerated the process of liberalisation. He tried to attract foreign investments by investing heavily in infrastructure development and implementing measures against the widespread corruption with the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan of 1996 in order to create an investment-friendly environment in the country (Ewald, 2002). In 1997 he launched the Agriculture and Livestock policy in which the new approach towards agriculture and rural development of the state emerged. The policy

emphasised the commercialisation of agriculture and market-led development, signalling the progressive shift of the state from small scale farmers-oriented to liberalisation and large scale-driven agriculture (Mbilinyi and Nyoni, 2000). The idea of improving agriculture via modernisation and commercial transformation is certainly not new, and was already pursued during Nyerere's years. As explained in chapter 4, during villagization, the provision of modern inputs was structured so as to represent a 'prize' for the farmers that embraced the principles of *Ujamaa* and joined the resettlement schemes. However, there are some differences to be noted between Nyerere's approach to agricultural development and more recent approaches. Nyerere underlined the important role of small scale farmers in bringing about rural development, and looked at large scale farmers with suspicion, so much so that the possession of large plots of land was condemned and seen as shameful. The campaign against large scale farmers reached its peak during the years 1970-72, and as a consequence many European farmers that owned plantations in the north of the country left (Hyden, 1980, pp.102-104). On the contrary, the recent approach of the Tanzanian state towards agricultural development is very different. In particular, modernisation is not only seen as related to the spreading of mechanisation, but also involves a desire to transform small scale farmers into middle and large scale farmers in order to be more effective. Small scale farmers are no longer seen as the engine of agricultural transformation but as *what* should be transformed for agriculture to be successful.

Yet, the political exigencies to appeal to a society made prevalently of small scale farmers pushed Mkapa's succeeding government guided by Kikwete to adopt a series of different policies and initiatives that claimed to be supporting farmers and local communities, but still praised investments and a commercial transformation of

agriculture. This inner dichotomy in the state's approach to agriculture can be traced to the several initiatives and policies adopted. The shift from small scale agriculture towards intensive and industrial agriculture aimed at increasing both the productivity per ha cultivated and the area under cultivation via mechanisation and use of chemical inputs can be identified in the Abuja Declaration of 2006 on Fertilizer for the African Green Revolution signed by the members of the African Union, which stated that the transformation and modernisation of agriculture is the key for broad economic growth, reduction of mass poverty and food insecurity (JGDGP, 2009, p.16). Furthermore, the emphasis on modernisation and commercial agriculture is also found in the agricultural programmes and policies - formulated and promoted as national state initiatives but largely financed by external donors - signed and implemented during the more recent governments. This includes the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), part of the Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), adopted in 2011 and in the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) and its related initiatives such as the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Program (TAPP) that is currently under implementation. All these policies envision a transformation of agriculture from subsistence to commercial, essentially embracing the objectives expressed in the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) promoted by the G8 and embraced by the Tanzanian state in 2012 (Lugoe, 2010; Ngaiza, 2012; Cooksey, 2013).

On the other side, the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative formulated in 2009 together with the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) (2001 – 2013) and the Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (2005) presented themselves as programmes close to farmers' interests. Nevertheless, according to

Cooksey, Kilimo Kwanza actually ended up being just a political ‘slogan’, while in practice only the interests of large scale farmers have been supported, in line with the objectives of the CAADP/TAFSIP and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) (Cooksey, 2013).

In general, the more recent agricultural policies implemented in Tanzania reveal the state’s ambition to develop the agricultural sector by bringing modernisation and greater involvement of the private sector. While it is debatable how these imperatives would favour small scale farmers, the essence of the policies themselves need to be assessed according to their stated objectives. Essentially, after around 15 years it is questionable whether these policies have succeeded in transforming the agricultural sector in Tanzania. Moreover, even if they had been fully implemented, modernisation and public-private partnerships would have done little to help small scale farmers to improve their conditions and in particular their food security.

Furthermore, it is clear that behind the intents of these initiatives lies the assumption that small scale farmers are unproductive and inefficient. This idea is echoed by some scholars such as Denise Wolter, who in her analysis of Tanzania’s poor agricultural performance, affirms that what is holding Tanzania back is the predominance of subsistence and small scale farming and therefore a change towards large scale farming is needed (Wolter, 2008 and 2010). The interviews confirmed this widespread assumption. Many private sector representatives, researchers and officials agree on the idea expressed by the principal agricultural officer at the national level: ‘if Tanzania wants to overcome food insecurity and malnourishment it needs a change and the transformation of small scale farmers into middle or large scale’ (Kidole, 2013). Mr Legge, sales manager at Mining and Agriculture Construction Services (MACS), also claims that ‘80% of the farmers in Tanzania are

not real farmers’ as they are ‘subsistence farmers not even able to satisfy their needs because they are not productive’ (Mr Legge, 2013). This negative attitude towards small scale farmers is extremely important to understand the reasons behind the changed approach of the state towards the agricultural sector and to analyse the complex farmer-state relationship and the outcome of policies. In the next section the most recent policies on agriculture will be analysed in further detail, to uncover and analyse the state’s vision of agriculture and farmers.


6.3. Current agricultural policies in Tanzania: modernisation and partnership with the private sector

In this section some of the most important agricultural policies that define the state’s approach to the sector and which affect rural communities will be analysed. Tendencies of modernisation and a willingness to create a strong partnership with the private sector emerge in the frameworks of these policies, although it will be noticed how in reality things do not seem to be going as planned. This section will analyse the policies related to the SAGCOT, the NAFSN and the CAADP, while the Kilimo Kwanza policy will be explained in more detail in the next section.

Perhaps one of the most important initiatives in driving modernisation and partnership with the private sector is the SAGCOT, which was launched at the World Economic Forum summit in 2010, and is still in the phase of implementation. It is supposed to represent a ‘new, long term commitment by many different organizations to develop a modern, private sector-led approach to agricultural development’ in Tanzania (Ngaiza, 2012). Embraced by the Government of Tanzania, in partnership with different international organizations, the private sector and agribusinesses companies, this initiative also envisions the development of the

agricultural sector as led by large commercial farmers. In fact, one of the objectives of the initiative is to ‘bring 10,000 small scale farmers into commercial farming’ (SAGCOT, 2014).

The SAGCOT is funded by many different bodies, including the overseas development agency USAID, which has dedicated a large portion of the overall Feed the Future funding for Tanzania (between 50% to 80% of the total 77 million US\$ per year) to projects in the corridor, claiming that ‘the SAGCOT promises a transformation in the fortunes of hundreds of thousands of Tanzanian farmers working in the corridor, which boasts rich farmland and infrastructure including roads, rail, power and an international port at Dar es Salaam’ (USAID, no date). An illustration of the general objectives of the project is provided in the image below (from SAGCOT, 2011, p.61):



The SAGCOT project has been accused by some journalists - for instance Provost in the *Guardian* (2014), politicians such as the Member of Parliament Zitto Kabwe

(Provost, Tran and Ford, 2014), the UN Development Programme (2013) and the World Development Movement (2014, pp.23-24) of having a negative impact on farmers of the area while favouring private investors. Among these are multinational corporations such as Unilever, Yara International (which announced an investment of \$20 million into a new fertilizer terminal in the port of Dar es Salaam), Dupont, Monsanto, SABMiller, Diageo, Syngenta and General Mills. Through SAGCOT, the government has earmarked nearly a third of the country (7.5 million hectares) for commercial farming projects, setting aside thousands of hectares of the country's most fertile land for private investors (Provost and Kabendera, 2014). With the demarcation and the land rights certification in the villages in the SAGCOT region not yet being completed, concerns about the use of the land allocated for the project and possible issues of displacement of local communities are justified (Provost, Harris and Dzimwasha, 2014).³⁰ A study reported by the Tanzanian newspaper *The Citizen* in an article of Felix Lazaro reported several land rights disputes in Ruvuma region: in Litukila village a company called Montara Continental got 50,000 acres of land, and some local farmers argued that the company had manipulated their decision to sell their land by bringing them food in a period where most households were going hungry. In another village called Lipokela the investors were accompanied by the police during negotiations with villagers, which accepted to sell their land with small monetary compensation because they were afraid of the police (Lazaro, 2014).

³⁰ Only three of the Tanzania's 14 policy commitment (SAGCOT and New Alliance Initiative) have been completed, according to the 2013 progress report of the New Alliance initiative (Provost, Kabendera, 2014). The 3 completed agreements concern the demarcation of village land in Kilombero district, with secured certificate of land rights for smallholders and investments; the VAT on spare parts for machinery and equipment hectares been reduced; the time required to release new varieties of imported seeds hectares been reviewed and aligned to international best practices.

Despite supporters of the SAGCOT claiming that Tanzanian businesses and farmers groups are also involved in the process, and that the participation and involvement of civil society and farmers in the decision making is warranted by a Memorandum of Understanding (SAGCOT, 2014), this is questionable. In fact, most of the platforms created within the SAGCOT to give the possibility to farmers to have a voice and participate in the decisions - such as the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (supporter of the SAGCOT), the Agricultural Non State Actors Forum (ANSAF) and the Tanzanian Horticultural Association (TAHA) - are membership organizations welcoming groups or associations of farmers, but not individual smallholders. Therefore, there are practical limitations to small scale farmers' involvement in the formulation of projects within the SAGCOT. As a matter of fact, the great majority of farmers that I interviewed in Coast region (part of the corridor) were not part of any farmers group and they did not even know of the existence of these membership platforms or of the SAGCOT initiative in general.³¹

Basically, the SAGCOT requires farmers to learn agricultural processes through aid programmes and subsequently apply and further develop these processes to their own plots. From my interviews however, it seems that very few farmers had knowledge about these training schemes, hence the majority were not able to go through the learning process as described above. Despite the Tanzanian state authorities actively supporting this initiative, the lack of communication to, and involvement of, small scale farmers' communities is clear. This attitude of the Tanzanian officials is a clear signal of a divided state-society relationship, where the state is perceived to be above society, an idea put forward by several authors

³¹ As it will be analysed further in chapter VII, many farmers tend to work autonomously, and not linked to a group or an association. This is probably for historical but also practical reasons, as will be noticed in the next chapter.

including Scott (1998) and Ferguson and Gupta (2002) with the term ‘vertical encompassment’ (see chapter 3).

Other aspects of the SAGCOT have also been criticised, and the relationship between the Tanzanian state and the private sector in the implementation of the SAGCOT objectives appears weak, compromising the outcomes of the projects. For instance, the CEO of the UK-based agribusiness Agrica claimed that very few tangible benefits have so far been achieved, as his company is still to see a change in the tax rules and an improvement in infrastructure that ‘would help the company not to get cut off from the rest of the world every rainy season’ (Provost and Kabendera, 2014). In this environment it is difficult to guarantee an effective use of the agricultural produce (and hence a constant income to producers), since it needs to be processed and reach the market even during the rainy seasons or risks going to waste in the absence of proper storage infrastructures.

One of the projects linked to the SAGCOT is the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Program (TAPP), which also has the objective to ‘improve productivity and change the farmers from subsistence to commercial farming’, as explained by Mr Maregewe (interview, 2013), the TAPP programme manager. The TAPP is funded by USAID and works in cooperation with local NGOs, the private sector and the Tanzanian government. In practice, the TAPP promotes new technology and a market-led agriculture, by running several demonstration plots in which farmers can become confident and learn how to use the technology available, and by doing market research and advising farmers on what to sell. As of 2014, the project involves around 19,000 farmers, mobilised in groups of 10-15 farmers involved in the demo plots. Usually, one of the farmers donates a piece of land, and USAID funds all of the inputs and incentivises the group to write a constitution and set targets. The

TAPP assists farmers for about a year and then farmers should manage the plot by themselves. The TAPP Programme manager seems proud of the project even though he admits that:

‘after the TAPP’s assistance farmers will have to demonstrate that they are managing the profits in a clever way (by keeping aside a certain amount for seeds and fertilisers for the next season) and taking care of the technology, otherwise we will take it back from them. In exceptional circumstances USAID sponsor the farmers for a second time, for example when there has been weather disruption. The project is successful, and more farmers want to join. Nevertheless, it is difficult to include new members in already created groups because existing members do not wish to share the profit with new members, and often there are conflicts within members, this is why a written constitution is very important’ (Mr Maregewe, 2013).

Nevertheless, the TAPP, and similar small projects related to SAGCOT have little relevance and have so far failed to improve the agricultural sector in a substantial way to open a breakthrough in agricultural production. The reasons for this are to be found in the lack of synergy between the different projects and initiatives within the SAGCOT scheme and the other initiatives both at national and international levels. For example, although ‘TAPP always stresses the importance for farmers to keep a garden nearby their house for their own consumptions’ (Mr Maregewe, 2013), the focus is on horticultural production and high value crops. However, farmers have often reported a lack of market to sell or store these products - and the presence of a trader to facilitate this is also often problematic - and they seldom integrate the produce into their diet. Therefore, the promotion of these crops has a limited impact

on the lives of producers - especially those in isolated areas - if it is not supported by proper investments in infrastructures and in social initiatives to promote diet diversification. As admitted by Mr Maregewe (2013), '[TAPP] tries to promote high nutritious crops but it is difficult to change dietary patterns within the households', implying that other initiatives and projects should concentrate on improving these aspects and work in synergy with the TAPP efforts to improve agriculture and food security in rural areas. Moreover, all of TAPP demonstration plots make use of irrigation, but this is something very difficult for small scale farmers to maintain and reproduce in their own plots. This underlines the importance of designing projects that reflect the conditions of the rural areas to which they are directed, and also points at the need to develop policies that adopt a multi faceted approach to the agricultural sector and address the different needs of farmers.

Another initiative framed around the same idea of agricultural transformation with a stress on the importance of external donors-state relationship is the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition initiative, joined in 2012 by 10 countries including Tanzania. The New Alliance is also characterised by a considerable involvement of the private sector and of donor countries in the agricultural sector of several countries involved, with the commitment of improving food security, achieving sustained and inclusive agricultural growth and raising 50 million people out of poverty by 2022 (Feed The Future, 2014).

As with SAGCOT, farmers, despite being named as the central beneficiaries of the initiative, are left out of the decision-making process, whereas the private companies that sit in the leadership council, such as Unilever, Syngenta, Yara and Cargill help to decide the future of agriculture in the countries involved and are even refusing 'to make their full investment plans available for public scrutiny on the basis of

commercial confidentiality’ (Provost, Tran and Ford, 2014). This initiative has been strongly criticised by the World Development Movement and described as a ‘new wave of colonialism in Africa’ by the Chairman of the Tanzanian parliament’s Public Accounts Committee and MP from the opposition party CHADEMA, Zitto Kabwe, as reported by *The Guardian* (African civil society networks and organisations statement, 2013; Hamouchene, 2013; Provost, Ford and Tran, 2014). Zitto Kabwe is also convinced that the New Alliance and other similar initiatives only benefit large scale farming while ‘turning small scale into mere labourers’, and that they do not help to liberate people from poverty (Provost and Kabendera, 2014). Just as with the previous examples, this initiative shows the lack of involvement of farmers and the top down approach of policies, which fails to address farmers’ issues in an effective way and contributes to creating an alienation of society towards the institution of the state that imposes and promotes these policies.

The New Alliance is in line with the objectives stated in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which claims to be an ‘African-led and Africa-owned’ initiative, and has been presented in 2003 under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of the African Union (CAADP, no date, NEPAD, 2009). The CAADP, like the SAGCOT and the NAFSN, presents itself as a partnership between the Tanzanian government, the private sector, and civil society. The objective is to bring on board the private sector in order to build a modern and commercial agriculture that ‘will lead to economic growth and food security and overall reduction of poverty’ (CAADP, no date, NEPAD, 2009). Within its objectives is the commitment to attain agricultural growth at 6% annum and to devolve at least 10% of the national budget to the agricultural sector, confirming the commitments undertaken on the occasion of the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture

and Food Security signed in 2003 (Bitegeko, 2012).³² These two commitments are however far from being reached, with Tanzania spending only about 6% of the national budget in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, according to Cooksey this initiative, despite being promoted as ‘African-owned and African-led’ in the NEPAD-CAADP webpage, is another initiative where the role played by multinational corporations is actually counter-effective in promoting food security and rural development (Cooksey, 2013). According to the scholar a more transparent approach is needed if these policies want to gain the trust of citizens, most of which are unaware or very critical towards these initiatives, especially towards the risk of land grabbing represented by unclear and manipulated investment agreements.

The national government’s policy under which the programmes mentioned above are implemented is the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS, implemented in 2001) and the more recent Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), implemented in 2006/2007, which embraces the approach and the objectives of the SAGCOT, New Alliance, and CAADP initiatives. As mentioned, these programs are in large part sponsored by external donors, such as USAID and the World Bank, that lend money to the government and provide assistance in the formulation of the initiatives. Despite the claims of the Tanzanian state officials to be involving society in the decision making and that this is reflected in the policies implemented, it is clear that the role of external donors and of the private sector is becoming increasingly important in deciding the future of agriculture in Tanzania. This is confirmed by declarations such as the one coming from Mbogo Futakamba, the Tanzanian Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, which reads:

³² Nonetheless, at today, only 8 countries reached the 10% agreed (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Senegal).

‘We are witnessing remarkable contributions from non-state actors like non-governmental and civil society organisations, various associations, local think tanks and the private sector. Not only does the government have high regard for the contributions by non-state actors, but it believes that these partnerships should be nurtured and developed’ (FANRPAN, 2012).

The problem with these policies is not the collaboration with the private sector and third parties (which of course should also be questioned), as much as it is the complete disregard towards farmers’ needs and requests, and the lack of a common ground of action and a common approach within the multiple and different initiatives in the Tanzanian countryside. Without coordination and a clearly shared vision of what the future of agriculture should be like, the projects follow confusing paths, pointing to different direction but without actually achieving the ‘big results’ promised by the state authorities. Moreover, as will be underlined further on, most of these policies are unknown or judged ineffective by a large amount of farmers interviewed.

Cooksey questioned the coherence and the feasibility of such a variety (and pro-private-companies approach) of agricultural policies in Tanzania, looking in particular at the relevance of these policies compared with the catchy slogan to gain popular consent in the countryside: Kilimo Kwanza, which claims to be putting agriculture and farmers first and stresses the state’s commitment towards improving livelihoods and farmers’ conditions (Cooksey, 2013). But is Kilimo Kwanza really different from the other policies mentioned so far? Has it been able to harmonize the different agricultural initiative in the name of a common national vision of the future of Tanzanian agriculture? And is this vision pro small scale farmers? In the next

section this policy will be analysed more in depth, by also looking at the results of the empirical research.

6.4. Kilimo Kwanza: *what* agriculture first?

Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) is a national policy formulated by the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) and introduced by President Kikwete in 2009. It is portrayed and presented in the countryside as a policy designed around the needs of the farmers of Tanzania. In comparing it to past initiatives, Mashindano and Kaino, recognize the lack of adequate inclusion of society of previous policies and claim that although:

‘Kilimo Kwanza is not different from past themes like Kilimo cha Kufana Kupona or Siasa ni Kilimo, [...] the difference is that Kilimo Kwanza stands to gain from the lessons of previous initiatives, which include the need to ensure adequate local participation in planning, funding and implementation [of the projects related to the policy]’ (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009, p.19).

But if closely analysed, the Kilimo Kwanza policy is actually little different from the SAGCOT, New Alliance and CAADP mentioned previously, and instead shares the same assumptions and objectives - so much so that initiatives such as the SAGCOT are actually described as being part of the Kilimo Kwanza Growth Corridor Initiatives (SAGCOT, 2011, p.2). In fact, it is often advertised as a policy promoting a Green Revolution for Tanzania since it aims at ‘accelerating agricultural transformation in the country by addressing the various sector challenges and taking advantage of the numerous opportunities to modernize and commercialize

agriculture in Tanzania' (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009; Ngaiza, 2012; Swenya et al. 2013).

Moreover, as Lugoe's analysis of the Pillar V of Kilimo Kwanza on Land underlines, this policy argues for a re-distribution of land 'in such a way that smallholder peasants become a minority against the majority of medium scale farmers' in order to have 'a real breakthrough in food production' (Lugoe, 2010, p.17-18). Pillar 1.2 of Kilimo Kwanza literally states that the policy objective is to be 'transforming peasant and small farmers to commercial farmers' by 2015 (TNBC, no date, no pagination). Hence, if this is supposed to be the national vision of the future of agriculture in the country, it does not promise to be pro small scale farmers.

To understand better how the Kilimo Kwanza policy is structured, it is worth mentioning its ten pillars, which are, as summarised by Coulson (2010):

1. A national vision
2. A mobilisation of financial resources – including a rural development bank
3. Institutional reorganisation – good governance, good co-ordination
4. 'Paradigm shift' – production of the right crops (food crops are given top priority)
5. Land titles, and use of land to 'promote harmonious exploitation'
6. Better incentives, including removal of market barriers
7. Industrialisation – processing (forward linkages), fertilisers, seeds, machinery and tools (backward linkages)
8. Science, technology and human resources development – using an increased percentage of government income

9. Infrastructure – irrigation, storage, ports, airports, roads, markets

10. Mobilisation of all Tanzanians.

These pillars are very generic, and in order to understand exactly what each of them entails it is necessary to read the description of all pillars in detail. I will mention some of the most important aspects of them and assess their outcome, comparing secondary data to the results gained from the empirical interviews collected in Coast and Kilimanjaro region. Generally and as previously mentioned, it is clear that Kilimo Kwanza shares with the policies analysed above an attempt to transform, modernize and commercialize agriculture. In fact, pillar number 1.2 reads ‘Modernise and commercialise agriculture for peasant, small, medium and large scale producers’ aiming at ‘transforming peasant and small farmers to commercial farmers through emphasis on productivity and tradability’ by 2015 (TNBC, no date).

In order to do so, and as stated in pillar 2.1, Kilimo Kwanza planned to increase the budget allocation to agriculture (as suggested and agreed upon in the Maputo Declaration) to 10% by 2011 and to irrigate over 7 million hectares by 2015. However, as reported by Makoye in 2013, Tanzania is investing only about 6% of the national budget to agriculture, and of 29.4 million hectares that could be irrigated only 589,245 are under irrigation according to Christopher Chiza, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperative (Makoye, 2013).

Moreover, pillar 7 expresses the need to increase the use of fertilizers, the production of agrochemicals and to improve seed production. This is to be done in cooperation with the privatised company TANSEED and in conjunction with a subsidy programme to provide ‘small scale farmers with high quality and certified seeds’ (TNBC, no date). Within this, pillar 7.6.2 stresses the need to ‘embark on local

manufacturing of agricultural machinery and farm implements'. Nevertheless, the successes on this front are debatable: the use of fertiliser is still very limited, with about 4.4 kg of fertiliser used per hectare of arable land in 2012, which had actually declined compared to the previous figure of 7.5 kg per ha in 2009 when Kilimo Kwanza was introduced (World Bank, 2014). Moreover, the amount of fertiliser used per hectare in Tanzania is lower than the average across Sub-Saharan Africa which stands at 13kg per hectare, and lower still compared to the amount of fertiliser used in nearby Kenya which is over 30kg per hectare (World Bank, 2014).

Interview data confirms the limited usage of fertiliser, with the majority of farmers interviewed in both regions not using chemical fertiliser. In Kilimanjaro the majority of the farmers use their own cattle's manure to fertilise their banana and maize fields. In the Coast region, less than 13% of farmers interviewed use chemical fertiliser, and not regularly. Farmers claim that they do not use chemical inputs because of the difficulties in accessing them, and in paying the cost of transport to purchase them from towns, which points to a lack of infrastructure, scarce distribution and capital. In some regions, as part of Kilimo Kwanza, there are subsidies to buy fertiliser but very few farmers know how to take advantage of them. Yet, fertiliser could help farmers to increase their production, given that proper assistance in dosage and utilization is provided. For instance, H.Z., a fairly successful rice farmer in Kwala, claims that the use of fertilizer has been very useful to him as he is now harvesting an average of 27 bags of rice from one and a half acre of land, compared to the 14 bags of rice he used to harvest when he was using less fertiliser.³³

³³ One bag of rice is equivalent to about 100kg of rice, before processing (70-85 kg after being processed).

The use of modern seeds is also problematic. Of the farmers interviewed, only 40% save the seeds for the next season, and even if they do, they still buy part of the seeds every year. Nevertheless, the quality of the seeds envisioned in Kilimo Kwanza and available on the market or through state's distribution points is contested by several farmers. For instance, in Kilimanjaro several farmers make use of the state subsidy program that allows them to get seeds at a cheaper price, but many noted how the seeds are often delivered late, are of low quality, or are not suited to the soil of the area. In other areas, such as in Coast region where the subsidy program is not active (the reasons for this will be explained later on), farmers rely exclusively on the private sector to get their seeds. Furthermore, it is difficult to establish the quality of these seeds, since up to 70% of them are imported, according to Zawadieli Mrinji, farm manager of the Agricultural Seeds Agency (IPP Media, 2013). Dangers of counterfeit and unproductive seeds are common, as reported by several media agencies and farmers interviewed (AllAfrica Global Media, 2012, IPP Media, 2013).

Hence, the attempts to increase the amount of farming inputs and modern seeds seems to have failed, and agricultural performance in general does not seem satisfactory on several fronts, as will be examined in section 6.5. In the next two sections the other objective pursued by state officials - the partnership with the private sector - will be analysed in light of the empirical results.

6.4.1. Partnership with the private sector – foreign investments and the question of land

Kilimo Kwanza also shares (at least theoretically) the same pro-private sector attitude of the policies described in the previous section. In the words of Revelian Ngaiza, the Head Unit of Investment Policies and Private Sector Development (from

the Division of Policy and Planning within the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives) the private sector is to be considered the ‘engine of economic growth-mandated to be the lead implementing agent of Kilimo Kwanza’ (Mr Ngaiza, 2012). Hence, all the pillars of Kilimo Kwanza reflect this approach and promote the involvement of the private sector in the various spheres of agricultural development. In reality however, the private sector laments the lack of transparency, the corruption, and the frequent state’s intervention in the market, thereby revealing a complicated relationship between local and international businesses and the Tanzanian state.

The current Tanzanian government claims that it is trying to attract private investors through adopting a ‘holistic approach to agriculture’, by addressing a diverse number of issues such as transport and infrastructure that affect agriculture in different ways (Bitegeko, 2012). For instance, in pillar 9 the objectives to improve infrastructure, irrigation schemes, storage facilities, ports (Dar es Salaam, Kisarawe), airports (Mwanza, Mbeya and Iringa), railways and road systems for the trading of agricultural commodities are illustrated. The national authorities aim to reach these objectives by attracting both national and international investments (pillars 2, 5, 6, 7). Inevitably, an opening to foreign investments often leads to the acquisition of land and the opportunity for the investors to gain an economic return by having access to the country’s resources. In fact, requests for land have increased in the last few years, and Pillar V of Kilimo Kwanza was meant to amend the Village Land Act No.5 of 1999 in order to ‘facilitate equitable access to village land for investments’ by 2010 (TNBC, no date, no pagination) also in view of the implementation of the SAGCOT initiative. Land deals can become problematic and create social distress if

the procedures to acquire land are not followed rigorously and if the local population is not aware of their land ownership rights or is manipulated.

Nevertheless, the issue of 'land grabbing' in Tanzania seems complex. On one side, politicians and officials claim that the legislation regulating land deals is clear and involves the villages concerned, but on the other side, the land ownership regulation is weak and the demarcation of land incomplete. From the interviews and the empirical data collected, the problem of unclear land ownership emerges, but at the same time the phenomenon of 'land grabbing' in the eyes of officials, international organisation representatives and even some farmers interviewed seems confined to few sporadic episodes. For instance, according to Mr Rohrabach, a representative of the World Bank in Tanzania, only about 6% of land is currently under foreign ownership, and the episodes of so-called 'land grabbing' are isolated (Mr Rohrabach, 2013). At a conference on 'Land Justice for Sustainable Peace in Tanzania', held in Dar es Salaam on the 9-13 September 2013, the Prime Minister, Mr Pinda defined 'land grabbing' as a 'misplaced fear' and identified the real problem of the country being 'underutilization of land', since, of 44 million hectares of arable land only about 20% is currently under cultivation (so 8.8 million hectares of cultivated land). Of these 8.8 million hectares of cultivated land, only 40,000 hectares are allocated to 63 foreign companies, which count to less than 0.5% of productive land in the hands of foreign companies (Pinda, 2013). The Minister of Land, Housing and Human Settlement, Prof. Tibaijuka, shared the Prime Minister's opinion and added that 'about 91% of arable land is in the hands of smallholders and livestock farmers, and that the land legislation protects the rights of the citizens of Tanzania' (Tibaijuka, 2013).

Truly, compared to other countries in the area, the process to obtain land is long and bureaucratic, as explained by Neville and Dauvergne (2012) and by Rwegasira (2012). Hence, in theory the Minister's statement is correct, as the national legislation on land ratifies that 'all land in Tanzania is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of citizens' (The Land Act, 1999). The land that was covered by property rights before the introduction of the *Land Act* and of the *Village Land Act* of 1999 can be purchased by citizens on the market. Citizens can apply for a right of occupancy for the land that was not covered by property rights before 1999; such right is granted by the Commission for Lands nominated by the Ministry of Land in agreement with the President (The Land Act, 1999). Non-citizens have to go through a longer procedure, and need to also get a Certificate of Approval by the Tanzania Investment Centre in order to apply for a right of occupancy grant. The land is classified as general land, village land and reserved land. If the demand involves village land, the village should also be consulted and consent needs to be gained before a grant of occupancy is issued. The law also clearly states that the communities have the right to receive a 'fair' compensation that needs to be agreed by those involved. The village land is administered locally by the village councils, which allocate land to their villagers upon application. However, no local authority shall grant any right of occupancy or authorisation to people residing outside their area of competence, unless this has been previously agreed by the Commission for Lands. Once land is granted, for a maximum of 99 years with the possibility of renewal, the occupier (citizen or non-citizen) needs to comply with certain conditions, variable depending on the purpose of the grant (The Land Act, 1999, Rwegasira, 2012, Chapt. III). Land can be revoked if these conditions are not met. For instance, it can happen that if the land has an agricultural use purpose, the grant

of occupancy could be revoked in case of land being used for other purposes other than food production (Rwegasira, 2012, Msemakweli, 2013).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that mistakes and omissions are frequent in land registration, since less than 10% of land has been surveyed and the registration of village land deeds is administered at the local level (US Department of State, 2013). Moreover, precisely because of the unclear and often un-registered land deeds, along with the lack of transparency and slow follow-up in land investment agreements, not all fears of land grabbing are ‘misplaced’, as confirmed by the land conflicts episodes presented above as a consequence of initiatives related to the SAGCOT. In the past there have also been further episodes where foreign investments have had a negative impact and the rights of the local communities have not been respected, for example the Sun Biofuels Tanzania Ltd, in Kisarawe, a British investment accused of having displaced about 10,000 people in 12 villages that agreed to allocate land to the company (Sulle and Nelson, 2009). In 2011, the company went bust without fulfilling the initial promises of compensation, job and social services to the local communities, which were left without land and jobs (Carrington, 2011). Moreover, Pillar V of Kilimo Kwanza is a source of concern, because it facilitates access to village land for commercial reasons, while failing to effectively protect the interests of small scale farmers and regulate village land holding titles (Vorley et al. 2012, p.20, Lugoe, 2010, p.17-18).

Furthermore, the procedures for the acquisition of land are not always followed rigorously and are not well known by the communities, so, according to Oswald Mashindano, a senior researcher at the Tanzanian-based Economic and Social Research Foundation agency (ESRF) interviewed in 2013, it has been the case that:

‘village leaders are the ones that conspire and start the conflicts. For example when talking about land grabbing, maybe there is not a real land grabbing problem, as local leaders may have actually agreed to give away village land without consulting the citizens, but they may still change their mind when they realise the real impact of their action at the last moment, and convince the population that the council has not signed the agreement, although it had actually done so in the first place. There is a big gap of information between the state and the community, and often procedures are not followed in the right way’ (Mr Mashindano, 2013).

It could also happen that occupancy rights are confused or treated as property rights, and transferred to third parties in an illegitimate way. For instance, a farmer interviewed in Mwembengozi claimed that ‘the land is given by the village government, and when the village council gives you the land it becomes yours and you can do whatever you like with it, even sell it if you wish’ (Mr Mbelwa, 2012). These mistaken understandings of the land legislation create confusion and increase internal conflicts and discontent towards the state.

In addition, there are reasons to believe that the desired and promoted increase in foreign investments will not directly help the poorest areas of the country, nor help increase food production where it is most needed. In fact, as SAGCOT demonstrates, the areas the most longed for by private investors are the areas the most fertile and close to water sources, exactly the land that farmers have little interest in selling and where food security is less of a problem, as claimed by Mr Kidole, from the Department of National Food Security in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives (2013). This claim is confirmed by a study conducted by the Oakland Institute, which affirms that most of the investments in the agricultural sector, such

as the AgriSol Energy LLC investment agreed between the Tanzanian government and US, have mostly been framed to benefit large-scale agriculture and have negative effects on local small scale farmers, which are often pushed to relocate to other areas (Oakland Institute, 2012).

Yet, and as stressed by the Minister of Communication, Science and Technology, January Makamba, interviewed in 2013, it is also important to contextualise land deals. According to the Minister, to talk about ‘land grabbing’ without exploring the reasons why certain farmers in certain areas are willing to sell their land means to be only looking at the problem superficially. It is true that often land agreements are signed under the hope of fake promises or scarce knowledge of land rights. But it is also true that farmers’ agreement to sell their land should be understood as an indication of dissatisfaction with the current condition of being a farmer while at the same time struggling to meet the households’ needs. Land ownership is not the only factor guaranteeing farmers to be successful and food secure, but if farmers agree to sell the land it is perhaps because they do not see their future improving under agriculture (Makamba, 2013).

The empirical results clearly demonstrate this. You can have plenty of land but still feel food insecure. As explained in Chapter 5, the farmers interviewed in Coast region do not report having problems over land control or ownership, but they blame the lack of resources (inputs) for their inability to make the most of it. To give just a few examples, in the village of Kwala, R. K. has ten acres, but she claims that she is only able to cultivate two, while in a nearby village called Mongomole, another farmer, Al. N., has thirty acres but he only cultivates ten because of the lack of resources (water, seeds, fertilisers, machinery) to cultivate more. Many of the farmers interviewed in this area reported youths’ detachment to the agricultural

sector and their personal dissatisfaction with the level of productivity of their fields, revealing a desire to sell their land and find another source of employment. Although being part of the SAGCOT corridor, the area in Coast region where I held the interviews has not experienced land conflicts or been involved in foreign investment land deals. Actually, all the farmers interviewed had a right of occupancy of at least one acre for farming and another acre for housing, conceded by the village council. The former chairperson of Kwala interviewed confirmed land not being a problem for farmers in the area, and the village being able to concede a piece of land to all villagers that would request so (Mr Msemakweli, 2012).

The situation though is different in Kilimanjaro region, where farmers lament the limited amount of land but are absolutely firm when stating that ‘nobody can buy land here, it is not an option, the land belongs to your family, not to the individual, and can only be passed to future generation through inheritance’ (Chairperson of the village of Kigare, 2013). Informal and traditional channels such as inheritance, allocation by the head of the family or clan, and gift are used commonly as land transfer systems throughout Tanzania. However, the national legislation does not regulate these transfer channel and therefore their occupancy is confusing and open to contestation, especially in situations where knowledge of legal ways to obtain land is scarce (Rwegasira, 2012, p.94).

In summary, it can be said that land investments are at the moment still scarce in Tanzania, despite the political commitments aimed at facilitating them. However, given the confusing legislation on the matter, the present commercial interests in land, and finally the national willingness to attract foreign investments, concerns over land grabbing are not completely misplaced. It is true that land is only but one of the problems farmers are facing and needs to be addressed alongside other issues,

but while land titles alone may not guarantee food security, they may protect farmers from exploitation and manipulation, while also facilitating bank loan requests, allowing farmers to grow and be more productive, while at the same time preventing land conflicts.

While land governance under new agricultural policies in Africa has received much scholarly and media attention, Kilimo Kwanza and other related policies in Tanzania do not only concern foreign investments on land but also promote public-private partnership in inputs provisions (seeds, fertilisers, and mechanisation), knowledge building, food manufacturing and market development. The next section will have a closer look at whether Kilimo Kwanza has succeeded in creating a strong public-private sector partnership with the companies that operate nationally in these other spheres.

6.4.2. Partnership with the private sector – the state’s engagement with domestic agro-businesses

Despite the intentions expressed in Kilimo Kwanza and in other agricultural policies, in general the involvement and cooperation with the private sector, even with Tanzanian companies, seems weak. For example, according to Mr Rohrabach, an economist at the World Bank in Tanzania, the problem is that the successive governments are still interfering a lot with the market, and liberalisation is still far from being achieved in Tanzania, as the state is highly involved in the agricultural and food system. Thus, he reports that:

‘the World Bank recently suggested the Ministry of Agriculture of creating a partnership with the National Seeds Trade Association, a private company dealing with seeds, and the Ministry replied “why

would we do that, we have our own public sector, agency and supplier”!

The problem is not that the state wants to retain control, the problem is when the state prefers one player instead of another just because of corruptive [sic] practices and clientelism, instead of looking at quality and efficiency. Market regulation is a necessity, but it can be negative in circumstances where corruption is a reality’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).

Another account on the matter comes from Mr Legge, sales manager at Mining, Agriculture and Construction Services and interviewed as part of this research in 2013. Sharing similar concerns, he claims that the recent agricultural policies are not successful, and that the state’s interference in the market is having a negative impact for the country. He adds that often the government imports more food than the country needs, driving the prices down. While this could be good for consumers in urban areas, cheap prices are not good for producers that depend on agricultural produce income to live (on this also Andrew MacMillan, 2014).

There are also other ways in which low prices affect farmers in rural areas. The communities interviewed are fairly isolated and only have partial connections with international market. Because of the lack of storage space, they have to sell a consistent part of their produce after the harvest when the prices are lower (because of the high offer), and purchase food daily during the year through middlemen and small shops in the villages, where prices are higher than in urban areas (because of the added transport costs to reach the villages). Hence, compared to urban areas, farmers in rural areas are affected by a lower purchasing power parity, which makes them poorer and more vulnerable to food insecurity.

The interference of the state in the agricultural sector is not limited to the import/export market. Another claim coming from the private sector is that, in trying to promote mechanisation and higher use of chemical inputs and modern seeds, the state as represented by the government wants to ‘be the only player in the game’ (Mr Lukas, 2013). For instance, Mr Lukas, general manager of Lonagro Tanzania Limited, a company that sells agricultural machineries in Dar es Salaam, criticises the national officials for ‘raising fake hopes, and wasting money, while making deals with companies overseas and not with the companies that operate nationally’ (Lukas, 2013). He refers to a recent agreement between the Tanzanian and the Indian governments, which lead to the company Suma KJT importing tractors from India to support the Kilimo Kwanza project (see also AllAfrica, 2013). According to Mr Lukas, the importation of tractors from India was a mistake and:

‘after few years you go to the villages and you notice that the tractor is not in use anymore, because farmers do not know how to take care of it and repair broken parts...beside spare parts being expensive because of the high taxes on them. The companies in partnership with the government do not offer any support or assistance’ (Lukas, 2013).

Actually, in this instance, the critique of Mr Lukas seems to have substance, since, as it will be noted in the following section, the problem of assistance and maintenance is evident and has been witnessed in several villages visited in Coast region, where it is common to see dismissed rusty tractors near the townhalls.

Historically, as showed in Chapter 4, the Tanzanian state has retained high control over the agricultural sector and in general over the economy of the country. This could in part explain why there are some residual tendencies to control some

industries key of the sector, such as the seed company.³⁴ For many researchers and members of the private sector interviewed ‘the agricultural failure of the country, better understood as the failure of the Green Revolution in Tanzania, has its roots in the past history and in the failure of past agricultural policies’, as explained by a senior researcher from the Research for Poverty Alleviation Institute (REPOA) interviewed in 2013. Mr Lukas and Mr Legge are of the same opinion, blaming the socialist past of the country. They share the same vision of liberalisation of the economy still being far away in Tanzania, and affirm that they are looking forward to ‘proper liberalisation in the country’ (Mr Legge, 2013).

As already mentioned in Chapter 4, it is true that, in the past, initiatives that largely involved the state – and which resulted in mismanagement of cooperatives and public funds, empty shelves during the nationalisation of the food market, and forced villagization settlements – are not a nice memory in the minds of many Tanzanians, and are even less so in the minds of private sector businesses managers that were highly affected by such policies (for instance small food shops in the villages were closed down and new ones, state-owned were opened). Under these premises, the recent attempts of the national political apparatus to create a partnership with the private sector have not proven easy, and many private sector representatives remain sceptical.

³⁴ The national seed company, TANSEED, was state-owned until 1990, but the state has since created a new agency under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, the Agricultural Seed Company (ASA). Launched in 2006, ASA produces for both the local and the export market, and its duties are related to: expanding seed production and distribution networks so as to facilitate seed accessibility by farmers, promotion of increased private sector participation in the seed industry development through establishment of public-private partnerships or joint ventures in seed production and distribution, promotion of increased demand of certified seed by farmers and strengthening research capacities for breeding and producing varieties that address farmers’ specific demands (<http://www.asa.or.tz/asaa/>).

6.5. Policy implementation problems and farmers' dissatisfaction

The agro-business private sector is not the only dissatisfied actor concerning the outcome of the agricultural policies illustrated. In order to understand the terms of the relationship between farmers and the state, this section will present the results of the interviews with farmers concerning their satisfaction with, and opinion on, the Kilimo Kwanza policy. Many farmers interviewed reported to be sceptical about this policy, saying for example that 'Kilimo Kwanza is only a slogan with no actual meaning', 'nothing has changed in their lives' and they 'farm in the same ways [they] used to farm in the 60s' 'Kilimo Kwanza is only on paper, there is no implementation, they make lots of promises during elections but then they disappear' (various farmers in Kwala, Mperamumbi, Dutumi, and Usangi, 2012 and 2013). The farmers interviewed, in both Kilimanjaro and Coast region do not hide their disappointment, for example a farmer in Dutumi argues:

'Through the years our life is the same, there has been no improvement, unless you find another source of income, cultivation will not help you to get a decent life. There is a lot of land in Dutumi but it is not used effectively because of the lack of tools and inputs. I have ten acres, but I can only cultivate one!' (I.R., 2012).

In Chapter 4 the problems faced by the farmers interviewed were presented. A good part of these issues are related to a dysfunctional policy environment and a disconnected economic sector. For instance, many farmers interviewed claimed that one of the biggest challenges is to get a loan to purchase agricultural machineries such as tractors, ploughs, irrigation pumps etc. It is easier to get a loan if they are part of a group, but in a group they find it difficult to manage the machines. Indeed, the

establishment of a Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB – pillar 2.2 of Kilimo Kwanza), and of community banks and financial institutions in rural areas (pillar 2.10) planned for 2009 and supposed to facilitate the loans, have yet to be formalised.

Nevertheless, often the problems are related to policies' misunderstanding of the reality of the countryside and even when agricultural inputs are provided there are problems of training and implementation. For instance, there is a program that aims at providing villages with power tillers or tractors which can be rented and shared by farmers ('farm trac' project, part of the Kilimo Kwanza policy) but often there are conflicts between farmers on how to share, manage and take care of the machineries provided. For instance, the words of S.O.M., a farmer from Dutumi, summarised the claim made by many of the farmers interviewed: 'last year I got a tractor late and we were late to cultivate our plot, as a consequence my harvest was too scarce and it will be difficult to rent the tractor again for the next season' (S.O.M., 2012). From the interviews in Coast region it emerged clearly that hiring a tractor has proven difficult, as many farmers need it in the same period, and there are few tractors to share.

Moreover, other farmers are of the opinion that renting a tractor is a further cost and a risk. To rent a tractor costs them about 60,000 TZ Shillings per acre, more or less the equivalent of buying 60kg of maize flour, which could cover the needs of a family of four for a bit more than a month.³⁵ Yet, if they pay this cost there is no certainty of a good harvest, especially if the rains are unreliable. The chairperson and the extension officer of Kwala, Mr Msemakweli and Mr Kimicho, add that one of the biggest problems is when the tractor (to be shared between 1020 farmers in the village of

³⁵ Calculated according to the governmental indication of 400g per maize flour per person per day.

Kwala) needs fixing or a spare new part. The council has no money to pay for it, and ‘farmers are not willing to take responsibility and to pay for the tractor to be repaired or for spare parts’ (Mr Kimicho, Kwala Extension Officer, 2012). Mr Msemakweli and Mr Kimicho’s concerns echo what Mr Lukas (from Lonagro Tanzania Limited) argued about the lack of follow up with project implementation. As a matter of fact, a tractor donated by the state through the farm trac project to the village of Kwala could be seen in front of the village council, with the tyres deflated and with several rusty parts. It has been there unused from 2011 – and it was still there during my last visit to the village in April 2015 - since the village or the farmers do not have funds to repair it.

Another interesting example that demonstrates implementation problems is the controversy over the water pumps in Dutumi. Several farmers and the chairperson, Mr Mkali Saidi Kanusu, interviewed in Dutumi, reported that ‘a group of ten elders’ was given five water pumps from the government in 2011, but these water pumps have disappeared. Actually, the situation is not very clear, with some farmers saying that the water pumps are not working anymore, and others saying that they were given to the children of these elders and are difficult to trace because of a lack of control and transparency. Anyway, it seemed clear that most of the farmers interviewed were annoyed by this situation, and felt that the authorities were not treating them in an equal way. For instance, one of the farmers said, in an agitated tone:

‘we feel very confused, the state helps old people that do not even use these water pumps, while it should help all farmers, especially those that are working hard and farming! There is no control on how the inputs given are used or even if they are used and not sold to others for profit!

The state of Tanzania is an ‘office state’ they waste money and there is no effective improvement for us!’ (A. H., Dutumi, 2012).

The chairperson agrees in saying that the project was mismanaged and that ‘the state should give each family a water pump machine, because farmers are far from each other and sharing inputs is problematic’, just as with the tractors (Mr Kanusu, 2012). These feelings of unfairness that emerge from farmers’ declarations strengthen the distrust of farmers towards state’s ability to improve their conditions and provide effective policies.

A further example that illustrates the failure and apparent mismanagement of initiatives within Kilimo Kwanza, and the related complicated relationship between farmers and the state is the case of the irrigation scheme project in the village of Kwala. During the fieldwork in September-December 2012, many farmers around the village of Kwala were enthusiastic about an irrigation scheme being implemented by state departments and supposed to cover 500 acres and help about 540 farmers of the area by providing water for about one acre for each farmer. This project raised hopes of a fruitful cooperation between the farmers of the area and the state, and was promoted as a Kilimo Kwanza/SAGCOT initiative. When interviewed in 2012, many farmers, along with the chairperson of Kwala, Mr Msemakweli, were confident in the future success of the project. As reported by the extension officer of Kwala, Mr Kimicho:

‘The cost of the project is 1 billion Tanzanian Shillings to build the channels, install the water pumps, and the water tanks [...]. This project represents an important farmer-state cooperation, within the framework of Kilimo Kwanza. The farmers that are part of the project are providing

the land and the manual work, which represent the 20% of the total cost of the project' (Mr Kimicho, 2012).

The chairperson of the irrigation scheme, Mr Ramadhani Shabani Zanda, explained that the idea started in the village, with the focus to increase the production of rice. The village committee wrote a proposal and the government agreed to fund it. The village set aside 2,000 acres for the project. Started in 2008, by 2012 150 acres were 'ready to be planted in the coming season' (February-March)³⁶ and the farmers involved decided to share these by using a quarter of an acre each. 15 members did a training course on cultivation in Morogoro and were supposed to assist the rest of the farmers. According to the chairperson of the scheme, 'with this project farmers will be able to harvest up to 30 bags of rice per acre, instead of the two to three bags they harvest now!' (Mr Zanda, 2012).

However, one year later things were different. In August 2013, another round of interviews revealed disappointment and frustration in the farmers involved. Of the 500 and more farmers involved, only 200 had participated in the cultivation of the plot during the past season. As reported by Mr Zanda, 'many farmers did not participate because the project started late (March), when most farmers had already lost hope and found another plot of land to cultivate'. Moreover, there were many problems:

'The small canals are not finished, the engineer decided to build them with soil instead of with cement, so the channels got washed away with the rain and they still need to be repaired. The water pump failed to pump the water, because the level of the pump was above the level of the

³⁶ The first stage is considered completed, while four more stages were still to be implemented.

pond. They took long time to solve this problem, there was a time consuming bureaucracy and because of the many engineers involved traceability of responsibilities has proved difficult to identify. The seeds in the nurseries were growing, so farmers had to water them manually and it was really hard because of the distances and no means of transport. Later on, when farmers were ready to transplant the plants from the nurseries to the main plot, there was another problem to do with electricity. The meter was outdated, so we went to TANESCO³⁷ in Dar es Salaam to ask for it to be replaced. This also took long time. Eventually most plants died and farmers left' (Mr Zanda, 2013).

Mr Zanda was the only farmer left carrying on with the project and taking care of his plants. He had to hire a water pump, paying about 40,000 Shilling per time and had used it four times when interviewed (August-September 2013) and planned to do three more irrigations before harvesting. Many farmers lost a lot of money with this project, some claim that they lost more than 200,000 Shillings and a whole farming season, and tried to ask for a refund and to complain, but it was difficult to estimate the exact losses. The costs of the project went up to two billion, and Mr Zanda admitted that there is no binding document that forces the government to fund this project until completion. Many farmers swore that 'never again we will trust the government or participate to these projects'. Others claimed that:

'asking for a refund is useless, nobody is willing to take responsibility for the mistakes made, the government told us to plant maize, since we now lost the rice cultivation. But how can they even suggest that? We

³⁷ TANESCO is the Tanzania Electric Supply Company.

would need again tractors to level the soil! The government does not even realize what we are talking about' (D.N., Kwala, 2013).

This case is a clear example of a growing distrust of farmers towards the state, as a consequence of a disillusion for the failure of projects and a conviction that the state as such does not protect their interests. This distrust is often expressed by farmers choosing the 'exit' option, deciding not to participate in meetings and detaching themselves from the state apparatus. The detachment is the expression of farmers not trusting the ability of the authorities to improve their condition. For instance, F.J., an elder farmer in Kwala, says: 'the state does not care about us old people, when you complain you get frustrated so it is better not to do anything and stay quiet' (F.J., 2012). Another farmer, A.M.T., a small scale farmer and village secretary in Mwenbengozi, explains his distrust and disillusionment towards the state using these words:

'Let me say this. If there are problems in our farms, for example to do with animals and insects, we meet and report to the village council. They send the report to the district, but most of the time this process is so long and ineffective that we, as farmers, prefer to deal with it by ourselves. It is much quicker to just go to the town and buy the medicine [pesticide] ourselves rather than wait for the state to help us. The state clearly has a top-down approach and our concerns are not taken into consideration' (A.M.T., 2013).

It is evident that there are policy implementation problems, symptoms of poorly thought-through policies that are not well adapted to the cultural and geographic realities of the country, and that these problems lead to farmers' frustration towards

the state. At the same time, when asked their perspective on the irrigation scheme case, district officials defended themselves claiming that ‘the farmers involved were late to report the problems. Furthermore, there were several meetings and they were supposed to attend, but only 20 farmers were present to discuss the issues’ (Kibaha District officials, 2013). As will be explained in more detail in section 6.6, distrust is circular, as the ‘exit option’ used by farmers boycotting the meetings is seen by officials as a reason to blame farmers for the failure of the project.

Along with the analysis of the Kilimo Kwanza policy and its practical implementation in Tanzania rural society, the gender approach of the policy deserves some attention since the presence of women in the agricultural sector is very strong, representing about the 54% of the workforce in agriculture (Mmasa, 2013). Despite the role of women being formally recognized in Kilimo Kwanza under Pillar 8.8 which states the aim of ‘mainstreaming gender in Kilimo Kwanza and developing programs to strengthen the position of women in agriculture’, the policy stands accused of ignoring the realities faced by farming women, since women do not have equal access to inputs and to land throughout the different areas of the country (Harcourt, 2012, p.180). In Coast region it is clear from the declarations of many farmers, local politicians and women interviewed that the general attitude is that women can own land both by means of inheritance or by right of occupancy from the village council, and can freely participate to farming project (such as the irrigation scheme previously presented). However, for cultural reasons and despite the national land legislation on the matter, in Kilimanjaro it is more difficult for women to own land, as it is customarily passed by inheritance to the male children of the family. Hence, the commitments at national level assume little relevance in areas where traditional customs are stronger than national law. Moreover, in both regions the role

of women is still clearly differentiated from the role of men. Many programmes and organisations – for instance TAPP, IFAD and WFP - try to facilitate the inclusion of women in their projects, but cultural differences and a vision of women still anchored to tasks such as taking care of the household, children education, cooking and fetching water and so on.

From the examples illustrated above, we can see that certain initiatives are disconnected from the reality of the countryside, revealing the state's top-down approach. As a consequence, several problems have been experienced during project implementation. Moreover, there is an issue of disorganization and an un-traceability of responsibilities, which results in delays in sorting out the issues and in the reciprocal accusation of the parties involved. Furthermore, mismanagement of funds and clientelism create an environment of disillusion, distrust and a feeling of unfairness that contributes to the declining status of the state-farmers relationship.

6.5.1. A disconnected society

Besides the problems with the implementation of the policies, another aspect that emerges from the interviews is farmers' scarce awareness of the agricultural policies promoted by the state officials. This information gap reveals a lack of effective communication between the level of the state and the farmers in rural areas and it is also responsible for the unsatisfactory outcome of policies, in the sense that if farmers are not informed of the broad objectives and of the benefits that they could receive through the implementation of a certain policy in the long term, they are less likely to welcome the policy and cooperate towards its success. As outlined by authors such as Azarya, Olorunsola, Ayoade (Rothchild and Chazan, 1988) Chazan (1994), and Migdal et al. (1994), a disconnected society is characterised by a lack of

confidence from its citizens in the effective implementation of policies by the state. Hence, this disconnect between the state and farmers causes the latter's alienation from politics. This section will look at the level of involvement and participation of farming communities in national initiatives. Moreover, farmers' discontent/disillusion will continue to emerge, following what has already been said in the previous section (Barker, 1989). Another issue that will emerge in this section is the internal disconnect within the state structure. Faced with problems and complaints from society, local, district and central state officials blame each other, adding another dimension to the complex state-society relationship.

According to the government 'Kilimo Kwanza has a strong emphasis on pro-poor growth' (JGDPG, 2009), yet Mashindano and Kaino underline the failure of this and previous policies to address rural poverty and improve agriculture (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009). According to these scholars, the failures were mainly attributable to 'most of them being externally initiated and/or donor funded and lacking effective local participation for sustainability' (ibid., 2009, p.18). Despite Kilimo Kwanza and programmes such as the ASDP and the ASDS aimed at improving farmers' knowledge and their use of technologies and infrastructures by involving local communities and small scale farmers in the planning and in the coordination of agricultural support and investments (as indicated by the CAADP, no date, and TNBC, no date, and pillar 8 of Kilimo Kwanza), the reality is more complex. There are doubts about the level of farmers' involvement, the extent to which small scale farmers can get access to financial help, and the benefits these policies have brought in rural isolated areas such as the ones where this research was based.

Kilimo Kwanza is supposed to ensure adequate local participation in planning, funding and implementation (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009, p.19). Nonetheless, the

results of the fieldwork demonstrate that, in reality, farmers do not feel included in the policy process, and their awareness of state policy is limited or non-existent, with an extension service at times unreliable and ineffective. Over 90% of the farmers interviewed did not even know what Kilimo Kwanza was, with the majority saying words to the effect of ‘we hear it in the radio, but nobody came to exactly explain to us what this entitles us to have’. The problems in communication reflect a problem in the organization of the state, as pointed out by Mr Sambuo, marketing officer at Rural Urban Development Initiative (RUDI), a local NGO:

‘Farmers do not know about state policy because the state has a top-down approach, at the root there is very little information. [...] at district level they got the information, but from the district to the village level the information do not flow’ (Mr Sambuo, 2013).

As expected, only the few ‘successful’ farmers (the farmers classified in group A in the previous chapter) know a little bit more about the policy, although even here one admits: ‘the government policy is a lot of *blah blah* and actually does not bring any changes to us. For example this region [Coast] is excluded from the subsidy programme’ (N.M., Mongomole, 2012). It is clear that, in the words of Mr Mashindano from the Economic and Social Research Foundation:

‘very few farmers are aware of the policies and they tend to disengage with politics, [...] people are not happy with the results, they think they are being deprived of their rights, sometimes they are right, other times they are manipulated by politicians against other politicians’ (Mr Mashindano, 2013).


Furthermore, farmers also believe that the recent agricultural policies in place do not benefit small scale farmers. For instance, a small scale farmer in Kwala, P.T.M., finds it really hard to support his family of seven children. In only two acres of land he cultivates rice that he sells to buy maize flour to feed his household. He has to deal with plant diseases, and claims to not have received any help from the extension officers to deal with the problems in his farm. Moreover he believes that the ‘Tanzanian state is backwards in helping small scale farmers, but it helps large scale. My family never got any help from the state, and our life is getting more and more miserable’ (P.T.M., 2012). F.T.M., a small scale vegetables farmer who lives in the village of Mwembengozi, and farm two acres of land, expresses similar concerns:

‘Kilimo Kwanza? In Tanzania almost three quarter of the population are farmers, but the government does not care about us small scale farmers, Kilimo Kwanza is directed to large scale farmers [...] It should be directed also to small scale farmers with one or two acres of land’ (F.T.M., 2012).

Farmers’ distrust towards, and disillusion in, the state apparatus is clear from the interviews with farmers. Yet, their concerns about the performance of the agricultural sector are not misplaced. According to Mr Rohrabach from the World Bank, the achievements of the last years in the agricultural sector and food security are not as good as they could have been. The sector has an annual value added rate of growth of 4.2%, while the World Bank believe a rate of 6-7% would be feasible if resources were used in a more efficient way. Furthermore, while production of the staple food the most consumed (rice and maize) have been on the rise, if analysed and corrected with data on population growth and import/export there is actually a

decline in the food supply quantity per capita per year, as demonstrated by the table below:

Table 8: Food supply and production of the two major staple food in Tanzania (FAOSTAT, 2014).



This, added to data on poverty ratio and the indicators on food insecurity discussed in the previous chapter, indicates that an increase in food production does not automatically lead to an improvement in either food security or farmers' conditions. Besides, the augmented production could be only benefiting large scale farmers or farmers that have been able to access the subsidy vouchers and/or live in proximity to a paved road that allows them to easily reach the towns' markets and exchange their produce. In the areas where the interviews were conducted there was no data available related to production of the two major crops, but the personal perceptions of the farmers interviewed on the performance of the sector were not positive.

According to Mr Rohrabach the unsatisfactory results are due to a mix of mismanagement and bad implementation of projects and funds. For example, he believes that:

‘while Tanzania is planning to develop 1million ha of irrigated land within the SAGCOT initiative that would only benefit around 3% of the farmers, it would be more efficient to improve the extension service so that water management and storage practices, in addition to soil conservation could be promoted on a larger scale. [...] Not all farmers are poor, but the majority are still farming in the same way they farmed 60 years ago and this shows a failure of state’s policies [...] It is disappointing that we are not making more progress. [...] Malnutrition is still incredibly high and production is low. The agricultural sector is so unproductive that most farmers are trying to escape to the cities, despite the fact that they may face lower nutritional values and calories intake in the cities’ (Rohrabach, 2013).

In contrast, state officials believe that Kilimo Kwanza *is* helping the poorest farmers to gain access to resources and inputs, especially through the subsidies policies, which allows farmers to get seeds and other inputs at a cheaper price through specific selling points. For instance, through the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme, the government provides vouchers for a 50% subsidy on fertilizer and improved seeds to eligible farmers³⁸ growing rice and maize in some specific high-potential areas – in the Southern and Northern Highlands and Western region (United Republic of Tanzania, 2012; Hepelwa et al., 2013). However, despite the

³⁸ Farmers eligible for the subsidy are the ones cultivating less than one hectare of maize and rice, with the highest priority being given to female headed household and resource-poor farmers who have not used fertilizer in the past five years (United Republic of Tanzania, 2012).

subsidised prices that should in theory help small scale farmers to gain access to the resources, many farmers seem to be unable to reach the selling points located in the bigger towns. This problem is compounded by the lack of proper information on the policy. Juma Mwatima, from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) agency underlines that in reality things are different and the farmers are not benefiting from the subsidy policy because:

‘The subsidy policy is not working right, and is not helping farmers. It is also not enough for the needs, for example, if there are about 300 farmers in one area, the vouchers for the subsidy are enough for only 90 farmers, therefore there is high corruption in the distribution of these vouchers. Often the farmers sell the voucher as they cannot even afford the discounted prices for the inputs. [...] Despite the many policies on the agenda there are still so many issues on the ground’ (Mwatima, 2013).

Furthermore, as mentioned before, the subsidy policy is not active in all areas of Tanzania, being implemented in only 57 out of 169 district. In fact, as explained in the policy, only the ‘high-potential areas’, meaning the regions where there is the greatest production of maize and rice, are chosen for the subsidy. For instance, in Coast region the policy is not active. Paradoxically, the areas in which productivity is lower and that would most need the input subsidy are left out of the policy. Curiously, when officials were asked why the policy of subsidy cut some areas off, the common idea seemed to be that areas in which the production is lower are areas in which farmers are less productive (or small scale), hence there is little point in helping them. For instance, Mr Mayabu, an agricultural input officer in the Agricultural Inputs division, under the Crop Development Department, said that:

‘there is a rationale behind the state’s decision not to extend the subsidy policy to Coast region, and that is because in Coast region there are no farmers, you cannot call the farmers in Coast region proper farmers!’ (Mr Mayabu, 2013).

As we will see further on (section 6.6), comments like this one above reflect the attitude of the state officials towards small scale farmers and are part of the problematic relationship between farmers and state. Concerning farmers’ perception of the state’s presence, it is important to note that when asked about state help, the majority of farmers interviewed - over 70% - claim not to be receiving or never having received any kind of help, while about 25% of the farmers interviewed reported receiving some kind of help, such as support to elders, and/or school fees paid for their children. Help in agriculture is seldom reported, especially in Coast region – not least because the subsidy policy is not active there. Some farmers reported receiving some food during hard times, but this issue is highly controversial and farmers reported confusing and contrasting information. Several farmers blame the state for being late in their responses or bringing too little, and local officials are blamed for distributing the food so as to favour certain households over others, or even for keeping part of the food for themselves. This displays characteristics of weak state, unable to efficiently communicate with and penetrate society, as outlined by Migdal (1988).

The problems in food relief operations are also linked to the way food insecurity is assessed. As explained by Mr Kidole, one of the facilitators of the Community Management Targeting Distribution, and by Mr Kalendo, from the Disaster Management Department, both interviewed in 2013, in cases of food emergencies the villages involved send the request to their relevant district. The district is

supposed to analyse the self-sufficiency relation by analysing agricultural production versus requirement in that specific area, and report to the central state that will then run some sample analysis to assess the real needs. As reported by the two state officials interviewed mentioned above, the food security assessment of the country is based on a sample analysis of six villages per district, and twelve households per village. The twelve households are selected in agreement with the village council according to their wealth, four households with a low income, four households with a middle income and another four with a high income. From this assessment the officials identify households who are in a condition of acute, mild and minor food insecurity. The food is distributed according to this assessment and should be shared according to the needs of the households: free food (usually maize to last for three months)³⁹ to the households considered to be suffering from acute food insecurity, while the other households considered mildly food insecure or at risk of food insecurity could get maize or seeds at a cheaper price than the one on the market.

There are several problems with this assessment. It creates a distorted picture of the real needs of the households, and, as reported by several farmers both in Kilimanjaro and Coast regions, it is often manipulated by officials to favour some households to the detriment of others. Furthermore, by the time the village sends the request it may take up to five months to be processed and the food to be delivered. The response to seasonal food insecurity is slow and farmers know that they cannot rely on the help of the state. By the time the food is delivered to the villages the households that were experiencing acute food insecurity could have developed serious sickness due to undernourishment amongst their members, especially children, unless they had found another way to satisfy their food needs (Mr Mwimbe, the chairperson of

³⁹ Calculated on 400g per person per day.

Mwembengozi, 2012). Furthermore, it is not rare to experience conflicts between villagers during the food distribution,⁴⁰ as the procedures are not properly followed and forms of clientelism are vast (chairperson of Kigare, 2013).

According to the state officials interviewed, while these long bureaucratic procedures are surely problematic, it is difficult to imagine a more efficient way to assess food insecurity (Mr Kidole, 2013). In particular, the national state officials have to deal with local forms of clientelism, in which ‘local politicians lie and ask for more food than is needed in order to present themselves as good politicians in their village’ (Mr Kidole, 2013).⁴¹ In such circumstances, and given the limited availability of food to distribute, ‘the state needs to make sure of the real needs of the villages to provide the food in the villages where it is mostly needed’ (ibid, 2013). As previously noted in the case of land conflicts, faced with complaints and problems in the food distribution process, local, district and national level officials blame each other, showing a lack of coordination and internal conflicts within the state structure. For instance, according to Mr Kalendo, an official in the Disaster Management Department under the Prime Minister’s Office, local officials are to blame for the poor implementation of the food aid policies. He accuses local politicians of using the food given for their own interests, and of not following the guidelines and giving it to random people. In contrast, from their point of view, the district and village officials interviewed blame the central state for giving too little or no help, and for it being ‘so late that at times what we get is not even good to be eaten’ (Mr Mwimbe, 2012; Mr Kadege, 2013; Mr Doyle, 2013).

⁴⁰ As reported by several farmers interviewed, especially in Kilimanjaro region.

⁴¹ Chabal (2009) well explains these practices of neo-patrimonialism, where some local and district politicians misuse public funds in order to gain consent, aiming to take personal merit for policies.

Reciprocal blame is also noticeable in local politicians' assessment of the outcome of policies. While the chairperson of Dutumi, Mr Kanusu, simply claims that 'Kilimo Kwanza has brought no changes', and Mr Mwimbe, the chairperson of Mwembengozi, argues that the only implementation of Kilimo Kwanza seems to be the demonstration farms where farmers are showed modern methods of cultivation by the *bibi shamba* (extension officer), other local politicians are more critical both towards farmers (as we will see in the next section) and towards the central state. For instance, Ashura Hussein, a local politician in Mperamumbi, blamed national politicians for the failure of policies to improve the conditions of rural inhabitants: 'politics never help people to solve their problems, politicians do not care about agriculture, they only think about eating' (Miss Hussein, 2012).

In referring to these conflicts within the state apparatus, Mr Kinyondo, a senior researcher at the Research for Poverty Alleviation Institute (REPOA), admits that 'there is clearly a discrepancy between the central state stated intentions and what actually happens on the ground, there are lots of slogan, but on the ground they have very little relevance' (Mr Kinyondo, 2013). There are several reasons why this is so. For instance, according to several state officials interviewed in the Department of Food Security the problem is with local and district administration, although they also admit that:

'there are lots of nice policies and programmes but implementation is problematic because of the delay in the funds, and extension services not covering all the country, beside the fact that it is difficult to get farmers on board and change their ways of farming' (Mr Kidole, 2013, a similar opinion was also expressed by Mr Ngaiza, 2013).

At the same time, the district officers complain about being given contradictory tasks. For instance, one of the district officers in the district of Mwanga (Kilimanjaro) notes that:

‘while on one side the central state asks us to promote the production of sorghum and talks a lot about food security and integration of other crops and fruit and vegetables in the diet, on the other side all the food aid they provide is maize, is that supposed to help people being food secure? How is that supposed to help us promote other crops if we continue to give only maize? We are contradicting ourselves, this is why farmers do not listen to us anymore!’ (Officer at the District of Mwanga, 2013).

A divided internal state structure is therefore evident, as it was also noted and explained in chapter 4 when the different levels of state power were identified (central, district and local). In recalling what has been said in the chapters 3 and 4, in Tanzania this separation of power within the state structure translates into a clear hierarchy of power, with local level state officials being closer to villagers and often blaming higher level officials for their inadequacy of improving villages’ conditions. In this respect, the interview findings confirm the theoretical assumption presented in chapter 3, in which the relationship between the state and the society is also the result of how the national authorities presents the state to society. First, there is a tendency of high level officials to physically distinguish themselves from the rest of the society, by wearing expensive clothes and jewelleryes and driving expensive cars. This is particularly noticeable during ceremonies and electoral campaigns, where officials’ visits to villages are considered and treated as extremely important events, and the official is accompanied by several policemen and treated with high regards. Outside these ceremonies the visits are rare, as affirmed by several villagers and the

chairpersons interviewed. This tendency of high level officials, reported by the farmers interviewed but also described by scholars such as Scott (1998), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Daloz (2003), Lund (2006) and Becker (2009) demonstrates the top-down approach, which can be also observed in the character and implementation of policies.

In addition, forms of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism can be traced, whereas local and district officials tend to take personal merit for successful occurrences/projects coming from the central government, as seen in the case of food distribution strategies. This attitude of local and district officials remarks, again, the incoherence within the state structure, and, as explained by scholars such as Chabal and Daloz (1999), and Hyden (1980 and 1983), adds to the complex state-society structure. In fact, it confirms the presence in Tanzania of a certain 'economy of affection' described by Hyden in the 1980s, useful to understand various aspects of Tanzanian society and its relationship with politics and the state (see chapter 3 and 4).

Hence, in summary, behind the problems of policy implementation due to mismanagement of funds, clientelism, a disconnected private sector, and an unclear legislation there is a conflictual relationship between the different levels of the state (local, district and national). Furthermore, central in understanding policy failure and farmers' dissatisfaction is the character of policies, not being formulated around the needs of small scale farmers, and therefore of difficult implementation. What follow now are some considerations on the extension service, supposed to be the transmission belt between the central state and the farmers. Why is this system not working?

6.5.2. A complex and controversial relationship: the role of extension services in the state-farmer relationship

Pillar 8 of Kilimo Kwanza deals with the role of extension officers, who are supposed to ‘establish demonstration farms and provide guidance on proper farming methods to farmers’ and to ‘be evaluated according to set performance targets’ (TNBC, no date, pillar 8.1). The figure of the extension officer has a central importance in the framework of the national agricultural policy and in the argument of this thesis, because it is the connecting point between the state and farmers, as affirmed by Miss Justa Katunzi, from the Extension Service Division (under the Department for Crop Development, interviewed in 2013). Nevertheless, given the lack of information reported by the farmers interviewed, it is clear that this service is not helping much to achieve the expected results. The majority of the farmers interviewed showed complete dissatisfaction with the work of the extension officers, claiming, for example, never to have seen them, or to be afraid of calling them as they ask money for their services (a practice that is illegal).

Other farmers assert that extension officers are not helpful and give misleading advice. For example S.S.M., from Mwembengozi, exclaims:

‘Kilimo Kwanza is only a political slogan! We know how to plant and dig, we know all this. Sometimes we call the extension officer and ask him how to cultivate the cassava, and they can suggest us to cultivate it upside down [he laughs]. We need inputs, not lessons on how to farm!’
(S.S.M., Mwembengozi, 2012).

This opinion is shared by other experts of the agricultural sector, for example Mr Lukas from Lonagro also mocks the extension officers claiming that:

‘extension officers know nothing! For example in Morogoro, they were telling people to burn the maize left as soon as the crops were harvested. This is an obsolete practice of 20 years ago! They give people the wrong information’ (Mr Lukas, 2013).

According to Mr Rohrabach from the World Bank the farmers are right to think that extension officers are not well prepared, and this is because they do not receive the right training and neither do they share a passion for agriculture. In his words:

‘extension officers are kids that make through secondary school, but did not do well enough to become secondary school teacher or go to business so they decided to follow a course to become extension officers. Many of them never farmed in their whole life, they do not know how to use the tools, how to deal with farmers’ problems and their recommendations are irrelevant to farmers in reality. They follow a manual on farming practices but are unable to adapt to different conditions. This is why farmers do not trust them’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).

Moreover, often the extension officers live far from the village they are supposed to supervise. For example A.O.M., from Dutumi, reports that the extension officer of Dutumi lives in Dar es Salaam, 120 km away from the village of Dutumi, hence ‘they are not close to farmers and do not provide any support’ (A.O.M., 2012). In the village of Msua the farmers share the same concerns, and lament that their extension officers lives in Kwala and never come to see their farms in Msua, and the same goes for the extension officer of Mwembengozi.

Mr Sambuo, from the NGO the Rural Urban Development Initiative (RUDI, interviewed in 2013), provides other reasons on why the extension service fails to

help farmers. He explains that extension officers do not go around farms because they lack a means of transportation, nobody monitors extension officers to make sure that they are working properly, and farmers don't trust them because they have no relationship with them, and they are not originally from the places they supervise. This is confirmed by the declarations of many farmers interviewed in both Coast and Kilimanjaro regions: most farmers meet their extension officer only once a year, while others do not even know who he or she is. Mr Kidole, from the Department of National Food Security, also mentions the 'lack of incentives to work well because they lack transport, housing, and they often get appointed far from the cities'. Nevertheless, he also admits that 'farmers do not trust extension officers because of corruption' (Mr Kidole, 2013). Mr Mashindano, a senior researcher at ESRF and Lecturer of Economics at the University of Dar es Salaam also stresses the low salary and the lack of transport but adds that 'some officers are expert in veterinary but not in agriculture, although they deal with both activities. Often they take part in other projects sponsored by external donors and neglect the rest of the farmers and their main job' (Mr Mashindano, 2013).

From their point of view, extension officers claim that farmers often do not ask for help, and they cannot go personally to all farmers' fields if not requested specifically by farmers. For instance, Mr Kimicho, an extension officer in Kwala, claims that he lacks the inputs to establish a demo farm, and can only assist farmers theoretically (Mr Kimicho, 2012). Although according to Kilimo Kwanza each village is supposed to have a tractor and an agricultural officer, in practice there are not enough extension officers to cover all villages. As a matter of fact, the number of extension officers is limited, with only 7,974 officers present in the whole country, while there should be at least 15,000 as expected by the Ministry of Agriculture (Mr

Mashindano, 2013). Furthermore, the extension officers interviewed blame the farmers for not following their advice. For example, the Kigare ward councillor, Mr Abdul Selemani Kadege, stresses how farmers are often late to cultivate and do not follow the expert advice. He claims that:

‘farmers blame the government but the truth is that they do not like to consult the extension officers, and they do not attend meetings! Often the council calls a meeting but the participation is so low that it is we have to postpone the meeting until more people participate. Extension officers are always present at meetings, if farmers say that they do not know their extension officer it means that they never attend any meeting! There is high participation only when the council is giving something away, for example in the case of food’ (Mr Kadege, 2013).

The scarce participation in meetings (an aspect that will be more fully analysed in the next chapter) is also noted by the Chairperson of Kigare, Mr Doyle, and by local politicians in the villages in Coast region where the interviews were conducted. It was also mentioned in section 6.5 while talking about the irrigation scheme project problems in Kwala.

In this section, two key features of the national agricultural extension service have been highlighted. The first is the opinion expressed by several extension officers and politicians who describe farmers as stubborn, and accuse them of not participating in local meetings, not cooperating with the state authorities and not following expert advice. The second is the tendency to abide to stereotypes such as those that define farmers as being lazy and ignorant in Coast region but hard working in the North of the country. These two tendencies are traceable in both the extension officers and

other officials at different state levels; as it will be illustrated in the following section.

6.6. The state's negative perception of farmers and its stereotypes

There were several officials interviewed who, when asked about the problems of the agricultural sector or the relationship between the state and farmers, took the opportunity to describe farmers as stubborn, in particular concerning innovation in farming methods, adaptation to change and to new crops. For instance, the local chairperson of Mperamumbi, Mr Rashidi Vitusi, felt that:

‘farmers don’t follow expertise advice, they don’t cultivate according to the requirements [...]. Sometimes I have to force them to go to farm instead of staying in the local bars drinking the local alcohol. [...]The officers should also check these *pombe*⁴² shops!’ (Mr Vitusi, 2012).

There is also a general belief that it is difficult to change farmers’ eating habits, or their farming systems. In Mwanga region (Kilimanjaro) numerous farmers interviewed lamented the scarce harvest and the unreliable weather. According to a representative at the FAO, ‘70% of the maize grown in Mwanga dries before reaching the right development of the plant’ (Mr Laizer, 2013). Nevertheless, when both the FAO and the district officers suggested farmers switch to other crops -for example cassava or sorghum - they were met with reticence and a refusal to follow the advice (Mr Laizer, 2013).

Moreover, several state officials describe farmers as being demanding and expecting everything for free. Using the words of Mr Kalendo, from the Disaster Management Department:

⁴² ‘*Pombe*’ is the name in Kiswahili for the variety of alcohol produced at home.

‘there is this attitude that the state should provide everything for free, if the state gives something for free than everybody is willing to share it, but if they have to pay for it that is when the cooperation spirit ends. Farmers are not willing to cooperate with the state, but they want everything provided for free. For instance, in Shinyanga we tried to push the cultivation of sorghum, but farmers were reticent, they were expecting the seeds for free and were not willing to swap from rice or maize to sorghum’. (Mr Kalendo, 2013).

A similar opinion is shared by Juma Mwatima, country program officer for IFAD and chair at the Tanzania Organic Agricultural Movement, who believes that ‘in the past the state and external partners were too generous in giving help, making farmers think that it would be easier to tick a box and claim to be vulnerable rather than looking for alternatives’ (Miss Mwatima, 2013). Also according to Mr Laizer, from the FAO, ‘farmers have developed dependence’ (Mr Laizer, 2013). Mr Mashindano, senior researcher at ESRF, adds that people’s expectations from the apparatus were raised during the Nyerere era, which:

‘by distributing resources and basic services promoted a mentality in which people expect everything to be for free [...] the difference is that now the government does not have anything to distribute. In the past there were policies that incentivised waste. A big personalisation of politics led leaders to make promises and abuse of public funds. But it is also people’s attitude that has changed, Nyerere wanted to address inequality, that is why he was transferring resources, but nowadays there is no responsible use of resources, even from people. For example people

abuse public services, requiring more medicines than they need' (Mr Mashindano, 2013).

Another theme that constantly emerged during the fieldwork is the belief that there are cultural differences within the country and that some tribes are more productive than others. For instance, the stereotype of farmers in Coast region as being lazy and farmers in Northern regions as being hard-working is diffused in the society, and emerged in the fieldwork, especially when officials were asked about the problems of farming communities in Coast region.

A representative from a Tanzanian think tank expressed this popular dichotomy between the supposedly laborious Northerners and laid-back inhabitants of the Coast region:

'People in Coast region are not used to farming, they fish and do small scale activities, petty business, they like to wake up in the morning, visit their cashew trees, see if there are any cashew nuts to pick up and sit under a tree to sell them up to 1pm. Then they buy maize flour from the nearby shop and go home to eat. They are not interested in more productive activities. They are more interested in *ngoma*⁴³! People from the North are more entrepreneurial, and they have more opportunities as they border countries like Kenya' (Mr Mashindano from ESRF, 2013).

It becomes obvious that a clear cultural difference in the attitude towards work is said to exist in Tanzania, one that depicts the Coastal Region as a domain where leisure dominates over labour. At the same time, this affirmation comes with a normative undertone as the subsequent quote highlights:

⁴³ This refers to traditional dances and ceremonies.

‘Farmers in Kibaha do not take agriculture seriously, while in Kilimanjaro they are very serious’ (Mr Laizer, representative at FAO, 2013).

It is telling that an employee of the FAO is as blunt in his comments and judgement. However, representatives of national political bodies come to very similar conclusions:

‘Most of coastal communities are lazy, they wait for the government to act. They don’t even want to go to farm, they spend their time in the bar, even in the morning. When you go to Mbeya, Iringa, people are very serious, very very serious’ (Mr Clepin Revelia, Department of planning and public-private partnership, 2013).

Other interviewees made references to historical and religious aspects to explain this perceived difference:

‘Farmers in Kilimanjaro are more welcoming, maybe because of the influence of the missionaries. We [as the government] face problems, as farmers do not want to listen to us and do not want the state to control them. The problem is the level of illiteracy in many households. Moreover farmers are stubborn, we try to promote a certain crop but it is difficult to change their farming practices. Farmers want to see the results before starting acting! How is this possible?’ (Mr Kidole, from the Department of National Food Security, 2013).

‘The Coast region had the impacts of Arabs, they behave like Arabs, they don’t do much agriculture, they are not used to that. People that work

here are not from the Coast, but from other areas. There is a lot of ignorance and illiteracy in people of this area. The missionaries went to areas with climate more similar to theirs, such as Kilimanjaro, Songea, Kagera, Mbeya, Arusha. Muslim people put a lower stress on education than Christians; this is why people in this area are poorer, because of ignorance' (Mr Rwehambiza, WFP).

It is quite surprising to hear these kind of declarations coming from representatives of international organisations such as the WFP. It indicates that these sort of stereotypes are collectively shared by a large part of the Tanzanian community. It is true that with diverse historical backgrounds come educational systems that prepare the population more or less well to a life as a farmer, and clearly there are cultural differences within tribes. In the previous chapter it was noted that the level of education was higher in Kilimanjaro region rather than in Coast region. Nevertheless, these judgements, by mixing education and the more fatalist view of inborn cultural differences, are manipulated to justify policy successes or failures in different parts of the country, as showed by these two following comments:

'Kilimo Kwanza is working well in some places such as Kilimanjaro because people are more educated and are taking advantage of the programme, including a different approach with extension officers, but in other areas such as Coast region people are lazy, maybe because of the different culture and tribe, and the programme is not working well' (Mr Kimicho, extension officer in Kwala, 2012).

'In other regions people are much more hard working. Laziness is one of the problems that contribute to the lack of food in this area. There is the river there, but people still wait for the machines to irrigate. One day a

person -Mr Masaka, from Kwala- came here with his tractor and borrowed it to some farmers that should have paid back with produce, one bag per acre. But when the farmers harvested later on they did not pay back their debt, so nobody will trust these farmers again. Often they waste all the harvest income for local dance and celebration instead of saving it! There are some groups, but they are not active because people are lazy. It is not like other regions such as Msongea, Iringa, Morogoro. [...] People here complain a lot but do very little. Kilimo Kwanza is there, but people are not using it properly, although it is true that the government has not provided good information about this project'. (Mr Kakwete Chia Zulu, extension and veterinary officer in Dutumi, 2012).

These quotes illustrate a certain degree of defeatism among officials and highly qualified people that have little hope for agricultural policies to function with a population that seems to behave in an irrational way. They thus also locate the main part of the responsibility with certain sections of the farmers themselves, and not with the practice of policy implementation. The common conception seems to be that if farmers are too stubborn, no one can help them. In other words, the disconnection between state and farmers is mutual, at least with some parts of the farming community. On the one hand, the farmers have grown tired of the state and see it as distant from their lives. On the other hand, state officials and those having the authority to influence policy-making seem to have given up on farmers that are seen to be either misinformed, or not interested, or simply resistant to advice.

‘People in this area are different from people in the north of Tanzania, for example in Moshi, where they work very hard. People here are very lazy, there is a lot of land but people do not like to dig. There are some

reasons behind it, cultural reasons, they grew up like that. Most of them do not use modern methods of cultivation, therefore they harvest little. There is scarce knowledge on the good ways of farming, and farmers are very reluctant and stubborn to farm their own way and not follow the advice' (Miss Pendi Ally Semoka, extension officer of Mwembengozi, 2012).

Surprisingly, these stereotypes are also common within farmers. In particular, the successful ones seem to believe that parts of the problems in the agricultural sector in the Coast region are due to farmers' attitude. E.M., one of the most successful farmers interviewed, has been living in the village of Kwala for over 20 years, but he is originally from Kilimanjaro, Chagga tribe. He believes that:

'People in this area are lazy and don't go to the farm every day. In Iringa they farm more. The government should promote the value of hard work and not depend on buying food and import food from abroad' (E.M., 2012).

But also within the Zaramo tribe there are farmers that agree with this stereotype. For instance, a low income farmer in Kwala, who struggles to meet his household's needs, blamed farmers of this area for not getting together and cooperating. In his opinion, 'the Zaramo are not used to help each other and work together, while in Kilimanjaro it is different' (2012). But is it really different? Does this widely shared stereotype reflect actual realities in the field?

Firstly, it needs to be understood why this stereotype persists, perhaps by looking at the different historical pathways and development of the two areas. In the words of Mr Rohrabach of the World Bank:

‘There is this stereotype that farmers in the north of Tanzania are entrepreneurial while farmers in Coast region are lazy. However, it is important to understand why there may be some differences. There is a base of truth in saying that in the north they are more entrepreneurial, but this is because of the past history, there used to be a coffee growing culture up there, so they are historically more used to business and agriculture done with a business mind-set’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).

Hence, the different agricultural history, more related to commercial crops in Kilimanjaro thanks to the exchanges with Kenya and thanks to the presence of cash crop cultivation (coffee and bananas) could explain a different attitude towards the agricultural sector, as mentioned above. Moreover, the villagization process has been administered in different ways in Coast and in Kilimanjaro region, (as explained in Chapter 4) and this could partly explain why there is a general belief that people in Kilimanjaro are more ‘welcoming’ than people in Coast region. In fact, while in Coast region people were forced to move to other areas, in Kilimanjaro the communities were already settled in villages, hence villagization did not assume the tones of dislocation it did in other areas. Therefore, people in Coast region may have developed a more sceptical attitude towards foreigners and state officials than people in Kilimanjaro.

It is also important to stress that the areas where people are judged as ‘lazy’ are the ones that have mostly been ignored by government, as reflected in the exclusion of Coast region in the subsidy policy. But also international organizations and NGOs, as specified by Juma Mwatima from IFAD, tend to exclude certain areas. Most IFAD projects for example are based in the Northern areas of Tanzania (Miss Mwatima, 2013). Mr Sebastian Sambuo, from the Rural Urban Development

Initiative (RUDI, 2013), a local NGO, also confirms that some areas in Tanzania, including Coast region, have been more ignored than others, and also the NGO in which he works does not operate in Coast region (it operates in 63 villages in other 10 regions of Tanzania). Also, international NGOs are usually based in the northern parts of the country, more easily accessible and with a more tolerable climate. Out of 62 NGOs dealing with agriculture registered in the Tanzania National NGO Coordination government website only three are located in Coast region (of these two are in Bagamoyo, on the coast, and only one in the Kibaha district) while the majority are located in wealthier areas such as Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Morogoro, Ruvuma, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania NGOs National Coordination, 2013).

Furthermore, the results of the empirical research gave an overview of two different realities, with different issues, cultures and farm systems but with lots of similarities, especially if the results of policies and the attitude of farmers towards the state are analysed. It is true that the attitude of state officials towards small scale farmers in Coast region is generally more negative (and this is at the root of the decision of excluding this region from the subsidy program, as explained by Mr Mayabu from the Department of Seeds and Inputs, 2013), but as noted previously, policy failure and food insecurity are also present in Kilimanjaro region, where despite a more positive attitude from state officials there is still a certain alienation of society from it. Despite the claim that in Coast region there are no farmers (Mr Mayubu, 2013) the villages interviewed in Kibaha district were inhabited by farmers, who spend their days on the farm or trying to find other sources of income. At time of harvest, most farmers interviewed admitted to having slept on their farms to keep wild animals at bay and protect their fields. Most farmers in this area have to walk several kilometres to reach their farms. This is because the farms, closer to the water sources, are often

far from the villages. As mentioned in chapter 4, as a consequence of the villagization policies, the villages have often been located in areas far from water sources, and this is one of the major problems of farmers in this region.

Calling it laziness is clearly a way to exonerate the state's past and present failure to improve the livelihoods of many farmers. It is also a way to justify farmers' poor performances without having to look and address their issues in an effective way, externalising and dismissing the problem instead of thinking at possible solutions to solve it. Moreover, the idea that farmers in Kilimanjaro are more productive and more entrepreneurial is true only to a certain extent. In the Mwanga district, on the villages on the mountains, farmers are struggling with a unreliable weather, poor connections and the lack of market to sell their produce as a consequence of many cooperatives closing and international market price below the production costs. For these reasons, many farmers in this area have stopped cultivating cash crops – mainly coffee - and went back to cultivate food crops (on the decline of coffee production in this area see the study of Ikeno, 2007 and Craparo et al., 2015).⁴⁴

The stereotypes eradicated in the Tanzanian society are only but the expression of an official attitude towards farmers and the lack of consideration of the problems faced by rural communities; they also reveal a central negligence towards certain areas of the country, and add elements to understand the detrimental relationship between the state and the society. Furthermore, they conditioned the formulation of top-down and state-centric policies, which gives little consideration to the needs of small scale farmers and hence fail to improve their conditions. All these aspects of the

⁴⁴ For instance, in Mwanga district the production of coffee has decreased dramatically from around 700 tons in 1985/86 to 100 tons in 2004/2005 (Ikeno, 2007).

Tanzanian state are in line with the analysis put forward by Ferguson and Gupta (2002) in describing the vertical structure of power.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the outcome of the agricultural policies that the successive governments of Tanzania has promoted in the last 15 years, and the way these policies were formulated and received by society. The relative success/failure of policies has been analysed by looking at the level of mechanization and modernisation (use of modern seeds and inputs), involvement of the private sector, infrastructures and access to the markets, farmers' satisfaction and farmers' awareness of policies.

In short, from the results of the empirical research emerges a general discontent from the farmers and some local government officials towards these policies, which have failed in both achieving their stated objectives (modernisation and commercialization of the agricultural sector by a greater opening to private sector partnership and investments) and in improving the conditions/livelihoods of small scale farmers and consequently their level of food security. Furthermore, it was claimed that the failure of such policies to achieve modernisation was attributable to a series of reasons. There is a tension between the state and the private sector, with the latter blaming the state for still wanting to retain a high level of control over the agricultural sector. Foreign investments in the agricultural sector remain scarce, also due to the confusing and bureaucratically complex system of land transfers. Furthermore, a lack of coordination between the central government and the local government emerged from the interviews with both central state and local state representatives. This adds to forms of corruption and misplacement of funds during the implementation of

projects. On the farmers' side, there is distrust towards the extension service, which limit the possible positive outcome of policies as it makes farmers sceptical of new initiatives.

Moreover, and more importantly, the core of this thesis argues that these policies fail to improve the conditions of the greater majority of farmers in the country because they were not framed around the needs of such farmers, and were not in favour of small scale agriculture (on state's distrust towards traditional methods and local farmers see for instance Scott, 1998). Alongside this, there is also a lack of effective information and knowledge dissemination on what these policies would entail for farmers: an example being the subsidies programme of Kilimo Kwanza. Behind the policies not being in favour of small scale agriculture, there is state's officials' idea that only a transformation of the agricultural system from small scale driven to large and medium scale can lead to the growth of agricultural production. This adds to generalised stereotypes and a negative opinion of small scale farmers often described as stubborn, ignorant, backwards and lazy (with Coast region farmers receiving the worst of it).

Hence, it has been observed that the top-down approach of the state is also reinforced by the definition of the role of the extension officers, seen as the 'teachers' of the 'right farming methods'. This patronising approach reflects little trust in the ability of farmers to improve the agricultural sector. This top down approach does not facilitate the relationship between the state and rural society, creating a condition of reciprocal distrust, where farmers look at the state with scepticism and detachment. Political detachment is manifested in several ways, for instance by boycotting public meetings or the advice of extension officers, or by following tribal and cultural customs more than the national set of rules, as

demonstrated by the example on land regulation. As clearly explained by Azarya, Olorunsola, Ayoade and Chazan (all 1988), in rural Tanzania farmers' disengagement, understood as a form of alienation from the state and expressed by a withdrawal from it, is related to a conviction in a lack of capabilities and willingness of the state to improving the conditions of the society (Olorunsola, 1988, pp. 189-207).

In particular, the results of the interviews collected in Kilimanjaro region - where villagization did not take place and memories of Nyerere are positive - provide interesting elements to believe that farmers' disengagement from the state is more the consequence rather than the cause of the state's attitude towards farmers, although it is true that the state became harsher and more extended as a result of a deluding participation of farmers towards the realization of Ujamaa's objectives despite an agricultural sector highly subsidized.

If farmers have chosen the 'exit option' as an expression of their discontent and disengagement towards the state, what are the coping strategies they choose against food insecurity? And, given their discontent towards the recent agricultural policies presented in this chapter, what are their forms of contestation? The next chapter will look at these issues in more detail.

Chapter 7 - Farmers' political engagement and coping strategies for food security

7.1. Introduction

While the previous chapter analysed the complicated relationship between the state and farmers, underlining the feeling of alienation of this social group towards formal politics, this chapter will look at first, social hindrances to political action that impede farmers from forming a collective movement, and second, the coping strategies of rural communities and their attempts to improve their conditions, both at the individual and the collective level. As explained in the previous chapter, a disregard towards small scale farmers needs, and a negative attitude of state elites towards small scale agriculture, characterise recent and past agricultural policies. As a consequence, the policies do not seem to have achieved the desired increase in agricultural production, in rural development (improved conditions for farming communities) and in the general economic performance of the agricultural sector. Rural movements have not been able to address the state and bring substantial social change in rural areas, confirming what Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) and Bratton and De Walle (1992) had noted in analysing African movements in general (see chapter 2). The reasons behind weak collective movements in Tanzania are hence to be found in the political history of the country. In the specific, I argue that the negative attitude of state elites, which has been shown to be historically grounded, contributed to create a tense relationship between rural communities and the higher level of the state, which has compromised the success of several initiatives.

In the light of this situation, this chapter will analyse farmers' responses to policy failure and agricultural crisis and their attempt to ensure their own food security.

Farmers' responses enact their discontent towards the state and manifest a form of political action, despite the fact that direct action is seldom reported. Seen through this lens, even intra-society clashes should be interpreted as a result of dissatisfaction of farmers with their livelihoods. Distrust within society is an important aspect of these conflicts and should be analysed in its political dimensions and beside farmers' reaction to state policy and food insecurity. Hence, the first part of this chapter will explore the conflicts within society and in particular the clashes between farmers and pastoralist communities and how this is mediated by the Tanzanian state.

This chapter will also look at how intra-national conflicts undermine the creation of a strong farmers' movement and strong farmers unions that could negotiate with the state and/or organise protest against undesired policies. Many scholars have highlighted the lack of a proper farmers' movement and the weak level of social cohesion in Tanzania (for example Hyden, 1980 and Kelsall, 2004). However, while it is true that direct forms of political engagement are rare, the reasons behind this need further assessment, and cannot only be attributed to an un-cohesive society as some scholars have tried to do in the past. Hyden (1980, 1983) for instance, blames the increasing individualist attitude of farmers, while other authors point to geographical issues that impede farmers' more direct contestation, such as living in remote and sparsely populated communities. Furthermore, there are scholars such as Chabal (2009) who play on the role of cultural differences and interaction of different tribes in order to account for the passivity of Tanzanian social movements.

There are no doubts that the historical background needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the ability and willingness to cooperate within farming communities. However, this chapter argues that the difficult relationship between the state and the farmers contributed to a feeling of political alienation of farmers

towards the state and a negative understanding of cooperative work within the farming communities themselves. In fact, the failure of past state-led initiatives such as the mismanagement of cooperatives in the 1970s (explained in Chapter 4) left a bitter memory in the minds of many rural farmers that directly experienced those years or simply heard about it. At the same time, the distrust towards state's abilities adds to the scepticism of farmers in the effectiveness of direct action. Hence, the reasons behind the lack of a strong farmers' movement that could address policy change and improve food security in the countryside by creating a direct link between farmers and state and improving democratic participation, are political and the reciprocal distrust between farmers and the state is connected to the struggles and conflicts within society.

Yet, despite the scepticism about cooperation and the ineffectiveness of direct political action, the strong message of this chapter is that there are other ways farmers react to food insecurity and policy failure. The second part of this chapter will present some of the coping strategies in place, and will stress how a different political approach, one characterised by inclusion, could lead to cooperation between farmers and hence to a more successful outcome of projects. The success of politically inclusive projects confirms that the failure of governmental programs is mostly due to the top down approach adopted by the state, as exposed in the previous chapter.

However, most of these projects - such as the Farming Field Schools implemented by the FAO - are managed and implemented by NGOs and international organisations, raising a whole set of different issues. The problem here is related to the influence of external agents on the national food system, and the growing dependence of the country on external aid. This dependence can again be read as a

form of dissatisfaction and distrust towards the state's capacity to address basic public issues. In this sense, the growing dependence on external aid, whilst helping to address short-term basic needs, is also deepening the wedge between society and the state.

7.2. Conflict as a form of discontent: clashes and mistrustfulness within society

Questions on cooperation within society add to questions on society cohesion, which will be analysed in this chapter. Clashes between pastoralists and farmers and a reluctant attitude towards cooperation are used as examples to describe a general mistrustfulness found in the areas interviewed, in particular in Coast region. It will be explained why, in this study, these episodes of mistrust within society are seen as a manifestation of discontent. We will reflect on the relevance of these attitudes within the political sphere of state-society relations. Do these episodes of mistrust within society reveal an individualistic character of farming communities as stressed by authors such as Hyden (1980) and Kelsall (2004)? And is this character limiting the creation of a strong farmers' movement and affecting the political relationship between state and rural society?

As it was noted in chapter 3 and 4, some scholars have criticised Nyerere for misunderstanding its society. In fact, Nyerere believed that he could create a national identity through the implementation of socialism, which would have put aside the differences within the many different tribes present in the territory (more than 130) in name of a Tanzanian spirit of cooperation and self-reliance. For this reason he also pushed for the adoption of Swahili as a national language to be spoken in all spheres of society. According to Nyerere, traditional African society used to be based on the socialist principle of cooperation. However, he felt that that spirit was already

somehow ruined by the influence of colonialism and capitalism and needed to be ‘reactivated’:

‘We have to reactivate the philosophy of cooperation in production and sharing in distribution which was an essential part of traditional African Society’ (Nyerere, Mbioni, Vol. IV No. III, p.15, from Lundi, 2012).

In *Freedom and Unity* he stated the importance of equality as a basic principle of his philosophy, also implying his desire to go beyond the distinctions between the tribes living in Tanzania (Nyerere, 1967). It is clear from the following statement that he aspired to social change driven by some form of nationalism:

‘In Africa the social ethic is changing, and has to change, from one appropriate to a tribal society to one appropriate to a national society’ (Nyerere, 1967, p.20).

Indeed, it can be said that Tanzania has been able to overcome tribal differences under a common spirit of national identity. Contrary to many other countries in the region, Tanzania has not experienced violent clashes between tribes, and this is perhaps one of the achievements of the moral drive and national vision Nyerere provided in the aftermath of independence (Kessler, 2006). Nevertheless, tribal differences persist with many tribes retaining their cultural customs and traditions and observing traditional customs more than the national set of rules. For instance, the Maasai tribe communities generally prefer to live outside the villages and strongly defend their nomadic way of life against state control (Coast, 2002; Benjaminsen et al., 2013).

Episodes of antagonism within society are also present, even though they do not assume the appearance of violent conflicts at national level and are not directly driven by tribal differences. These conflicts are a result of a general dissatisfaction within society complicated even further by confusing or misleading policy legislation and its implementation, for example concerning land ownership. Such are the clashes between farmers and pastoralist communities that will be illustrated below. In this sense, these conflicts highlight the limited ability of the state to deal with land discrepancies in an effective way, confirming and reinforcing the idea of a distant and alienated state. Behind the clashes between these two parts of rural society, there is therefore a common and shared sense of discontent towards the high level of political power.

7.2.1. Conflict between pastoralists and farmers

Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are certainly not new in Tanzania. As a matter of fact, the villagization process in the 1970s accelerated the creation of villages where people from different tribes had to live together and share resources. This increased intra-society conflicts, in spite of Nyerere's vision of unity, peace and cooperation. In 1975, a land use division agreement was decided by the government whereby grazing and farming activities were assigned specific areas of land (Msuya, 2009). The land division system is in place, at least in theory, still today, but it is scarcely applied, and often challenged by both pastoralists and farmers.

Yet, increased violence has been registered over the last decades. In particular, conflicts increased as a larger number of pastoralists started to migrate from the northern part of the country towards the central, southern and eastern areas – for

examples in several districts in the regions of Morogoro, Manyara, Coast, Lindi, Mbeya, Tanga and Dodoma - as a result of climate change, population growth and the expansion of areas under cultivation and land delimited for national parks, which have reduced access to pasture and water resources (Mwamfupe, 2015). Except from some districts in Mbeya, Manyara and Dodoma, the other regions have historically not been characterized as important areas for livestock keeping. Hence, in the words of Mwamfupe:

‘these conflicts are now being witnessed in predominantly crop cultivating areas which had no prior experience of livestock keeping, let alone experiences of other resource use conflicts. Indeed, this partly explains why farming communities label the herders as “invaders”’ (Mwamfupe, 2015, p.2).

For these reasons, violent clashes were reported in several parts of the country over the last years, for instance in December 2000, 38 farmers were killed during clashes in Kilosa district, Morogoro Region, while more recently, in January 2014, 10 farmers died during conflicts in Kiteto district, Manyara Region (Makoye, 2014). State intervention to resolve these controversies has proven ineffective. The policies on land management are often contradictory. For example, as noted by Lugoe (2011), the Livestock Policy of 2006 recognises nomadism as an important aspect of pastoralism and encourages the move from overgrazed areas to lower grazed areas. However, the National Land Policy (the Land Act and the Village Act of 1999) prohibits nomadism in all its forms and does not regulate land ownership to herders (Lugoe, 2011, Mwamfupe, 2015). Furthermore, the attempt to confine livestock keepers to certain areas and to limit nomadism has proven difficult, as pastoralists

lament that these areas lack sufficient pastures and water or these resources are too far, and therefore defend nomadism as a survival technique (Kaney, 2014, Mwamfupe, 2015). Pastoralists also claim that the government is not protecting them and in some cases is actually conspiring to evict them and sell their land to foreign investors; for example in Loliondo the government has been accused of trying to sell 1,500sq km of land inhabited by Maasai to a company based in the United Arab Emirates to create a game hunting reserve (Smith, 2014).

On the other side, farmers accuse local officials of collusion with pastoralists in an attempt to make them leave certain areas. For instance, in the most recent conflict in Kiteto district, Kizito Makoye, writing for the International Press Service, collected declarations from several farmers of the area who accused local officials of taking bribes from pastoralists to evict farmers from economically strategic areas and to influence political decisions to their disadvantage. Job Ndugai, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of Tanzania, referred to this situation by stating that:

‘Land disputes are fuelled by officials... Who have been soliciting bribes in terms of money and livestock from pastoralists to evict farmers on the pretext that the land occupied by farmers is a reserved area’ (Makoye, 2014).

These rumours have been dismissed as false by local officials, but this attitude of officials has also been noted in other circumstances (Benjaminsen, Maganga and Abdallah, 2009). For instance, Yefred Myenzi, a researcher from the Land Rights Research and Resource Institute (HakiArdhi) also argues that most of the conflicts are the results of decisions and actions taken by the state. According to the researcher, besides confusing land policies at national level, violation of laws by

district officials, corruption and weak law enforcement are causes of the struggle for resources. These adds to a lack of proper awareness and knowledge of the land tenure system and inadequate participation of local people in policy and law formation (Makoye, 2014; on this also Mwamfupe, 2015).

The results of my study are not dissimilar. The conflicts between pastoralists and farmers should be analysed in their political dimension, looking at the role that state officials play in it. Although the villages in Coast Region where the interviews were conducted are not in the proximity of a natural reserve, almost 50% of the farmers interviewed reported one of their major problems to be the disruptions caused by cattle trespassing their fields (for greater details see Chapter 5). In general, as we will see below, farmers accused policemen of favouring pastoralists during their clashes, while local politicians were accused of not taking a strict stand on the issue and to be keeping an ambiguous position. In other words, not only is the state regarded as being weak and distant by farmers, it is also accused of being partial.

The nature of these clashes and the discrepancies around the land management issue are exemplified by some episodes witnessed during the fieldwork in Coast region. During the fieldwork in November 2012, I met the chairperson of Dutumi, Mr Kanusu, near the river of the village, busy handling some trespassing issues and debating with farmers. The latter were showing and lamenting the disruption of their fields caused by cattle trespassing. Later on, Mr Kanusu showed me a fenced area near the town hall where all the cows ‘caught’ in farmers’ fields are kept, waiting for the pastoralists to claim them back and pay the trespassing fine to the council, which will then pass the amount paid to the farmers involved. Mr Kanusu explained to me that, being the village chairperson, the only thing he could do is to catch the cows and wait for the pastoralists to reclaim them. He adds that writing to the district and

asking for the problem to be addressed has proven ineffective. Nearby, in the Secondary School of the village of Kwala, it was not unusual to find cows ‘trapped’ in one of the classrooms, caught by students that would wait and hope for the owner to come and pay a release fee. The headmaster of the school, Mr Mitimangi, explained that:

‘the students are catching the cows that invade the school area and keep them until the owner comes and pays about 100,000 TZ Shillings per cow [around £30]; this is happening more frequently this year, because it is very dry and the rains have not yet started [usually they start at the end of October]. The problem is that after a few weeks that this has been going on, now the owners are not coming back to get their cows, because they believe that their cows will die anyway later on because of starvation. Even the school has difficulties to keep these animals alive until the owner reclaim them, often the cows die and end up in the school canteen [eaten by the students]’ (Michael Mitimangi, 2013).

Besides the declarations of the headmaster of the school, it was clear that the students had found an innovative way to ‘entertain’ themselves and to get money - although the school would eventually keep the money paid by the pastoralists to have their cows back - and were starting to take advantage of it, deliberately attracting the cows to enter the school compound with the intention to catch them. Of course, this is an isolated example, as farmers would have little interest to deliberately attract the cows in their fields just for the monetary return. This is because the produce that they may lose as a consequence of the trespassing may have a higher value of the compensation that they may get from the pastoralists. Moreover, individual farmers are less powerful than an institution such as the school

hence the probability to actually obtain the compensation are lower and uncertain. Nevertheless, the attitude of the students shows a disrespectful attitude towards the Maasai and Daatoga pastoralist minorities.

These episodes in general exemplify the problem of cows trespassing and the tension between farmers and pastoralists within the communities interviewed in Coast region. The chairperson of Dutumi explains that 'Kwala and Mperamumbi have been allocated to farmers, while in Dutumi and Msua the district allocated about 3,000 acres for pastoralists, without specifying a limit on the amount of cattle that can be present in this area' (Mkali Saidi Kanusu, 2012). This represents a problem for farmers in Dutumi, who are more exposed to cattle invasion in their field, as the cows are growing in number and the acres allocated do not suffice. In the case of trespassing, the law requires the owner of the cattle to compensate the farmers for the loss in their fields. If an agreement cannot be found there should be a court trial. However, several farmers interviewed in Mwembengozi and Msua complain that pastoralists never pay them back, or that pastoralists bribe policemen not to bring them to court for illegal trespassing (S.S.M., Mwembengozi, 2012; the chairperson of Mwembengozi, Mwimbe, 2012; F. M., Msua, 2012). In addition, pastoralists will only pay if they get caught, but often the cows get into farmers' fields during the night, when it is more difficult for farmers to catch the animal and identify the owner to ask for a refund. Moreover, as reported by Kwala's extension officer, it could happen that even though the procedures are followed, and there is a trial in court, pastoralists can afford to go to the court (which is in Mlandizi, a town about 30km away from the villages of Kwala and Dutumi) while the farmers cannot, so the pastoralists have more chances to win the cases (Mr Kimicho, 2012; also Miss Pengo, area representative of Msua, 2012). Pastoralists are not generally wealthier

than farmers, and actually their living conditions are usually of a lower material standard than those of the farmers in the villages interviewed. Very rarely do they have access to electricity, and their houses are isolated from the villages and built with wood, straw and mud. However, they usually have more disposable cash when they sell some of their livestock. As referred by one of my former Tanzanian students belonging to the Sukuma tribe, which is now a pastoralist with over 100 cows in Mwembengozi, an adult cow sold in the local market could fetch up to 400,000 Shillings (around £120), which could satisfy the food needs of a medium household for about two months (Mahene, 2015).

References to physical and direct confrontation between farmers and livestock holders can be traced in some declarations given by farmers. For instance, H.A.F. (2012), a farmer in Kwala, affirms that he ‘only got a bike as a repayment for his loss [of crops], but if farmers want to have a full refund from the pastoralists they need to be strong’. According to A.M.F., if you are a woman or an elder person, it is even more difficult to face the cattle owners, as ‘they are strong’ and many farmers are afraid of being beaten up or ‘even killed’ (A.M.F., Mwembengozi, 2012).

These examples hint at a precarious peace within different parts of the society. Furthermore, such social tensions impacts upon the the political behaviours of the individuals involved. Indeed, the conflicts with pastoralists offer farmers a further opportunity to criticise state officials, as the farmers interviewed claimed for example that ‘their voices are not heard, as policemen prefer to defend the interests of pastoralists rather than the interests of agriculturalists, because pastoralists bribe them’ (A.P.N., Mongomole, 2012). For many farmers in this area, cattle trespassing is a major problem that affects their lives and for which they have to act individually as they feel that the state does not help them. J.R.S., a farmer from Msua, claims that

‘farmers cannot improve their life because of pastoralists, as you have to guard your farm all day while you could spend your time doing other jobs’ (J.R.S., 2012). Moreover, farmers complain that ‘they cannot keep any goats or cows, because they will get stolen by pastoralists’ (F.M., Msua, 2012). Several farmers expressed the wish for pastoralists such as the Maasai and Daatoga -commonly referred to by the interviewees with the derogatory term ‘Mang’ati’- to be ‘chased away’ (R.T., Dutumi, 2012).

Not only are pastoralists believed to affect farmers’ livelihoods, but there is a general concern that future agricultural projects, such as the irrigation scheme of Mongomole, Kwala (see chapter 6 for details about this project) would be disrupted too, if this problem is not politically addressed by state officials. The chairperson of this scheme is very clear in this, and affirms:

‘if the issues of pastoralists will not be addressed the project will be destroyed. The farmers will guard their farms but it takes only one small distraction to lose the produce of half an acre. The group of farmers involved in the project has asked the village committee and the district to address the issue and make firm decisions, for example limit the amount of cattle that the pastoralists can own in a determinate amount of space, and make sure that the pastoralists respect the rules. Moreover, it is important that pastoralists are kept far from the area where the project will be implemented’ (Mr Zanda, 2012).

According to local politicians, it is difficult to estimate how many pastoralists live in a specific area because they live in secluded areas far from the villages (‘they hide in the bushes’ in the words of one of the local officers in Msua, 2012), and often do not

register their new born children, as they try to ‘escape governmental control’ and do not want to be forced to send their children to school (Miss Pengo, 2012). Hence, beside the problem of trespassing, there is a clear problem of integration, which adds complexity to the conflicts between them and the villagers.

Admittedly, local politicians find it difficult to settle this conflict, caught between a tendency to defend farmers, which have ‘been born here and have the right to stay’ (Miss Pengo, 2012), and the revenues provided by the presence of pastoralist communities to local businesses, mostly recreational places and small grocery shops. Moreover, the local politicians interviewed (the chairperson of Kwala and the one from Dutumi, for example) blame the unclear land legislation, and the directives coming from district and central state officials, for creating a situation in which they are powerless to address the conflict in any effective way. Again then, unclear policies at the national level are seemingly complicit in rendering processes of local governance more difficult.

At the same time, the district officials believe that the problem is within local jurisdiction and local officials ‘should enforce the law’ and use the land use plans formulated by the district in order to prevent intra-society conflicts. According to Sibara Singa, the Agricultural, Livestock and Cooperatives officer of Kibaha district, pastoralists tend not to respect these agreements and this makes it difficult for local officials to prevent the conflicts (2013). As was noted in the previous chapter, the fact that the state actors at different levels blame each other and the negative attitude towards rural villagers (both pastoralists and farmers) makes the understanding and prevention of conflicts even more complex. Furthermore, it makes it harder for both pastoralists and farmers to address resource management issues and clearly understand both state’s responsibilities and the rules they should abide to.

7.2.2. Difficulties of cooperative association

Intra-societal antagonisms do not seem to be confined to farmer-pastoralist conflicts. Several politicians, farmers, scholars and members of civil society also believe that there is a general distrust within society, which impedes them from cooperating successfully and working together towards a common objective. The clashes between farmers and pastoralists are one expression of this general distrust. Further manifestation of distrust can be found in the difficulties of cooperation and the lack of a strong farmers' movement and unions, that seem to characterise the areas studied. These forms of distrust not only depict a fragmented society, but are also important factors impacting coping strategies against food insecurity and farmers' political engagement with the state. But if the struggle caused by unclear land ownership legislation is at the basis of the conflict between farmers and pastoralists, what is behind the difficulties of farmers to aggregate and create a strong movement or work within a cooperative structure?

As one of the country's most historically important channels of aggregation of farmers (Lyimo, 2012, p.127), this study will look at the cooperative movements to understand whether a reluctance towards general cooperation is connected to the historical evolution of agricultural cooperatives. It is essential to have a look at historical events that have influenced the way cooperatives are seen by rural society. Following a period of negative performance of the cooperatives already present in the country before independence, the Tanzanian state decided to nationalise all cooperatives in 1976, effectively abolishing them as autonomous farmer-led institutions (Coulson, 1982, p.152; Bryceson, 1993, pp.53-62; Lyimo, 2012, pp. 115-118). In response, farmers tried to escape state control by, among other things,

diverting produce to the black market to sell at a higher price than the state-run cooperatives would offer.

Meanwhile, the villagization process and the forced cooperation in the common fields were also to leave bitter memories. Many scholars report that villagers preferred to work in their personal plot as they could not see any benefit in working in the communal plot (Coulson, 1982, p. 242; Scott, 1998, p. 240). As explained in Chapter 4, the difficulties and problems of the villagization programme in the countryside created a series of problems at the social, economic and political level, where growing tensions between the farmers and the state were beginning to be felt (Sijm, 1997, p. 210-223; Raikes, 1982; and Scott, 1998, p. 239).

In 1982 the government decided to re-introduce the cooperatives under the Cooperative Societies Act, but the control of the state and of the major party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, was to remain strong. In 1991, further reforms were implemented with the objective to make the cooperatives more independent and involve the members in a more extended way. However, according to Lyimo, in reality the structure, objectives and rules of cooperatives were still strictly regulated by the state (Lyimo, 2012, p.115-117).

In fact, even though this represented an attempt to move away from a top-down approach, the Tanzanian scholar believes that:

‘the bottom-up approach had become a difficult strategy to be implemented successfully as farmers had been living under the support of the government, and hence there was a sense of dependence which critically eroded peasants’ confidence. There was lack of appropriate knowledge and the peasants believed that it was the role of the government

to initiate the formation of the cooperatives and to provide them with necessary financial resources, to supervise and control them in achieving the goals set by policy makers' (ibid., p.118).

Essentially, farmers had developed an understanding of cooperatives as an extension of the state, and had difficulties re-embracing the cooperative structure in autonomous terms.

Recently, there have been some positive changes, for example with the Cooperative Society Act of 2003 affirming that

‘the Bill will enable members to determine their own cooperative structure and destiny, build their share capital through member contributions, use such capital to access bank loans, and in general operate under conditions and reduced dependence on government assistance’ (Tanzania Parliament online, no date).

As a consequence of this act the number of cooperatives present in the countryside has actually increased. In June 2008 there was a total of 8,551 Cooperative Societies in the country, of which 2,614 were registered as ‘agricultural marketing cooperative societies’ (Lyimo, 2012, p. 122).

Nevertheless, as noted by Maghimbi, less than 80% of registered cooperatives are active, and management problems persist, with most of the active cooperatives being largely indebted with banks (Maghimbi, 2010, p.30). Furthermore, a large number of cooperatives have a short lifespan, as highlighted by the Coast Regional Commissioner, Ms Mwantumu Mahiza (AllAfrica, 2014). Bringing the example of the failure of the Coast Region Cooperative Union (CORECU), Ms Mahiza accuses

the leaders of several cooperatives to having been using the cooperatives' money for their own personal projects leading to a failure of cooperatives themselves (ibid., 2014). The Cooperative Reform and Modernization Program of 2005-2015 tries to address cooperatives issues, recognising these being 'poor management, inappropriate cooperative structures, a lack of working capital, a lack of cooperative democracy and education, weak supporting institutions, and some instances of corruption and embezzlement' (MF Transparency, 2011, p.8). In order to do so, this program has promoted efforts within the cooperatives to adopt a stronger regulatory framework and increase supervision. The results of this program should be seen in the next few years.

Yet, very few of the farmers interviewed in both Coast and Kilimanjaro Regions take part in a farmers' union, movement, or cooperative, showing that the recent increased number of cooperatives are to be found mostly in the proximities of urban areas. Bibby (2006) noted that in 2006 there were nearly twice as many cooperatives societies in urban areas than rural, and this is probably still the case. In the meanwhile, many cooperatives seem to be suffering also from the changes in the international market. Indicative is the case of coffee cooperatives in Kilimanjaro region. The Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union, one of the oldest and largest cooperatives in Tanzania, has recently been hardly hit by falling coffee prices at the international level and a declining production in many districts caused by the inability of the cooperative to continue offering input support to its members (Temba, 2013 and 2014). Furthermore, the internal structure of the cooperative started trembling as several of its members decided to sell their produce to a competing group of primary cooperative societies, the so called 'G32' that would pay a better price (Simbeye, 2013). Smaller cooperatives also suffered from the

declining price of coffee on the global market. For instance, in Kilimanjaro region, Mwanga district, in the village of Usangi, there used to be several coffee cooperatives but most of them are now disbanded, following the international food prices crisis in 2008 (chairperson of Kigare, 2013). Of the farmers interviewed in this area, only one was still cultivating coffee, and selling it to a cooperative in a nearby village, but many other farmers reported to have stopped cultivating coffee and to have gone back to maize, bananas, potatoes and minor crops, moving from cash crops to subsistence crops.

The farmers interviewed reported being sceptical about the effectiveness of cooperatives, for instance S.S. says ‘what is the point of having a cooperative? Even if we meet, we can talk about our problems all day, but then there will still be the problem of dryness, so what will we change? Unless you believe that dancing around a fire will call the rain...’ (S.S., Mwembengozi, 2012). Other farmers stress the ‘exclusivity’ of cooperative groups. For example, A.M.F. (2012) is over 60 years old and lives in a thatched house with her two grandchildren in Mwembengozi; she claims that no group would want her because she is old and slow to dig. In other cases, farmers believe that ‘it is difficult to be part of a cooperative because once the group is formed it is not really open to new members’ (R.H., Kigare, 2013). This echoed what has been argued by a member of the WFO and the RUDI organization (Miss Negroponte, 2013 and Mr Sambuo, 2013). In general, and as exemplified by the failure of the cooperative water irrigation scheme project in Kwala, Kibaha district, missing self-regulation mechanisms, implementation problems, unclear responsibilities and misuse of funds seem to be at the heart of the failure, and hence disillusionment with cooperative efforts.

Besides the participation to cooperative societies, the vast majority of the farmers interviewed reported that they did not meet with other farmers to discuss problems in their fields. For example, Edrissa, a farmer in Mperamumbi, admits that ‘if farmers want to contest governmental policy or bring forward special requests or ask for assistance it is better to act as a group’. However, he also claims that he does not like to be employed or work with a group of people, but he ‘prefers to be free and work by himself, even if this means being poorer’ (E., Mperamumbi, 2012). E.’s desire to be autonomous is explained by his belief that it is better to be his own employer and that by himself he can better manage his farm and satisfy his households’ needs. Disillusionment and doubts over the effectiveness of joining a group are clearly the result of past negative experiences that farmers had in the past. Even small initiatives that were started autonomously did not succeed. For example, in Dutumi a group of farmers got together and were given some water pumps from the government in order to start producing vegetables in a field nearby the village (see Chapter 6), while in Mwembengozi, another group of farmers bought and shared several watering cans to irrigate their field not too far from the river. Both these group initiatives stopped after a few months, because of management related problems and mismanagement of inputs, which made farmers reluctant to take part in future similar initiatives (chairperson of Mwembengozi, 2012).

The reasons behind the difficulties of cooperative associations and the reticence to cooperate expressed by several farmers have been explored by several studies. According to Kelsall, the heterogeneous nature of society in Tanzania is amongst the reasons that limit the ability of farmers to aggregate and act collectively (Kelsall, 2002, p.64, 65 and 163). According to the scholar, time management, in a society where farmers have to find other sources of income other than agriculture in order to

satisfy households' needs, is also an issue (ibid., 2002, pp.56-63). Several farmers and members of NGOs and international organizations interviewed, partly confirm this hypothesis, affirming that cooperatives 'have a hard time if the members do not know each other well, while they may work better if the members are part of the same religious or tribe group' (F.T.M., Mwembengozi, 2012, also Rohrabach, from World Bank, 2013). Essentially, it is important that the members of the group share common interests, beyond the economic sphere. Moreover, in order for group initiatives to succeed, 'farmers need to see the results, they need to know what are the future perspectives in order to get interested and get involved in projects and initiatives coming from outside', as explained by Mr Lukas, from Lonagro, a society that sells agricultural inputs in Dar es Salaam (2013).

A further idea that could explain the difficulties of cooperatives to succeed and the lack of strong movements is expressed by Hyden (1980), and Spalding (1996a), who both believe that farmers in Tanzania are essentially (and have been, historically) individualistic and not used to obeying a central authority or cooperating with each other. The idea that 'Nyerere got it wrong', in the sense that he misunderstood the nature of Tanzanian rural society, comes forth strongly in work by Hyden (1980 and 1983), and is also shared by later scholars. Shivji, for example, believes that certain values promoted by Nyerere's Ujamaa, such as equality, are 'alien and not organic' to rural citizens' perceptions (Shivji, 1995, pp.153, 158). Kelsall talks about a 'keenly individualistic streak' he witnessed in analysing communities in Arumeru district (Kelsall, 2004, p.10). But, importantly, this assumption is even shared by some of the people interviewed. For instance, David Rohrabach (2013), from the World Bank, believes that:

‘farmers are in general individualist, they farm their own plot of land, operate their own machinery, sell their own crops, and like to operate individually, while they often do not do well in group. The level of participation to the various projects varies, it depends on the project and how it is implemented. Often you can see that an organization is formed for a particular project, but after the project terminates the organization collapse’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).

Actually, individualistic attitudes, reciprocal jealousy and scarce community cooperation emerged in farmers’ accounts of certain episodes, such as the one reported by a farmer in Dutumi, A.H. According to his report, in 2011 a wealthy farmer of Kwala was able to get a lot of rice in his farm, and could not harvest all of it. Many villagers, from both Dutumi and Kwala, asked him to have the opportunity to harvest some of his rice and keep it for themselves, but he was very firm in not letting anyone touch his farm, even though that meant that most of the rice was wasted (A.H., Dutumi, 2012). In another occasion, a farmer in Mwembengozi reported that sometimes he hires a water pump from another farmer, but ‘when the owner of the water pump sees that [he is] doing well, he gets jealous and asks to have the water pump back’ (R.C.S., Mwembengozi, 2012). A.O., a farmer over 60 years of age that lives in Msua with her four young grand-daughters, reports that ‘in old days, during Ujamaa, farmers were working in cooperatives, but now everybody is more individualistic, some people are lazy while others work hard so there are no cooperatives anymore. During Nyerere farmers were helping each other, but now all of that is dead, we only work for ourselves and do things for ourselves’ (A.O., Msua, 2012).

Other farmers look at cultural reasons behind the lack of a strong farmers' movement and the decline of cooperative work. For instance, H.A.F., a farmer from the Zaramo tribe who lives in Kwala, claims that 'there are no cooperatives here; the Zaramo tribe do not know how to help each other and work together. In Kilimanjaro it is different...' (H.A.F., Kwala, 2012). Some officials from Kibaha district share this thought, recalling some of the stereotypes about Coast region farmers reported in the previous chapter. However, the results from Kilimanjaro region were no different, and except for a greater number of independent microfinance groups led by women, cooperation between farmers was weak. Does this support the idea that all farmers in Tanzania are individualistic though?

The argument of the individualistic character of Tanzanian farmers might offer some degree of insight into the situations observed, but it needs to be analysed in its specific context. Given the structure of the households visited during the fieldwork, in which mutual social assistance and family support were evident, it is difficult to believe that individualistic attitudes permeate all aspects of daily life. It is also more difficult to believe that individualism could be an inherent part or character of a whole community. It is more probable to think that some individualistic attitudes are the result of past experiences, disillusionment and distrust after the failure of past projects and loss of self-confidence, which led to a fear of failure in future group projects, or in the belief that group action is ineffective and/or pointless. Under this light, individualism is not an inner quality in the character of farmers, but is their response to a situation of discontent. In fact, cooperation and community sharing of wealth can be traced in other circumstances, for instance in the large family support within the households, in festivity events, and also in the sharing of food coming as food aid from the state and other organization during periods of food emergency.

Furthermore, farmers do cooperate and take part in projects if they feel directly involved and part of the decision process. If the failure and mismanagement of cooperatives in the past and the problems of working as a part of a group have put off farmers to cooperate, other circumstances have demonstrated that in certain conditions farmers are willing to cooperate. Empowerment is a determinant factor in affecting the level of involvement of farmers in different initiatives. In the following section, we will see how some of the results of the fieldwork have indicated that where a bottom up approach is implemented farmers are more willing to cooperate and the project is more likely to succeed.

7.3. Different approach, different results? Cooperative attitudes between farmers under programmes following a bottom-up approach

Initiatives such as the Farmer Field School (FFS), promoted by the FAO, and firstly introduced in Zanzibar by IFAD in 2007, and embraced by several NGOs that work in rural areas and deal with agriculture, seem to have success in the countryside and the number of farmers that participate in such projects is in continued growth, according to Mr Laizer (FAO coordinator of the FFS in Tanzania, interviewed in 2013). The FFS are based on a principle of bottom up group-based learning and experimenting. Differently from the historical approach of the Tanzanian government (which sees the figure of the extension officer as central in providing the right farming mode to be reproduced by the rest of the farmers in the group), in the FFS all farmers have equal deciding power and take the decisions based on a democratic process. Initially, the FAO pays for the inputs and usually one of the farmers of the group donates the field. Part of the produce is shared, and the other is usually sold, in order to have a fund to sustain the costs of running the project in future years. According to a study conducted by Davis et al. (2010), in Tanzania the

FFS and their bottom up approach have improved income and increased agricultural income to the members. The FFS seem to also have a positive impact on food security (Larsen and Bie Lilleør, 2014). The success of these projects compared to the ones promoted by the state confirms that the problem with state's policy is mainly a problem of approach. A study conducted by Braun and Duveskog (2008) also underlines how the key of success of the FFS is to be found in the participatory approach used. Raphael Laizer, the FAO coordinator of the FFS in Tanzania agrees:

‘The FFS approach develops knowledge, attitudes and practices, and promotes participation. Farmers prefer to get together through the FFS, because these use a participative approach, where farmers have full decisional power and learn even through making mistakes. Moreover, farmers are cooperating with each other because the group is self-selected and they decide the rules of the group themselves’ (Laizer, 2013).

Similar initiatives are also run by local NGOs, such as the Rural Urban Development Initiative, which trains farmer groups and helps them improve their marketing skills. Sebastian Sambuo, representative of this NGO, on farmers' attitude towards cooperatives and on the initiatives run by his organization, claims that:

‘Cooperatives have a bad reputation because of political interference on them in the past. Autonomous groups, such as the ones supported by RUDI are outside the government, so farmers are more inclined to participate’ (Sambuo, 2013).

But the bottom up approach and the level of autonomy in these projects are not the only factors accounting for success. In fact, in the previous section we saw that other projects, started autonomously by groups of farmers were not successful. Where is

the difference between the projects promoted by the FAO and RUDI and those initiated by smaller autonomous groups? It is clear that the presence, the follow up, the initial training and the expertise and the funding provided by the organizations that promote such initiatives to the group of farmers makes the difference in the projects outcome. Bahati Maregewe, from the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Programme⁴⁵ and Marina Negroponte, from the World Food Programme, underline that it is extremely important to empower farmers and create ownership of the project in order to promote efficiency and create the conditions in which farmers have an interest to maintain and continue the project as a group. Nevertheless, they admit that ‘initially lots of follow-up and close assistance are needed, but once the farmers see the benefits of working as a part of a group they have no problems in cooperate with each other’ (Negroponte, 2013). For the P4P programme,⁴⁶ for example, Negroponte claims that

‘it took about five years to run smoothly, and for the people to be convinced that they could benefit from this. Before being involved in the P4P, households were producing an average of 1.4 metric tonnes of maize per year, but now they are producing about 4.1 metric tonnes per year, and more people want to take part in this project’ (ibid, 2013).

It is important to note that extension officers also participate in many of these programmes, but while they can provide advice and assistance, it is the farmers themselves that have full decision-making power. The extension officer, in projects such as the Farmer Field School, is more of a guide and behaves like a member of

⁴⁵ The Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Programme (TAPP) is a USAID funded programme that support local NGOs to assist farmers with the use of technology in agriculture and creating connection with the market.

⁴⁶ The P4P programme is funded by the Gates Foundation, and aims at promoting and helping local farmers by buying the food aid needed and distributed in the country from local farmers in areas where there is a surplus of food production.

the group rather than an imposing teacher. According to Braun and Duveskog (2008) this approach makes a big difference to the harmony and the cooperative spirit of the group. This has also been claimed by several of the people interviewed (Negroponte, 2013; Sambuo, 2013; Laizer, 2013; Mwatima Juma, 2013; Maregewe, 2013).

Nevertheless, like many state initiatives, these projects also target some areas of the country (the North for example) and neglect others. For instance, in the areas interviewed in Kibaha district and in Mwanga district there were no programmes of this sort. With the support provided by initiatives such as the FFS (expertise, training and funding), cooperation between farmers in these areas could be successful and improve their lives. With the right premises and if they feel ownership over the project, farmers are willing to work together. This hypothesis is confirmed by a project that I personally started in the secondary school of Kwala in October 2011 (still ongoing), and observed throughout the following years. This project, sponsored by the Rotary Club, had as a first objective the creation of a school garden to cultivate vegetables for the school canteen, and gave an interesting insight into the vision of agriculture by the younger generation of future farmers, as well as showcasing their ability to work as members of a group. Most children (between 12 and 18 years of age) that volunteered to participate belonged to a farming household and saw themselves as future full-time or part-time farmers (as a side activity to run while also doing another economic activity). The results were surprising. In 2011, the first group comprised 30 members, and the area cultivated was around one acre, while today the group is composed by around 120 students which cultivate an area bigger than three acres, and includes a poultry farm with over 40 chickens. With minimal supervision, the students were able to share the workload, create several groups to share activities, and write their own code of conduct, with penalties and

awards to the members according to their contribution to the project. They keep a daily journal and attend theoretical agricultural lessons at the school based on the national educational curricula on agriculture.

The Rotary pays for the inputs, the seeds and the salary of the teacher that supervises the project. Initially I supervised the students; we had meetings where we discussed together an organizational structure and where I offered assistance and guidance. After this short period of training, the students were given full decision-making power; they followed a voting system to decide how to share the workload, what to plant and where, to take care of irrigation, manure and fertilizer, and to organize, share and cook the vegetables after harvesting. Most of the times the students prefer to cook the vegetables at the school and eat them together with the other members, rather than taking their share home. According to the vice master of the school, Mr Ngimba, the project:

‘has proven successful in many ways, it has increased students’ confidence, their knowledge of different agricultural practices, their ability to use the little resources available, and it has demonstrated that agriculture can be successful if the resources are used in an efficient way’ (Ngimba, 2013).

Moreover, it has helped students develop a spirit of team work, and a passion for agricultural activities, while also improving their organizational skills, and their nutrition (Ngimba, 2013). One of the students participating, Hamisi Abdallah, reported that: ‘this project made me realise than being part of a group can be fun, especially if you can decide the next step. I feel like being an important part of the group, and I am proud of the results’ (Abdallah, 2013).

The assessment of this small project adds to the declarations of representatives of international organizations and NGOs interviewed (from FAO, IFAD, WB, RUDI, TAPP, etc.) and lends support to one of the thesis' key claims that individualism, distrust and an unwillingness to cooperate are not an intrinsic part of rural society, but instead depend on the terms and conditions upon which projects are developed and implemented. Farmers need to see the benefits and to understand and share the values of the project, as well as feeling a part of the group and having decision-making power. Initial guidance, founding and follow up are also very important for a project to be successful and to create a basis of sustainability.

Therefore, the reasons behind the scarce participation of farmers in state-driven initiatives need to be found outside a supposed inner individualistic character that authors such as Hyden (1980) and Kelsall (2004) had identified. The reasons behind farmers' distrust towards state officials both at local, district and national level and their reticence towards cooperation needs to be explored in their historical context. In the following sections the modalities in which discontent is expressed at a political level will be explained.

7.4. Coping strategies towards food security and farmers' engagement with the state

The lack of a strong farmers' movement has been interpreted as a form of political passivity by scholars such as Kelsall, who, writing about the lack of a strong movement in opposition to the 'hegemonic ambitions' of the state, argued that: 'What is most interesting about rural Tanzania in the independence period is not its degree of politicization; it is its passivity', (Kelsall, 2004, p.8).

True, historically very little has been done to involve and promote rural citizens' participation in political life. Following liberalisation, since the early 1990s, Tanzania witnessed a change in the structure of power dynamics, which became less state centric and more 'multi-level', with a 'horizontal shift of responsibilities from government to NGOs and civil society actors' (Havnevik et al., 2010, p.4). Moreover, since the 1990s there has been the introduction of a multi-party system and further devolution of power to the regional and district administrations. However, as noted in Chapter 4, these changes do not seem to have led to greater participation of rural areas citizens in political life. Actually, the decentralization process was a way to enforce the control of central state officials over local decisions (Hyden, 1980, pp.134-141; Coulson, 1982, p.254; Ninsin, 1988, pp.234-265; Olorunsola, 1988, pp.192-193). It is also debatable how much the introduction of the multi-party system has contributed to the process of democratization; despite the presence of about 18 parties, only five are represented in the Parliament, and the opposition lacks a realistic and comprehensive political programme, which makes the major party, CCM, a winner in all national elections (Shivji, 2005, Ewald, 2010, pp.223-253). According to Ewald, 'one of the main constraints for the emergence of a more democratic society was and still is the lack of arenas for participation and voicing opinion' (Ewald, 2010, p.236). The state tends to suppress criticism, for example by not renewing licenses for business people or by suppressing demonstrations and public meetings. At the same time, the employees of the public sphere cannot stand in any election, but they have to resign first, and run the risk of not being employed again if they had campaigned for the opposition (ibid., p. 243).

The limited political engagement of farmers, as we have seen in the previous chapters, can be seen in the poor attendance at local meetings, in the lack of strong

political movements and direct contestations, in their scepticism of collaboration with state officials, and in the relatively poor electoral turnout. Citizens' turnout to elections in Tanzania has been generally lower than 50%, and has declined over the years recording the lowest rate of 37.53% in the last parliamentary elections of 2010. The turnout for Presidential election was at 40.71% (International IDEA, 2015). This runs counter to the growing level of political participation in neighbouring Kenya for example, where electoral turnout has been on the rise from 40.9% in 1992 to 55.6% in the 2013 Parliamentary elections.⁴⁷ Within this data, it is difficult to know the electoral turnout of farming communities compared to citizens employed in other sectors or living in the cities. Nonetheless, most of the chairpersons interviewed agreed that rural communities feel closer to local politicians, because they know them better and feel that they belong to their same social group. It is plausible to assume that local elections are more participated in than national ones. Therefore, in the words of Mr Msemakweli (chairperson of Kwala):

‘The common people do not really understand much of politics, or of the power dynamics between different parties. The key for a political party to win the national elections [and gain the trust and the vote of rural citizens] is to have charming representatives and a good amount of funds to run the campaigns in the villages’ (Mr Msemakweli, 2013).

⁴⁷ In other nearby countries such as in Zambia and Uganda the electoral turnout (considered as the percentage of the voting aged population that actually voted) is more variable over the years. In the last elections the electoral turnout for Zambia was at 42.25% for Parliamentary elections in 2011, while it recorded its historical lowest rate at 24.17% for Presidential elections in 2015 that follow the death of the former President Michael Sata. In Uganda the electoral turnout for the last elections in 2011 was at 55.32% for both Parliamentary and Presidential elections. Rwanda is, differently from the other countries of the area, characterized by a very high percentage in electoral turnout, reaching 99.38% for the last Parliamentary elections in 2013 and 89.17% for the Presidential elections in 2010 (data retrieved from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, International IDEA, 2015).

This claim is important as it partially explain why the ruling party has been in power since independence, and confirms the concerns expressed by several scholars (such as Shivji, 2005; Pinkney, 2005; Edwal, 2010) about the difficulties of the opposition parties to run an effective electoral campaign, as they have less financial resources and a weaker political manifesto than CCM.

The reasons behind the low participation of farmers in electoral politics are diverse. As argued in Chapter 4, it can be interpreted as the consequence of an effort of farming communities to escape state control over their way of life. While this may indicate a willingness of rural communities to preserve their tribal costumes and traditions, it also underlines how the tendency of the state to exercise control in rural areas in a top-down manner is at the basis of state-society alienation. In fact, the diffused presence of formal institutions and state control in the countryside was resented by the population and has certainly contributed at harshening the relationship between the state and farmers, creating an ‘alienated, demoralised, and uncooperative peasantry’ (Scott, 1998, p.237). At the same time, it can be argued that the central control and expanded bureaucracy that characterised Tanzanian politics at least until the mid-1980s was an answer to ‘peasant resistance’ and a way to force rural communities to accept the introduction of new methods and crops (Coulson, 1982, p.162).

Hence, this thesis argues that farmers’ alienation towards the state does not translate into complete political apathy. As noted by Scott (1998) and Mamdani et al. (1988) there are several ways to show dissent, and the ‘exit option’, characterised by citizens deliberately choosing not to take part in direct contestation, could be one of these, and represents a reaction to policy discontent. Moreover, the previous chapters have described examples of farmers rejecting (or even deriding) policies and advice

from the district, local and extension officers - for instance the case of sorghum plantation in Mwanga district. Other episodes pointed at farmers boycotting formal meetings - see the example of the scarce participation to public meetings in Usangi, and the example in Kwala when farmers did not participate to meetings to discuss the problems of the irrigation project.

This rejection, or 'passive resistance' in the words of Raikes (1982),⁴⁸ is clearly a form of indirect political engagement and challenging of the state. Hence, in summary, and as it has been explained in the current and in the previous chapters, the communities interviewed mainly showed two forms of reaction to state policies: non-compliance and boycott or non-participation in political events (mostly meetings). Furthermore, the coping strategies adopted by farmers to improve their livelihoods and food security are also political. In fact, the choice of resorting to illegal practices (such as intensive charcoal production and game hunting) is a further proof of a society which does not recognise or respect state's authority.

7.4.1. Coping strategies for food security

The cash needs arising from a liberalisation of services in the 1980s pushed farmers to search for other forms of income. Thus, the phenomenon of depeasantisation, as described by Bryceson (in Havnevik et al., 2010, pp.76-81), is common in rural Tanzania, where agriculture alone is not sufficient to cover household needs. There are different options that farmers pursue as alternatives or in addition to farming. In the Coast region the main alternative in rural areas is charcoal production. For instance, in Kibaha region, one of the districts surveyed, the production of charcoal is very popular amongst farmers: more than 30% of the farmers interviewed admitted

⁴⁸ Raikes (1982) talked about 'passive resistance' referring to the attitude of farmers to resist and escape modernisation, boycotting state's initiatives and resisting change in the countryside.

to producing charcoal as a side activity, and in dry seasons they rely on charcoal production to satisfy their economic needs. Especially in more isolated areas, such as between Mperamumbi and Msua, farmers engage in this activity as they claim that ‘agricultural productivity is extremely low because of weather condition and dry soil’ (L.V., Mperamumbi, 2012).

As an example, in Dutumi, A.U.K., a farmer of over 70 years of age, told me that he wakes up every morning at 5.30 am, he takes care of his farm after an hour of walking and later on he goes to the bushes to cut trees to prepare charcoal. He does so by piling the wood collected and covering it with soil and mud, leaving some holes for the oxygen to go through. He puts fire on the wood through one of these holes. The wood will burn very slowly for several hours, usually one day, and when there is no more smoke coming out, indicating that the combustion is over, the charcoal is ready to be collected and separated from the soil. If he works hard, in two to three days A.U.K. can collect enough wood to burn and fill a bag of 20 kg of charcoal. He sells the charcoal collected to one of the middlemen of the area that will bring and sell it in Dar es Salaam. Mr Kirunga will get about 4,500 TZ Shillings (less than 2 £) for this bag of charcoal. The price for the same bag of charcoal in Dar es Salaam could be three times higher, up to 20,000 TZ Shillings (around 7£). Many other farmers in this region follow this routine (A.U.K., 2012).

According to the chairperson of Dutumi, Mr Kanusu, preparing charcoal is the only alternative source of income for many farmers in this area, despite the fact that the Tanzanian government has declared this activity illegal in forest areas (Mr Kanusu, 2012). It had also initiated a two-weeks ban and several dis-incentivising measures in 2006 to discourage this practice in the country, albeit with very little success (World Bank, 2010, pp.15-29). There are about 450 farmers in the village of Dutumi,

each household counts five to eight people, and almost half of these households are at risk of seasonal food insecurity, according to Mr Kanusu. He claims that farmers know that charcoal cutting is not a healthy option, but there are no alternatives, despite 'the lack of rains being directly connected with people cutting trees' (Mr Kanusu, 2012). A belief shared by many other farmers interviewed, for example S.S.K., who claims that 'his future depends on charcoal, despite making charcoal brings less rain, but there is not much else to do' (S.S.K., Msua, 2012). The connection between deforestation and change in rain patterns has been recently supported by some scientists when analysing deforestation in Brasil and Congo (for instance by Spraklen, 2012, and Aragao, 2012), but it is curious to note that in Tanzania it is a notion easily found in the school curricula, and widely known to children: sign of the government's efforts to discourage the practice of cutting trees.

Besides the production of charcoal, an activity generally run by men, there are several petty businesses initiatives in all the villages surveyed, usually run by women. In Kilimanjaro region, the situation is not much different, with the main coping strategies against food insecurity being represented by petty business, cutting and selling grass to feed animals in house captivity, and the sale or exchange of milk and/or vegetables to acquire basic produce such as maize flour, again at the expense of diversification and nutritional value. The so called *mama-ntilie*, are women that cook different kind of meals in the street, from breakfast - *chapatti*, *sambusa*, cake, bread, fried cassava or sweet potatoes and so on from a price range of 200-500 TZ shillings a piece - to lunch and dinner - rice or *ugali* with beans and *mchicha* or okra, often accompanied by a piece of stewed chicken, goat or cow meat, or the more

expensive *chips-mayai*⁴⁹ for a price range of 1500-2500 TZ Shillings. A good percentage of women within the farming households interviewed in both Kibaha and Mwanga districts are involved in some sort of alternative activity, among which cooking in the street is the most common. This is especially true in bigger villages (such as those of Kwala and Kigare), where the presence of primary and secondary schools opens the doors to more market opportunities. It is ironic to find the same people who are at risk of being food insecure cooking food for other people, but the cash needed to pay for services such as education and health service push many women in the farming households to seek another source of income rather than agriculture. As explained by the chairperson of Kigare:

‘Farmers want their children to get an education so they can get jobs in the cities and help them when they are older. This is why they look for other jobs: to pay for their children to go to school. Maybe they will mostly eat ugali and beans for several months, but providing an education for their children is their priority’ (Mr Doyle, 2013).

Other strategies used in order to be able to satisfy the household exigencies over the years have a direct impact on the quantity and quality of food consumed in the household. Many farmers interviewed in Coast region revealed that they are selling all their rice at harvest time and then buying maize to satisfy their food needs during the year in the small shops in the villages. According to the results of the interviews, there are several reasons why they decide to sell all of their rice production during the harvest season: they do not have storage facilities to keep their rice, they need disposable income for other needs such as education and health services, and they

⁴⁹ Chappati is a traditional type of round-shaped and flat bread, sambusa is a fried snack filled with potatoes or/and meat. Mchicha is a kind of spinach cultivated locally. Chips-mayai is a dish made of fries and eggs, a sort of omelette made with fried potatoes.

can feed the family for a longer period of time with maize because it is cheaper than rice at the market price.

However, while it is true that maize is cheaper than rice in shops, a closer analysis demonstrates that farmers sell their harvest mainly because of a lack of storage facilities, and their decision is not driven by food preferences (in Chapter 4 it was mentioned that for many farmers rice is preferred to maize) or economic logic. In fact, during harvest time the selling price for rice is lower, because the offer is high, hence the amount that farmers get by selling rice almost equates the price that they pay later during the year to buy maize from middlemen sellers. As a consequence, by choosing maize instead of rice there is a loss in nutritional value and a relatively small gain in economic value for farmers. Moreover, not all of the income coming from the sale of rice is used to purchase food, but it is shared to satisfy the several needs of the household, such as education, health, clothes, housing maintenance and so on. As a result, if the income coming from the sales of rice is not enough to cover all these needs throughout the year, the household will be at risk of food insecurity in the months preceding the following harvest, when they lower the food intake or have to find other sources of income to satisfy their food needs.

In addition to these risks, to rely on one crop is never a safe decision, as the experience of P., a young woman farming in the village of Kwala, demonstrates. In 2012 she did not get any rice from her acre and a half because a rice disease had affected her plants. Because she had planted nothing but rice, she was facing a year of extreme food insecurity, without harvest and without any income, relying on the help of neighbours and family to support herself and her child. She blamed the extension officers for not helping her and providing her the 'medicine' to treat her crop. Because of these problems, many farmers in this region had started to keep

chickens or cultivate different crops in their field, beside rice. Amongst them, P.T.M., a farmer and father of seven young children in Kwala, decided to start keeping and selling chickens. His field was also affected by the rice disease, but thanks to his chickens he was able to get about 700,000 TZ Shillings, by selling 70 chickens. He believes that ‘chickens make more money than agriculture, and they saved [his] household from starving’ while his one-acre farm was affected by the disease. He also said that thanks to the income raised from the sales of chickens he could increase the area under cultivation, up to two acres, and introduce other crops such as beans and cassava (P.T.M., 2012).

During the fieldwork it has also emerged that there is a high level of illegal activities from the younger generations: at school level, the headmaster of Kwala Secondary School revealed that some students ‘engage in sexual activities in the village because their parents - who are farmers and live in villages nearby - are not able to provide for them, and this seems to them to be the only way to acquire enough cash to purchase food while they are in school’⁵⁰ (Mitimangi, 2012).

It is clear that different households pursue different coping strategies, or a mix of those presented above. Yet, if these activities are analysed with respect to food security at the household level, it becomes evident that they do not represent a plausible long-term solution to food insecurity. The choice of selling the rice

⁵⁰ Despite the Tanzanian government wishes everybody to attend secondary schools, public schooling in the country is not free and can actually represent a high cost for poor families. Moreover, children that live in isolated villages, which are usually the poorest, have to live and study in bigger villages where the schools are located; hence they have to also sustain the cost of renting a room. Generally, the secondary schools have a canteen where the students can eat, but this has also a cost that many families cannot afford.

Concerning the abuses and prostitution tendencies, many schools in rural areas have a problem of limited staff; therefore, in most occasions the students are not supervised or protected. Moreover, the students often do not trust the teachers themselves. For example, in 2011 the previous headmaster of Kwala Secondary School has been accused of abuses towards several students in the school, and has been transferred.

produced to buy maize to feed the family does not have much sense in economic terms, and it lowers the level of nutritional value assumed in the household, accompanied by a compromise on diversification. The charcoal production in particular is an uncertain activity with a variable economic return. While the state legislation on the matter has done little to limit and regulate this activity as it is disregarded by villagers and local officials, the indiscriminate cutting of trees for charcoal production has led to deforestation and degradation of large areas, especially in the proximity of the highway from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, where more than 70% of farmers are considered to be relying on charcoal as a source of income (Malimbwi and Zahabu, 2005, p.230). Without wood regeneration initiatives, the potential for woodland to produce charcoal is declining over the years, increasing competition for resources between farmers and reducing their capacity to produce charcoal and gain an income alternative to agriculture (Ibid., 2005).

At the political level, what can these coping strategies tell us about the relationship between the state and the farming communities of the areas interviewed? The disregard of national law that forbids the practice of cutting trees in some areas is a sign of rural communities not recognising the authority of the state, although there is little enforcement of national law from local officials, which tend to 'close an eye' and do not report illicit activities. Can we consider charcoal production and other coping strategies adopted to survive as political? I argue that these activities are political for different reasons. First, they express the discontent of farmers and their search for alternatives outside state's control. Secondly, these choices manifest a lack of trust in the state's ability to improve their conditions. The farmers do not count on the state to improve their conditions. In the words of farmers there is a sense of indifference, rather than a will to contest or dialogue with the state. We can

identify this spirit in the mocking words of many farmers towards state officials - 'that come with their big white cars, golden watch and expensive technology in a dusty village during elections and act as if they are the kings of the world' (N.K.Z., Mperamumbi, 2012) -, in their indifference towards the advice that they get from the district officers - 'they do not know what it means to be farmers, and they bring wrong advice, so their meetings are useless' (A.M.T., Mwembengozi, 2012) -, and in their lack of interest and trust towards state's agricultural policies - 'Kilimo Kwanza? Lots of blah blah...' (S.K., Dutumi, 2012). While a society that is included and encapsulated in the state would probably react with anger and direct confrontation to unwanted policies, a society that shows indirect reactions and indifference is rather a society that has developed a detached, cold cynicism and disinterest towards the state. Again, I argue that the relationship between the state and rural society in Tanzania is a relationship between two actors that have grown apart from each other, and that increasingly see each other as separate entities.

The increasing influence from external actors does not seem to be helping in reconnecting these two entities, but, as will be explained in the next section, it may also be more detrimental to the relationship between the state and rural communities.

7.4.2. The growing reliance on external help

As foregrounded in the previous section, in the context of an already complex relationship between the state and the society, and perhaps in spite of this complexity, there are other actors that are shaping farmers' livelihoods. The increasing presence of both smaller and larger NGOs, often sponsored by international organizations such as the Gates Foundation, USAID and FAO, are increasingly interested in helping and assisting farmers in different projects. But

what are the consequences for food security in the countryside, and how are these new actors changing the relationship between rural society and the state?

There is reason to believe that the shifting of powers due to the increasing influence of external authority is complicating the already fragmented relationship between the state and rural society, making these two subjects grow further apart. In a situation where farmers are not confident in the ability of the state to improve their situation, the presence of these organizations works as a further incentive to divert requests and complaints from them rather than directly to the state. This is confirmed by the declarations of the project director of a foreign NGO that operates in Kwala:

‘There is little cooperation between our organization and the state, especially at high level. With local level politicians it is different, and the chairperson of the village is always willing to listen to us and he is very thankful for what we do for this little community. We have always felt welcomed by the villagers, and we have been working with the secondary school for several years now. At times it feels like the state does not care about the problems facing the school, or the village in general, so our first reaction is to intervene directly. For instance, to respond to lack of teachers we welcome volunteers from Europe and the USA, or to sort out the problem of providing water for the students and the school canteen we built a water tank and a rain collection system. However, we believe that certain problems should be addressed by the state directly, and at times we wonder if the community is becoming too much dependent on us and forgetting about state’s responsibilities’ (Scarpa, 2013).

Of a similar opinion, Sebastian Sambuo, working for the Tanzanian NGO Rural Urban Development Initiative (RUDI) considers the investment of the government into agriculture as limited. He claims that:

‘We [NGOs] are doing the work that is supposed to be done by the government, the money we have is peanuts compared to the money donors donate directly to the government! Nyerere built irrigation infrastructures, canals, warehouses, but most of them are now unused, unmaintained, there are bats in the warehouses, nobody is taking care of these structures. RUDI, and other NGOs are the only ones looking at funds to renovate these structures and help the farmers in a concrete way’ (Sambuo, 2013).

The efforts of these organizations are welcomed positively by rural communities, as reflected by the declarations of the farmers interviewed. For instance, E.M. thinks that:

‘It is thanks to small organizations such as NTC [Newton-Tanzania Collaborative] and CAMFED [Campaign for Female Education] that many households in the village of Kwala are able to send their children to school. Moreover, they have run HIV awareness campaign, literacy courses for adults, and started a sustainable agricultural garden in the secondary school, building an efficient water collection system. When someone have a problem or need help they are the first point of contact’ (E.M., Kwala, 2012).

In the previous chapter we have seen how important it is for the Tanzanian state to keep a good relationship with donors, and to continue to attract foreign support.

Given that aid inflow finances a good amount of government operations - about 40% in 2007 (Nord et al., 2009) - and account for about 10% of GNI (OECD, 2014), it is not difficult to understand why this is the case. For local politicians the situation seems to be the same. For example, the chairperson of Mperamumbi underlines the positive impact of donor-led projects and believes that ‘things will change [in the agricultural sector] if donors and other experts will support the farmers’ (Mr Vitusi, 2012).

Yet, it is clear that the presence of external actors in the countryside is changing the terms of the relationship between state and society. Following Ferguson and Gupta’s analysis (2002, pp. 989-990), the vertical dimension of the hierarchy of power, where the state is above society, should be redefined by considering the external influences of organizations that act in a regime of *transnational governmentality*. This term, developed by Ferguson and Gupta (2002), describes the situation in which international organizations - which are external to single states and do not respond to a specific government’s legislation - have the power to interfere on the national policies of several states, changing the national dynamics of power. While these influences may carry a quick answer to society’s needs, they are also a threat to the state’s sovereignty, as they take over some of the functions that were once in the hands of the central state. Therefore:

‘The social and regulatory operations of the state are increasingly “de-statized”, and taken over by a proliferation of “quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations” (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p. 989).

Havnevik and Isinika also underlined how this shift of responsibilities from government to NGOs and civil society actors does not necessarily mean an empowerment or an increase of political power for society:

‘Although a number of dynamic developments and transitions have been documented, structural changes that could promote broad based economic development and increased agency and participation among the population in governance and democratic processes in the country are lacking’ (Havnevik and Isinika, 2010, p. 274).

Alongside a detached relationship between state and society, the loss of sovereignty of the state and the increasing influence of international actors on politics at both national and local level are contributing to developing dependency and depoliticizing social conflicts, impeding even more the creation of a strong civil society (Larmer, 2010, p. 256; Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012).

There certainly is a strong connection between the increasing presence of international organizations and the relationship between farming communities and the state. As mentioned in section 7.3 when talking about the Farmer Field Schools, the projects implemented and promoted by donors seem to be more successful than the initiatives promoted solely by the state, because they pursue a bottom up approach and have more funds. Hence, they are received and welcomed more positively by farmers. Nevertheless, it is clear that dependence on aid is not sustainable and will not lead to long-term food security, especially if some parts of the country are left behind and if the state is not able to embrace a bottom up perspective and democratically empower rural communities.

7.5. Conclusion

This chapter analysed the reasons behind the lack of a stronger farmer's movement in rural Tanzania. The apparent lack of cohesion amongst the members of society has been identified as one of the main cause of the difficulties of creating such a movement. At the same time, this lack of cohesion is the result of past events that hindered the confidence of farmers in the success of cooperative action and lead to a general distrust amongst various members of society and different levels of state power.

The un-cooperative aspect of farmers, which is often mentioned by the state officials interviewed, is however not an intrinsic characteristic of farmers' personalities. In fact, farmers are willing to cooperate with each other and work together towards a common objective if they feel included in the project and they have decision-making power, as affirmed by members of international organizations and civil society, and by a side project that tested the ability of younger generations of farmers to work together and manage a collective garden. This validates the thesis' conviction that a bottom up approach is essential for projects to succeed, and that the failure of state agricultural policies is the result of a patronising and top-down approach.

This chapter went on to argue that farmers chose to reject the policies coming from the state by not following the advice coming from district and local official, by deserting official meetings and by not cooperating in projects organised by state officials. Nonetheless, the indifference towards politics demonstrated by farmers is not to be considered a form of apathy, and is the result of a controversial relationship between farmers and the state, two subjects that over the years have grown further apart and are disconnected with each other.

This disconnection is more evident with the increasing influence and presence of NGOs and international organizations in the countryside, which promote a more participative and inclusive approach that has proven successful. This presence further complicates the relationship between the state and rural society, by creating dependence on external aid and further weakening the state. Moreover, while the influence of external actors in national policy making has shaken the power structure of the state, the democratic participation of society does not seem to be improving, leading to a depoliticisation of the relationship between the state and the society, where the state is looked at with indifference and its authority not recognised.

This chapter also presented the coping strategies used by farmers to cover the households' food needs. It is clear that the alternatives sources of income are in many circumstances uncertain and do not represent a long-term solution towards food security in the countryside. It is therefore implied that a political answer is needed, and that this answer cannot come from outside the country or from aid dependency, but needs to involve rural communities and create the conditions to promote a re-connection between society and the Tanzanian state in a sustainable way.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion

8.1. Introduction

This concluding chapter will sum up the main findings and position its contributions with regard to the existing literature on food security and farmers' relationship with the state. This is done with reference to the original research question: How has the relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence? The chapter also reflects upon the limitations of this study, as well as the implications of the kinds of knowledge produced, both at the policy level and academic level. Finally, avenues for further research are explored that could enrich the knowledge of local Tanzanian agricultural systems and the role that different political actors and forms of political action have in the agricultural sector.

8.2. Answer to research question

In answering the research question, this thesis has showcased that the relationship between farmers and the state has been, and still is, determinant in shaping food security in rural areas of Tanzania, and in creating a situation of food insecurity. Hence, this research claims that the negative attitude that can be found at the national and the local levels of the state towards small scale farmers results in policies not being formulated according to the farmers' needs and rural conditions, and hence contributes to policy failure. This negative attitude is evident in both state officials' declarations and the objectives enunciated in the several agricultural policies implemented over the past years and analysed in chapter 6.

Thus, farmers feel left out of the decision-making process and see the state as a distant entity. They are therefore reticent to comply and cooperate with initiatives

promoted by the state, judging them to be ineffective and inadequate to the real conditions of rural areas and their needs. Past policy failures have created a discontented and disillusioned community of farmers which tend to be sceptical also towards cooperative associations - especially after the failure of the cooperative associations in the 1970s - and reluctant to engage in direct political confrontation in the form of protest and rural movements. The limited trust in the state's ability to improve conditions in rural areas, and farmers' lack of self-confidence to address their issues at national state level, results in a weak contestation of policies and little community involvement in policy formulation. As in a circle, this erodes the relationship between the rural society and the state and worsens food security for farming households.

The research question has been explored by using a qualitative approach, with the intent to give farmers a voice and let their stories be heard. 223 interviews were collected during two fieldwork trips conducted in 2012 and 2013 in two different parts of Tanzania: Coast and Kilimanjaro regions. Of these interviews, 125 were farmers, 55 teenagers aged 13-18 belonging to farming households, and 43 politicians and state officials at local, district and national level, members of international organisations and representatives of agribusinesses and various organisations (local NGOs, research centres). What came to the fore were farmers' difficulties, discontent and dissatisfaction towards political representatives, on the one hand, and their struggles towards reaching food security and providing a better livelihood for their households, on the other. The term 'food security' is used in line with the definition given by the FAO in 2006⁵¹, which embraces a long-term

⁵¹ 'Food security is a situation that exists when all people, at all time, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food

condition that also takes into account diversification of food available and preferences. Nevertheless, as explained in chapter 2, in this study the subjective dimension of food security – the personal perceptions of the people that are food insecure - is also given great relevance. Food security is analysed not only with respect to these indicators but also according to what farmers think is ‘enough’ food and their satisfaction of the food they do consume, as explained in chapter 5. This is an important corrective to mainstream institutional studies, in which food security tends to be measured in numbers, calorie intake and quantity of meals consumed (for example in studies conducted by the FAO, WFO, IFAD, WB and so on).

Chapter 1 introduced the study, and established that farmers, as both producers and consumers of food, would be at the centre of this study because they represent the largest majority of the rural population in Tanzania and are the most vulnerable to food insecurity. It then detailed the inspiration that drove this study, connected to my personal experience as a volunteer in a Tanzanian village in Coast region, where I witnessed the discontent and the problems of farmers and the impact of food insecurity on every-day life. Chapter 1 also introduced the focus of this research, which is a study of food security in rural Tanzania through the lens of the relationship between the state and farmers. It is recognised that different levels of state power are present in Tanzania: local, district and national. The relationship between the farmers and national level of the state – represented by national level politicians and officials in the several ministries – is complex and characterised by reciprocal mistrust.

preferences for an active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such access.’ (FAO, 2006).

The theoretical framework employed to answer the research question was provided in chapters 2 and 3. In particular, chapter 2 illustrated the evolution of the meaning of the term ‘food security’ from a term used to talk about fears of food scarcity to a more comprehensive term which takes into account social aspects such as vulnerability and sustainability, and which is employed in this study. Furthermore, chapter 2 illustrated the global food system as explained by McMichael and Friedmann (1989), locating this study in its global general context and setting the basis for an analysis of Tanzania in relation to the theoretical framework of the food security and food systems literature. Chapter 2 also introduced the political aspects of food security, highlighting the important role of the state in promoting food security at national level via agricultural policies.

The other important figure of the thesis, the farmer, was also explored in this chapter. The different categories of farmers clearly defined by Barker (1989) are, as a consequence of the internationalisation of the agricultural sector and the effects of globalisation, of difficult application in a context such as Tanzania. Farmers tend to adapt to the various circumstances and rarely are pure subsistence farmers (producing only to satisfy their food needs). It was noted that a large majority of farmers in Tanzania rural areas are small scale - only cultivate a limited amount of land, usually less than two acres – and exchange or sell part of their produce in order to satisfy other cash or food needs. Often, besides being farmers, they also have another off-farm job, as specified in chapter 7. Finally, this chapter underlined the importance of looking at the historical African context when analysing farmers’ coping strategies for food security and their political action against unwanted policies.

Chapter 3 provided the framework to analyse the interaction between farmers and the state, explaining how such interaction could impact the policy framing and farmers' political engagement and reaction, and eventually the outcome of policies. State and society are seen as two separate entities, in line with the reading of Scott (1998). These two entities influence each other. Given the presence of different levels of power within the state, the relationship between state and society in the Tanzanian context varies, as explained in chapter 4. At the local level it is characterised by what Hyden (1980) defines as the 'economy of affection', where officials and local politicians use their power to gain personal consensus and clientelism is highly practiced (on this also Costello, 1996, Snyder, 2008 and Becker, 2009). At national and district level, state officials and politicians are instead looked at with suspicion and distrust. In this sense, rural society, and more specifically farmers, have developed a form of detachment towards politics and national state officials. The literature framework used to analyse farmers' disengagement to politics is provided by Azarya (1988), Olorunsola (1988) and Ayoade (1988) among others.

Chapter 4 introduced the case study of this thesis, setting the historical context of Tanzania since its independence, and underlining the importance of a cultural and historical contextualisation for studies that wish to offer an empirical contribution around the theme of food security. The successive state-sponsored projects of nationalisation, modernisation, villagization and liberalisation were highlighted as key formative experiences in beliefs and behaviours practiced by farmers today. It was argued that the policies brought forward by Nyerere in the post-independence years, despite having unified the citizens under a common language and having increased the provision of social services such as health and education, have not been positive for the agricultural sector, and originated farmers' feeling of

disillusionment, distrust and disengagement towards the state. In particular, this chapter explained how the villagization project damaged the relationship between the farmers and the state and within society itself. Many farmers were forced to leave behind their houses and start a new life in new villages, where they knew little about the conditions of the soil of a farming land that was often far from the village or from water sources. Moreover, they were also forced to work in a common plot, where the products would be sold directly to the state. Most farmers resented working in these fields, as selling to the state meant less income received, and they preferred working on their own personal plot, where lower controls enabled them to divert their produce to the black market.

After the unifying spirit that characterised the independence of the country, and the years immediately after independence, the sense of alienation and disillusion towards the state started when the excitement of post-independence and the visions of great change morphed into bitter realisation of the reality and the limits of the state. These aspects have been analysed in depth by Hyden (1980 and 1983), Ayoade (1988) and Barker (1989), who identify the expectations raised and not met in the after-independence years as the origin of the process of disillusion and detachment of society from politics. As a matter of fact, despite the uncontested advancement in social services provision, the situation had changed for the worse for many farmers in rural areas. Moreover, at the same time, the state, symbolised by the figure of Nyerere from independence in 1961 to 1985, manifested an increasing feeling of disillusionment towards farmers which, contrary to Nyerere's initial thoughts, were not voluntarily embracing Ujamaa and were 'resisting modernisation' by disregarding state advice, and by not being open to the introduction of new crops and farming methods. This saw an intensification of state control in rural areas, with

villagization becoming compulsory in 1973. Nyerere approached the situation with a paternalistic and patronising attitude, convinced that farmers did not understand what was good for them and needed to be educated. This thesis argued that it is exactly this approach that signs a turning point in the state-farmer relationship in Tanzania. The state as an institution started to look at farmers as being a problem, since they were resisting change. This is an attitude that can be still retrieved in recent policies and in the words of several officials interviewed, as explained in chapter 6.

The following chapters (5, 6 and 7) are the core of the thesis and presented the results of the empirical research conducted in Tanzania. Chapter 5 provided an insight into the conditions of the farming households interviewed. It analysed their dietary patterns, their perception of ‘good’ food consumption and availability and the problems that farmers face in everyday farming. This research was inspired and originated by the assumption that there was a food insecurity problem in the countryside in Tanzania. Hence, the first thing that has been assessed through interviews and participant observation was the level of food security, and the personal perceptions, of the households where the research was conducted. These results are presented in chapter 5. It is clear that there is both a problem of quantity, quality and variety of food consumed in rural areas of Tanzania. This is confirmed by statistical data, but, more importantly, it is felt as a genuine problem by the farmers interviewed. The majority of them perceive themselves as food insecure, claiming that the food they consume is either not sufficient to cover the household’s needs or inadequate to satisfy their personal preferences.

Important findings were made about food consumption in the households interviewed. From the interviews it was established that maize flour, rice, beans and

bananas are the food crops most consumed in the households interviewed (with slight differences between the Kilimanjaro and the Coast regions). Diversification of food appears to be a problem in both regions, for almost all households interviewed. But quantity is also a problem for many households: 46% of the households interviewed consume less than three meals per day on a regular basis. Importantly, the majority of the interviewees are not satisfied with the quality, the quantity and the kind of food they eat regularly (although quantity appears to be a much greater concern than the quality or diversity of food for most farmers). These details about food consumption essentially confirm the statistical data on food security retrieved from FAOSTAT and the World Bank.

However, a deeper analysis of the interviews reveals the personal dimension of food security that is often missed in national statistics. About 70% of the farmers interviewed describe themselves as not having enough food to satisfy households' needs. Besides the quantity and the quality of the food consumed, perceptions of insecurity change according to the social context. In bigger villages, where economic differentiation is higher, there is a tendency for farmers to judge their own condition in more negative terms, as they compare their food habits and consumption patterns with wealthier farmers that live nearby. On the other hand, in more isolated villages, where the conditions of the households are very similar, farmers tend to describe themselves in less negative terms and feel less insecure. Food scarcity in these areas is considered and accepted as the normality, part of everyday life. This is interesting as it affects the households' measures taken to prevent food scarcity or improve living standards. In fact, the farmers interviewed in these isolated areas are also the ones that have less contact with state officials and participate less in the political life of the villages nearby, and are also the ones that when asked about 'future plans to

improve their living condition' (one of the semi-structured questions asked to farmers) had difficulty answering. These households were also within the poorest of the ones interviewed.

The reasons behind food insecurity in rural Tanzania are manifold. Related to the ability to produce enough food for consumption or for sale, the farmers interviewed identified several problems, with little differences between the two regions. Weather patterns, lack of inputs, infrastructures, irrigation system, market, poor land regulation and knowledge, and trespassing of cattle and other wild animals are within the problems the most cited. It is interesting to note that farmers do not directly accuse the policies of the state to be responsible for the problems that they face. Nevertheless, it is clear that some issues are the result of such policies, or would be resolved if policies were different. For instance, as was explained in chapter 6, a more coherent land policy and regulation of land titles could ease the clashes between farmers and pastoralists in some parts of the country, for instance in Coast region. The fact that farmers do not often connect their negative experiences to certain policies is the result of a scarce knowledge of the policies in place and the perception of the national state as a distant entity which can do little to affect their everyday life.

Moving from there, chapter 6 looked at the more recent agricultural policies, and analysed their achievements and their effects on small scale farmers. By an analysis of international initiatives such as the SAGCOT and national ones such as Kilimo Kwanza, it was argued that the several policies put in place have done little to improve the conditions of small scale farmers and to generally improve food security in the countryside. The failure of these policies is attributable to policies not being in

line with the real needs of small scale farmers, a confusing and problematic implementation and a lack of coordination between the different levels of state power and between state officials and farmers.

The lack of coordination between the state and farming communities is the result of a reciprocal mistrust that characterises the relationship between the two entities. In analysing this relationship, the interviews revealed a negative attitude of the state towards small scale farmers, which is also evident in the top down approach in policies implementation. This negative attitude is retrievable in some interviews with officials both at national level - mainly in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives - and in the two districts interviewed, where farmers are defined as stubborn, unproductive, inefficient, ignorant and backward, and envisions the future of agriculture in the country as mainly driven by medium and large scale farmers. The agricultural policies reflect this attitude, and are mostly directed to medium and large scale farmers, as explained in chapter 6. For example, the subsidy to get agricultural inputs at a cheaper price are not available in Coast region, because 'there are no real farmers in this region, the production is too low, so there is no scope to activate this policy' (Mr Mayabu, from the Department of Seeds and Inputs, 2013).

At the same time, from farmers' declarations emerged a general discontent and distrust towards national state officials and extension agents. Farmers see the state as a separate and distant entity in which they do not feel included. They have little trust in state's ability to improve their condition and they tend to dismiss state's advice – carried through extension officers – because they see the state being far from their problems and not able to understand agriculture and the problems of rural areas. It is in these circumstances that disengagement to politics is understood and expressed.

The two subjects have therefore grown disconnected to a degree where they are both alienated, separated from each other. Nevertheless, farmers' discontent in relation to the state is not expressed through direct action or confrontation but rather through indifference, scarce participation to local political meetings, and boycotts of the state's advice. The reasons behind the disengagement of state and society are two-fold: one has to do with a historical evolution of the state and a series of agricultural policy failures, and the other one is connected with the approach that the state adopts and has adopted over time towards small scale farmers.

As shown in chapter 4, a series of policy failures and the historical evolution of Tanzanian politics, including the effects of villagization implemented in the 1970s, have been decisive in shaping the relationship between the state and the farmers. In fact, this has contributed to develop distrust towards the state and a negative image of cooperative work within farming communities in rural Tanzania. In the 1980s, with the adoption of structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation policies, the state withdrew its attention from the agricultural sector and abolished the subsidies (until 2003), but reserved the right to still exercise a strict control over the agricultural market. The removal of subsidies however widely affected the performance of the agricultural sector and the livelihoods of farmers, bolstering even further the discontent in rural areas, and initiating the process of deagrarianisation and depeasantisation,⁵² as described by Bryceson (1993) and Ponte (1998, 2000). These two phenomena explain the increasing farmers' desire to 'escape agriculture', an activity seen as unprofitable and from which it had become increasingly difficult to make a living.

⁵² Depeasantization, as defined by Deborah Bryceson, is the process for which farmers look for other forms of income other than agriculture, as the agricultural sector becomes less profitable.

The more recent policy, Kilimo Kwanza, has experienced inefficiencies and exposed the struggle of the state between pleasing the majority of the farmers versus opening the economy to foreign investments and creating the right conditions for a commercial agriculture. In this sense, despite the catchy slogan and the popular image, the objectives of the policy reveal a tendency towards increasing foreign investments and promoting large and medium scale agriculture in the country. This is a tendency that, after four years of Kilimo Kwanza and several other initiatives supported by the Tanzanian state such as the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), does not seem to have brought any major changes to rural areas for the majority of farmers. These policies are in general characterised by a stress on commercialisation of the agricultural sector, a top-down approach, and a focus on middle and large farmers.

In chapter 6 it was also noted that there is a general lack of policy awareness in the countryside. This lack of awareness in turn further alienates farmers from the state, and increases the separation of the two subjects. Inefficiency, corruption and long bureaucratic processes also prevent the majority of farmers from taking advantage of the subsidies promoted by these policies to increase agricultural production, while a negative relationship between farmers and extension services works against a dissemination of information on state policies and actions towards improving food security in rural areas. State-farmers alienation precludes a fruitful cooperation between the two subjects (state and farmers) that could lead to more effective and fair agricultural policies, and thus prevents the achievement of food security in those parts of the country where a political response is most urgent.

Finally, chapter 7 looked at farmers' coping strategies and their political response to a situation of discontent and political disappointment. It also explored the potential for farmers to act cooperatively, both among each other and within externally-sponsored projects, where a bottom up approach is employed and farmers have more decision-making autonomy.

Farmers' attitude towards cooperation has been analysed by looking at one of the main institutionalised forms of cooperation in Tanzania, represented by the cooperative movements. It was argued that the villagization, and the abolition of cooperatives that were replaced by crop authorities in 1976, contributed to create a negative image of cooperatives in the eyes of the farmers, who saw cooperative association as an instrument used by the state to gain more control over their activities. As a matter of fact, only in 1991 was there a law to make cooperatives more independent from state control, the Cooperative Act of 1991. New attempts towards this direction were made in 2003 with the Cooperative Society Act. The number of cooperatives increased, but very few of them are active and management problems persist.

This thesis argued that one of the reasons behind the scarce success of cooperative associations and the scarce participation of small scale farmers to cooperative movements and to collective groups in general is a lack of trust in the efficiency of cooperatives and disillusionment coming from past failures and mismanagement of group-led initiatives. In remarking on the unwillingness of farmers to cooperate (both with the state and with each other), several scholars have talked about a misunderstanding of Tanzanian society by Nyerere (Hyden, 1980, Bernstein, 1981, Coulson, 1982, Shivji, 1995, Spalding, 1996, Scott, 1998, Kelsall, 2004). According

to some of these scholars, contrary to the socialist nature depicted by Nyerere, it is widespread individualism that best characterises Tanzanian rural society, and which should be considered as an obstacle to the creation of a strong farmers' movement.

Nevertheless, the results of this research indicate that cooperation can exist under certain conditions, and the social structure of Tanzanian society clearly indicates that there is a tendency to support family members and neighbours in periods of difficulties. Hence this thesis argued that to talk about individualism as an inner characteristic of Tanzanian farmers is a mistake. Perhaps Nyerere's assumption of a 'socialist by nature' society was wrong, yet the will to cooperate spurs from a set of favourable conditions rather than from an inner tendency related to farmers' personality. Furthermore, it was argued that in Tanzania, mistrustfulness, scarce cooperation with state's initiatives and clashes over resources are the outcome of poverty, uncertainty, food insecurity and past policy and cooperatives' failure. Unclear land policies, corruption and mismanagement also are responsible for internal social conflicts which limit opportunities for collaboration (for example in the case of farmers-pastoralists conflict illustrated in chapter 7).

Chapter 7 also analysed coping strategies for food security. As emerged in chapter 7, farmers' coping strategies are diverse as people perceive - and react to - their condition of food security according to the context in which they live. As explained in chapter 5, farmers in poorer and more isolated areas tend to see their condition of food insecurity as an inevitable destiny, to which they - or the state - can do little about, while farmers that live in villages where class differentiation is higher appear more critical both towards their condition and towards the state action.

In general, the phenomena of deagrarianisation and depeasantisation are still present in rural society, sign of a general discontent. Of the farmers interviewed, only 11 out of 125 are able to live out of farming alone, while the great majority of farmers need to find a side activity in order to survive. Side activities include making charcoal, petty business activities, cooking for other people, fetching grasses for animals, and in some cases prostitution and local alcohol brewing. Very few farmers have introduced changes in their ways of farming as a coping strategy to food insecurity. This happens for several reasons: lack of capital and inputs, but also resentment towards an activity – farming – perceived as unproductive and unsatisfactory. There were some exceptions. Most coffee farmers interviewed in Kilimanjaro have turned to food crop production, as a consequence of a declining price for coffee on the international market and the difficulties of dealing with increasing pests and plant diseases that caused a drop in production in recent years.

At the same time, a sporadic number of farmers in the same region, the few that had the opportunity to follow training and had a mean of transport to reach nearby markets, have done exactly the opposite, switching production from food crops into cash crops (mushrooms or vegetables). This means that, contrary to what several politicians interviewed claimed - farmers being stubborn and anchored to the past - if farmers see the possibility of a profit they are willing to change their habits. Also remarkable was the presence, especially in Kilimanjaro region, of a few microfinance groups of women autonomously initiated, that would support each other by buying agricultural inputs or by other petty business activities. This is a further confirmation that cooperation is present in the society in specific circumstances, linked to the possibility for members to have decision-making power and feel an inclusive part of the group.

All in all, however, these coping strategies, even when illicit (such as charcoal production, prostitution and local alcohol brewing) get little political attention, and have no meaningful register upon agricultural policy. In short, they are not recognised as a signal of rural discontent. Less nuanced reactions and manifestations of discontent such as mocking and ignoring extension officers' advices or boycotting or barely attending local meetings (that has been recorded in both regions interviewed) actually seem to be working against farmers. Instead of acknowledging that there is a problem in communication between state and rural areas, state officials find in these attitudes more reasons to stigmatize farmers as disinterested and stubborn, and to exclude them from the decision-making process. Consequently, farmers remain unaware of policy changes that could affect them both in positive and negative terms.

Another issue explored in chapter 7 was the increasing dependence on external aid and its impact on the state-society relationship. It was noted that while in Latin America the weakness of the state has provided space for the creation of strong social movements, as highlighted by Wolford, in Tanzania the weakness of the state - seen as the inability of the state apparatus to improve living conditions in rural areas - has provided space for an increased presence of external NGOs, that act as the first support in providing some basic needs (Wolford, 2010, p.94). Hence, the dynamism that characterises the state-society relationship in Brazil as described by Wolford is not present in Tanzania, where the terms of this relationship are indirect and hidden by the presence of external intermediaries. Furthermore, the influence that external bodies have on the state and on policies which will affect the agricultural sector of the country and will define future agricultural policies (based on a promotion of commercial agriculture and large scale investments) raises doubts

on the democratic legitimacy of these decisions and points towards the possible loss of sovereignty by the state. In a country where land demarcation and ownership legislation is weak and undefined, a loss of sovereignty by the state could inhibit the ability to prevent future conflicts over land and resources.

The inclusive approach adopted by many NGOs and international organisations seems more successful in gaining farmers' trust and in improving their food security conditions. This research has shown that, where there is initial guidance and provision of inputs, the ownership of the project empowers farmers and enables them to more easily get a loan from the bank, buy agricultural inputs, connect with the market and improve their production, which in turn brings positive outcomes in terms of food security at the household level. Usually, projects promoted by such organisations succeed and are more welcomed both because they dispose of larger amount of funds and because they have a different approach to farmers.

However, the increasing dependency on aid is not a sustainable option to improve food security in rural areas in the long term. In fact, if on the one side we have the state and its call for investments and involvement of international organisations in agricultural policies, on the other side we witness an increasing reliance on external aid in the countryside. International organisations and NGOs are substituting the state in some of its former duties regarding food aid and agricultural assistance. Another hypothesis highlighted in chapter 7 is the idea that in the absence of the state, or exactly because of the distrust that characterises the relationship between farmers and the state, farmers are increasingly referring to these organisations in seeking for help in the provision of various social services. This tendency is stretching the relationship between the farmers and the state to its limits, and

depoliticising the state-farmer relationship, since the state's authority and competences are disregarded by rural communities.

8.3. Main contributions

This research has heavily been influenced by the literature on food security, especially by reflections on the current state of food and the future of agriculture (for instance by authors such as: Friedmann, 1993; Tansey, 1995; Lappé et al., 1998; Bernstein, 2000 and 2010; Petrini, 2005; Patel, 2007; Bryceson, 2009; Holt-Gimenez, 2010; McMichael, 2010; Rosset, 2010; Schanbacher, 2010; Clapp, 2012; Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2012). Starting from this, the major contribution made by this research is to offer an empirical study that contributes to an understanding of the diverse food *systems* that exist around the world. In particular, this thesis offers a contextualised approach to the global food system literature introduced by McMichael and Friedmann (1989, see chapter 2). The general idea expressed by this literature is that there has been a historic evolution of the food systems worldwide and this has affected farmers and food consumers in several ways. It describes a current food system which is increasingly shaped by the commoditisation of food and financial speculation on crops, and where multinational corporations are deciding over the future of food and agriculture worldwide.

Nevertheless, I claim that in countries that are still in transition towards capitalism (such as Tanzania) there are communities of farmers which only have a marginal contact with the international market and hence their food security is mostly affected by a several amount of different factors at national level. In this respect, the role of multinational corporations in shaping food security in rural Tanzania needs to be downplayed, and actually some areas of the country are unattractive for foreign

investors because of low soil productivity and their inhospitable geographic location.

Whereas some authors highlight the effects of the progress of liberalisation in agriculture (Ponte, 1998 and 2000; Meertens, 2000), this thesis, in the light of the results of the fieldwork, argued that in Tanzania the transition to capitalism is far from complete, and that political elites have always been reticent in reducing the control of the state over agricultural markets - especially for export crops - even despite the reforms put in place since the mid-1980s. Hence the country seems to fit the description provided by Thomson (2010), Lewontin (2000), Cooksey (2011), and Hyden (1980, 1983), concerning the limited penetration of modernisation and of capitalism in African states (see Chapter 3 and Hyden, 1980, pp. 9-11, 83, 212, 250). The capitalist mode of production has difficulties to fully penetrate the country, especially rural areas, where modernisation is far from being achieved, and where the economic interests of private companies and agribusinesses clash with a confusing system of regulation and a complex bureaucracy. Since most farmers in Tanzania do not formally own the land on which they farm - hence do not own the means of production - the reading provided by Bernstein (2004), who sees farmers as both capitalist and workers, is of difficult application in Tanzania.

For similar reasons, this study questioned the use of food sovereignty as a lens through which to analyse the case of Tanzania. The means to achieve and define food security has been challenged by several scholars (Windfuhr and Jonsen, 2005; Schambacher, 2010; Patel, 2011; Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2012) who prefer to talk about food sovereignty stressing the importance for communities to have ownership over resources and define their own agricultural, labour, fishing, food and land

policies. To me, this approach presents two major problems: first, it undermines the responsibilities of the state to implement policies and create the right circumstances for rural areas to develop and be food secure. Secondly, it assumes that farmers wish to choose one agricultural model over another, namely, the sustainable agriculture model over the industrial and commercial one. Nevertheless, in countries that have not yet fully witnessed the consequences of the industrial and commercial food model, it may be the case that farmers are the first ones to express the will to sell their land and escape the agricultural sector, or conversely wish their farming enterprise to be incorporated into the corporate food system. For instance, with reference to the specific case study analysed in this thesis, many farmers interviewed manifested these tendencies, and, in their circumstances, this is understandable. Who would not chose the security of a monthly fixed salary (although low) over an unpredictable future in farming? Tania Murray Li (2014), in her empirical studies of the food system in Indonesia, expressed similar concerns and underlined the importance of considering that farmers may not all share the same vision of agriculture and hence may not all abide to the kind of food system envisioned by the food sovereignty movement.

Where depeasantization is an increasing phenomenon, and farming is resented by the rural population that see no advantage in it, the urge of having control over food resources and food system assumes a different tone. For instance, it may be the case that farmers have relative control over the land and their food system. In Tanzania, everybody I interviewed had a piece of land to cultivate, despite not always formally owning it. However, without resources, inputs and the political will to improve conditions in rural areas and address the challenges farmers face everyday, sovereignty and control of food and resources is only one of the aspects that

condition the food security condition of farmers. Essentially, this thesis embraced the idea supported by the food sovereignty movement of farmers' empowerment and their importance in the food system; however, while the food sovereignty movement identifies capitalism as the main source of insecurity, this thesis argued that in the case of Tanzania food insecurity is the result of a series of causes from which a complex relationship between farmers and the state.

Hence, besides contributing to the food security and food system literature, this thesis contributes to the literature on state-society relations. The novelty of this thesis is to look at the impact of state-society relations in relation to food security, joining two topics that are in general analysed in a separate manner. Surely, the political aspects of food security have been widely studied by the literature mentioned at the start of this section, and also there are several studies of economic nature about the effects of agricultural policies on food security (for instance Sijm, 1997; Devereux and Maxwell, 2001). This thesis tries to go beyond these analyses, and to understand how the historical evolution of the relationship between the state and rural communities in the Tanzanian context has affected the current food security condition. The implications of this approach to the study of food security are wide, and may help understand the mechanisms behind personal perceptions of food security in the farming communities and farmers' political responses. In particular it may help understand why in different areas of the world farmers react to discontent in different ways.

Regarding the contribution to the state-society literature, this research has defined the relationship between the state and the society - in particular rural society - as being best described as the relationship between two separate actors, in line with

analysis provided by several scholars including Scott (1998), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), and supporters of the neo-patrimonial literature. Within this separation, the state is perceived and presented as above society, as power dynamics follow a vertical structure, with the central authorities of the state on the top. The state and the societies are seen as complex entities, which influence one another and are influenced in turn by external actors. The complexity of the two entities is identified in a variegated rural community, where different tribes live together and where social differentiation is increasing, and a state represented by mainly three levels of power at central, district and village level, often in contrast with each other. Economic disparities between the different levels of power are evident, with local level politicians sharing only a minimal part of the state wealth. This renders the separation between the central state and rural communities even more noticeable.

Moreover, in light of theories of the African states, which tend to see the majority of African states as weak (Migdal, 1988), soft (Forrest, 1988), failed (Herbst, 2000), authoritarian (Fatton, 1992), incomplete (Bayart, 1993) or in general crisis (Rothchild and Chazan, 1988; Hyden and Bratton, 1992) this research has depicted an image of the Tanzanian state as one incapable of communicating successfully with its citizens and with great internal divisions that involve the different levels of the state at local, district and national level. The Tanzanian state is a state that has been unable to fully encompass and include certain areas of the country and its people - for instance farming communities in the most isolated areas - despite the fact that (or perhaps exactly because) central control and extensive bureaucracy has been a pervasive character of Tanzanian political history since independence. The particularity of Tanzania as an empirical contribution to the food security and state-

society relations literature is given by its historical and political history, in which, agricultural development has always been on the top of the political agenda since independence and where different agricultural policies have followed, albeit without great achievements in terms of rural development and improved food security in rural areas.

This thesis argued that rather than coercive control, state control in Tanzania assumed the tones of paternalism and persuasion. This understanding of the Tanzanian state is in line with readings provided by Hyden (1980), Bernstein (1981), Coulson (1982) and Scott (1998). In chapter 4 the dynamics of state control are explained and some examples provided, such as the one in the 1970s, when farmers were persuaded to settle in the new villages by promises of provision of social services, electricity and large mechanisation support, such as tractors (little mattered if the conditions of the soil were inadequate for the use of tractors or if farmers actually knew how to care about these machineries). This attitude is key to understanding the relationship between the state and rural communities. In fact, as a consequence of this attitude, it is argued that society has grown further apart from the state, and that the two entities regard each other with scepticism and mistrust. The relationship between the state and the farmers conditions both the outcome of policies and the ability of farmers to pursue efficient strategies towards improving their food security condition. Hence, the relationship between the state and the society in Tanzania needs to be considered as one of the reasons of policy failure.

This research, therefore, adds to the literature on state-society disengagement and society's distrust in the ability of the state to improve the conditions of rural areas. This literature has been brought forward by scholars such as Schwartz (1973), Hyden

(1980 and 1983), Rothchild and Chazan (1988), Barker (1989), Scott (1985), and Fatton (1992) among others. In particular, Ayoade's interpretation of society disengagement is embraced, according to which the relationship between the state and rural society is characterized by a reciprocal disillusionment, and a reciprocal estrangement between the two bodies. The high expectations rose during Nyerere's rule, and the consequent failure and high state control and bureaucracy have contributed to create a feeling of disillusionment in the society, while at the same time state's disenchantment with society's cooperation towards the realization of Ujamaa could be the cause of the state's negative attitude towards rural society and the basis of the increased presence and patronising attitude of the state (Ayoade, 1988, p.113).

The practical consequence of this disillusionment is a detachment towards politics, where farmers are discontent but do not aim at changing or directly contesting the state, preferring instead to keep a distance and to withdraw from participating at meetings held in the councils, as showed in the examples reported from the villages of Kwala and Kigare, and as explained by Azarya (1988, pp.8-11). According to Hyden such a tendency to disengage by boycotting meetings and associations (despite the fact that in the past cooperatives and associations in Tanzania used to be numerous) is common in a communitarian state like Tanzania, where state's control is challenged by the large varieties of tribes and cultures - more than 40 - (Hyden and Bratton, 1992, Hyden, 1992). However, while according to Hyden this attitude is attributable to a fear of citizens to contest state policies, this thesis argued that disillusion and distrust - more than fear - towards the state explain farmers' political disengagement.

Given the particular history of the country, it is difficult to locate the reciprocal cynicism between the state and the farmers and to say whether the negative attitude of the state towards farmers is the cause or the consequence of a certain diffidence of farmers towards the state and their disengagement from politics. Yet, this thesis supported the idea that a paternalistic and top-down approach started emerging in the 1970s, following rural communities' resistance to some policies that were seen as an essential part of the socialism strongly promoted by Nyerere, for instance the villagization project. The conviction that farmers did not know what was good for them accompanied state officials' attitude and conditioned the formulation of the successive policies, driving farmers' detachment and discontent even further. The analysis of recent policies highlighted that the top-down approach of the state is still evident, while the analysis of farmers' interviewed revealed that discontent, disillusionment and food insecurity are still present in some parts of the country.

By providing an analysis of farmers' coping strategies and their reaction to unsatisfactory policies in Tanzania, this study also contributes to the literature on farmers' movement in a part of the world that is generally little researched. There are several analyses of movements in Latin America and in India (see for instance the work of Brass, 1995 and 2003; Holt-Gimenez, 2006; Wezel et al. 2009; Rosset et al., 2011; Rosset and Martinez-Torres, 2012), but rural movements in Africa are generally given less attention (remarkable are the analyses provided by Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Holt-Gimenez and Amin, eds. 2011). Starting from the assumption that farmers' movements are an important instrument that politically empower farmers and facilitate their communication with the state, the recognition of the lack of a strong farmers' movement in Tanzania is important in the analysis of the state-farmer relationship and farmers' answers to inadequate policies in the countryside.

As mentioned, it is important to look at the reasons behind the weak political cohesion within farmers' communities. This study demonstrated that the lack of a strong movement is the symptom of a disconnection between farmers and the state. In fact, within the difficulties of creating a strong movement in Tanzania there is the scarce trust in the ability of the state to improve the conditions in the countryside and a lack of farmers' self-confidence in the effectiveness of active and direct protest to change policies.

The lack of a strong farmers' movement in a country like Tanzania does not mean that farmers do not react in other ways to unsatisfactory policies, but that the conditions - of political and social nature - for the creation of a strong movement are missing. Hence it is evident the importance of contextualising and studying forms of hidden communication between the state and communities, which do not feel included and part of the state. As noted by Scott (1990), there are forms of resistance that avoid open confrontation with the authority, and farmers are within those communities that usually and historically prefer to 'disguise their resistance'.⁵³ This research has explored these 'hidden forms of contestation' identifying them in farmers' boycotting public meetings and disobeying extension officers' advices. Furthermore, it has been argued that coping strategies, often illicit, adopted by farmers to overcome food insecurity are also a political expression of discontent. As defined by scholars such as Hirshman (1970), Raikes (1982), Mamdani et al. (1988), Scott (1990) and Fatton (1992), and explained in chapter 7, these hidden forms of contestation are political as they express farmers' discontent and their detachment from the state.

⁵³ Scott identifies some typical forms of resistance in peasants in:

- a) squatting to a defiant land invasion;
- b) evasion rather than tax riot, or fraudulent declarations on land farmed or animal possession;
- c) Poaching or pilfering rather than direct appropriation. (Scott, 1990, p.86)

8.4. Implications of the study

Besides contributing to the theoretical literature, this study also offers some practical implications. First, it offers a valid perspective and useful analysis to Tanzanian policy makers by presenting some of the challenges farmers face and an assessment on the outcome of the recent agricultural policies and on food security issues in some rural areas of the country. Chief among its policy implications is the need for the Tanzanian state to pursue a more inclusive approach to policy making, by taking into consideration farmers' opinions and the interest of small scale farmers who represent the largest majority of the population in the country. The importance of the agricultural sector is officially recognized by the government, but the challenges in policy implementation described in this study may offer some reflections and suggest some possible explanations on what is missing for policies to be successful and improve the conditions of the countryside.

A more inclusive approach could be pursued by reforming the cooperatives system so that even small scale farmers in isolated areas of the countryside could benefit of such institutions. Moreover, cooperatives should be regarded as political institutions and not just as economic ones. A political collaboration between the high level of the state and the cooperatives could help the formulation of more effective policies, and at the same time help the state address the issues faced by small scale farmers. Even the World Bank (2004, 2) has admitted that 'instead of sending sections of the state off to society, it is often even more fruitful to invite society into the inner chambers of the state'. In practical terms, an understanding of rural communities and their needs and the embrace of bottom-up agricultural policies to improve agriculture - and hence food security in rural areas - should be of special interest to the opposition

parties of the country, struggling to get a coherent and appealing manifesto to gain the support of rural communities and win elections. Opening the doors to political engagement and a re-connected rural society represents an opportunity for a political change in Tanzanian governance that has for long been missed.

Moreover, the dense amount of information collected through the interviews offer an interesting and detailed portrait of the farming communities in Coast and Kilimanjaro regions, with details on their social and household structure, eating patterns, agricultural practices and political engagement (or disengagement), problematics related to farming. Hence, this study may be of interest to the researcher interested in qualitative data on rural development, Tanzania, farming system in East Africa and rural movements.

8.5. Limitations of the study and further research

Besides the several contributions this research offers, it is fair to mention the limitations and difficulties encountered on the way, because of time or economic constraint reasons. First, it needs to be recognised that two areas of the country have been surveyed, hence the results of the study open the debate on the conditions of food security and farming in other areas of Tanzania, perhaps in those where food production per capita is higher, and different food habits and traditional customs may be present. The role of the state in agriculture, highlighted in this study, has general relevance, as policies and state's attitude towards the agricultural sector has the same effects in all regions of Tanzania. However, it needs to be noted that the relationship between the state and the society in other parts of the country may have assumed different nuances, according to the presence of influential politicians in certain areas that were more represented than others at political level. This was the case of

Kilimanjaro region in the after-independence years, for example. Yet, this study explained that while Kilimanjaro had a 'softer version' of villagization compared to the one experienced in Coast region, this has not substantially influenced the current terms of relationship between the farmers and the state. Notwithstanding, this comparison has its limits because it is based on two regions and particular areas of these regions - rural villages in semi-isolated locations, far from the main roads and not easily accessible. If the terms of comparison were to be made in an analysis of bigger villages closer to the main roads of the country the results could be different.

Moreover, because of time constraints and long bureaucracy to obtain permits from governmental agencies, the interviews to politicians are fewer than I had initially planned. In some cases the politicians interviewed agreed to talk to me but refused to have their declarations recorded or used in this research. In this sense, the connection between state and NGOs, and between the state and the private sector, in relation to promoting food security could also prove worthy of further research. Another topic that could benefit from further research is the impact and effectiveness of the several policies - both at national, regional and international level - that affect the agricultural sector and, as remarked in chapter 6, are often in contradiction with each other. For instance, contradicting policies emerged when analysing the land legislation, where on the one side the government and most of the agricultural policies implemented reflect a desire for the private sector and international investors to be greatly involved in shaping the future of agriculture in Tanzania, while on the other side politicians publicly claim to protect the rights and the needs of its citizens, making it harder for companies to acquire land. But here lies another contradiction: the land legislation of Tanzania does actually make it harder for investors to acquire land, but at the same time does not give any guarantee to the farmers that use their

land, as they do not detain any official ownership over it. On this topic, what is actually happening, and which deserves further investigation, is the involvement of state officials in the land speculation market, and their role in the several Joint Venture agreements signed with international companies, allowed by the land legislation.

This study has also not been able to fully analyse the issue of gender in relation to the research question. In a society where gender roles are in general well defined, the role of women in the food system is of high importance. Women comprise more than half of farmers' population, and within the household have an important role in distributing and utilizing the food. My intention was not to dismiss the issue. The initial intent of this study was to analyse farming households in the areas chosen and frame the research question according to what I would find as the main issue. Eventually, I found that the 'main' issues were many, all connected with each other. The role of women in the food system and their action as a separate group to contest policies would have been explored deeper if the areas surveyed had revealed a particular difference of women as a group towards these issues. But this was not the case, and what I actually witnessed was an almost equal presence (or absence) of women and men in meetings and a similar attitude towards politics and state officials.

Along my experience in Tanzania I met many great and strong women and a variegated picture of social structure within the households interviewed. In some households the men go to the farm and the women have some petty businesses on the side, such as preparing and selling meals or selling items previously bought in closer towns. In other households the women are the ones employed in the farms and the

men would collect charcoal or be employed in the towns or cities. Nevertheless, while participation to the economic activity is shared, the same cannot be said of household chores, covered mostly by women: Taking care of the house, fetching water, cooking and the education of children are all activities in the hands of women. Gender differences in the ownership of land are also common in many regions. In Coast region women can own land, while in Kilimanjaro the land is inherited and passed to the males of the family. These differences were the result of tribal customs, more than national legislation.

What emerged in this study is that all the organisations that I interviewed had projects with a focus on gender issues. The agricultural projects of organisations such as the FAO (for instance the Farmer Field School) aim at achieving an equal inclusion of women in their projects. This is positive, as it empowers women. On the other side, it would be interesting to explore how women in rural areas are involved in these projects, and what are the consequences of their involvement in their everyday life. Does empowerment in farming projects translate into a restructuring of gender roles within the household?

Another understudied issue that has been raised in this thesis (chapter 6) is the role of children in agriculture. One of the persons interviewed raised the issue by saying:

‘there is something nobody talks about, and is the consequence of cheap prices on child labour: cheap prices mean cheap labour, and there are lots of children working in the countryside in Tanzania instead of going to school, because farmers cannot stand the competition with the imported food and [so] employ them’ (Mr Legge, 2013).

This is an interesting claim, as it adds to the difficulties faced by farming households. Putting aside the unusual connection between cheap agricultural prices and child labour suggested by Mr Legge, the extent of child labour in Tanzania is reported in several studies. For example, Plan International (2011) reports that 20.7% of all children in Tanzania are involved in child labour, while the ILO and FAO estimate that about 80% of all the children undertaking economic activity are employed in agriculture (Plan International, 2011, ILO, 2013, FAO, 2013). The participation of children to the household farming activities emerges throughout an analysis of the households interviewed: in almost 20% of the households interviewed there is a presence of children below 14 years of age helping in the farm. This affects their ability to attend primary and secondary schools, as reported by the vice-master of the secondary school of Kwala, Mr Ngimba, and the headmaster of Mahundi Primary School, Mr Gunda (2012). The majority of farmers that reported having their children employed in the countryside justified it on the basis of a practical need, especially during the harvesting and planting seasons where the workload is higher.

The issue of child labour in agriculture could be analysed under a food security perspective, by also analysing the reasons for this involvement and the effects it has on the children and on the future of agriculture. Could this be at the base of the resentment towards farming manifested by many farmers interviewed? And how influential is the involvement of children in farming on their food security? Furthermore, how do state policies impact child labour in rural areas? For instance, Havnevik (1993, p.308) points to an increase of children labour during Mwinyi's government: as a consequence of a reduction of state support to the education sector and a drop in primary school enrolment, children accounted for 35 to 44% of household members working in the family. Primary education is compulsory in

Tanzania, and many farmers interviewed wish for their children a ‘good education’ to escape agriculture and find an employment in the cities. Nevertheless, often they are not able to pay the school fees and/or they need the help of their children in their farm in order to have enough food or money to buy it. There is clearly a deep resentment towards the state that does not help their children to get the opportunity of a better future through education and that indirectly forces them to work in the farm. This resentment is passed to the children, who hope in the future to run away from the countryside and get an office job, as I could witness during my stay in Tanzania and my stay in the secondary school of Kwala. The farming project in the secondary school of Kwala originated by the will of the sponsor in cooperation with one of the teachers of the school can demonstrate that students could be successful with the right inputs and knowledge of agriculture, and does not need to be a burden. Initially met with scepticism by the students, it grew in popularity after the first vegetable harvest, proving that after seeing the first positive results, projects are welcomed and self-confidence increases. The students also had the opportunity to visit some small scale farms and meet farmers that have made of agriculture a successful activity and managed to increase productivity by using resources in innovative ways, for example by using drop irrigation and plant spacing techniques.

Finally, another topic that deserves deeper analysis is the role of electoral participation as a tool to understand farmers’ engagement in politics. I was living in Coast region during the last elections in 2010, and witnessed the local atmosphere and the general discussions at local level. Electoral turnout was recorded at around 39%, and saw the victory of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party with more than 60% of the vote and the absolute majority of the seats in the National Assembly (263 out of 357). The CCM has been in power since independence as the opposition

parties do not have strong political programs and enough resources to raise consent during electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, the statistical data collected refer to the national level and it was difficult to find data on a specific section of the population, for example farmers or for the specific areas interviewed. The farmers interviewed did not seem comfortable in answering specific questions about their participation in elections, sometimes because they had little knowledge of the dynamic of politics and political parties and other times because they did not want to talk about who they had been voted for (if indeed they had). Hence the interviews concentrated more on attitudes towards direct confrontation and willingness to be part of a group. Clearly electoral turnout is an important indicator of political participation, but it also needs to be said that electoral participation, in a country where the democratic process is still ongoing, needs to be contextualised. In the elections of 2010, I witnessed the large number of ‘giveaways’ people received during electoral campaign and during the day of the vote itself, in the village of Kwala. Women were wearing kangas⁵⁴ with CCM prints, men were wearing hats with the same print. All you could see in the village were CCM leaflets and it was not hard to predict who the winner of the election would be. Nevertheless I couldn’t but ask myself, can a vote in these circumstances be interpreted as an indicator of political interest? This question remains open to further research, especially in view of the next elections planned in October 2015, the fifth elections to be held since the introduction of multi-party system in 1992.

⁵⁴ A piece of clothing largely worn by women in Tanzania.

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Tanzania NGOs National Coordination


<http://www.tnnc.go.tz/ngoresults.php?category=Agriculture>

www.feedthefuture.org

www.wdm.org.uk

Appendix 1

Structure of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives



Appendix 2

List of interviewees 1

FARMERS INTERVIEWED				
NAME	SEX	LOCATION	GROUP	DATE
R.K.	F	Kwala	1	September-December 2012
E. M.	M	Kwala	1	September-December 2012
Mr I.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
Pi.	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
P.M.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
R. J.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
C.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
unknown	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
D. D.	M	Mongomole	1	September-December 2012
N. M.	M	Mongomole	1	September-December 2012
A. N.	M	Mongomole	1	September-December 2012
P.	F	Mwembengozi	3	September-December 2012
S. K.	M	Dutumi	1	September-December 2012
A. Ki.	F	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
S. O.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. K.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
S' aunt	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
S'mum	F	Kwala	3	September-December 2012
A. C.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
K.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
A. P.	M	Kwala	3	September-December 2012
D. K.	M	Kwala	3	September-December 2012
H. Z.	M	Kwala	1	September-December 2012

E. M.	M	Mperamumbi	2	September-December 2012
S. S.	F	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
S. H.	F	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
T. M.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
Z. L.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
S. M.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
K. M.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
N. Z.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
R. A.	F	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
P. Z.	F	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
L. V.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
E.	M	isolated area near Mperamumbi and Msua	3	September-December 2012
S. M.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
P. L.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
I. R.	M	Dutumi	3	September-December 2012
H. B.	F	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. M.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
M. Ko.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012

R. T.	M	Dutumi	3	September-December 2012
A. T.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
R. H.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
S. R.	F	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. H.	M	Dutumi	3	September-December 2012
S. K.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. M.	F	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. S.	M	Dutumi	3	September-December 2012
A. K.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. B.	M	Dutumi	3	September-December 2012
S. L.	M	Dutumi	3	September-December 2012
M. K.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
T. B.	M	Dutumi	2	September-December 2012
A. T.	M	Mwembengozi	2	September-December 2012
F. M.	M	Mwembengozi	2	September-December 2012
A. S.	F	Mwembengozi	3	September-December 2012
S. S. M.	M	Mwembengozi	2	September-December 2012
A. M.	M	Mwembengozi	2	September-December 2012
R. S.	M	Mwembengozi	3	September-December 2012
A. F.	F	Mwembengozi	3	September-December 2012
S. S.	M	Mwembengozi	3	September-December 2012
A. M.	M	Msua	2	September-December 2012
S. R.	F	Msua	2	September-December 2012
S. K.	M	Msua	3	September-December 2012
F. M.	M	Msua	2	September-December 2012
J. S.	M	Msua	3	September-December 2012
S. F.	F	Msua	3	September-December 2012
S. M.	F	Msua	2	September-December 2012
M. R.	F	Msua	3	September-December 2012

P. M.	F	Msua	3	September-December 2012
A. O.	F	Msua	3	September-December 2012
J. C.	M	Msua	1	September-December 2012
R. Z.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
R. T.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
H. F.	M	Kwala	3	September-December 2012
K. J.	F	Kwala	3	September-December 2012
O. A.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
F. J.	F	Kwala	3	September-December 2012
J. M.	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
A. M.	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
Miss J.	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
Mr M.	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
Unknown	M	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
Mr Kimicho	M	Kwala	1	September-December 2012
A. H.	F	Kwala	2	September-December 2012
Mr Z.	M	Dutumi	1	September-December 2012
P. S.	F	Mwembengozi	1	September-December 2012
A. M.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
K. H.	M	Kigare	3	July-September 2013
Mw.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
M. R.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
R. H.	F	Kigare	3	July-September 2013
R. A. Ms.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
M.A. Ms.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
H. R.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
M. R.	F	Kigare	3	July-September 2013
N. K.	M	Kigare	3	July-September 2013

H. C.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
F. M.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
B. R.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
N.	F	Kigare	3	July-September 2013
A.S. M.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
K. S.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
M.A.M.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
A.H. K.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
H. S.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
S. I. I.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
A. K.	M	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
F. M.	F	Kigare	2	July-September 2013
A.I. D.	M	Kigare	1	July-September 2013
J.M.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
A.I.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
F.S.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
A.H.S.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	3	July-September 2013
H.A.K.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	3	July-September 2013
H.A.M.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	3	July-September 2013
R.A.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	3	July-September 2013
O. M.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
H.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
M.A.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
V. J.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
I. K.	M	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013
S. M.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	1	July-September 2013
A. S.	F	Makandeni - Usangi	2	July-September 2013

Appendix 3

List of interviewees 2

POLITICIANS, AGRIBUSINESSES, NGOs AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWED			
NAME	ROLE/ORGANIZATION		DATE
Ferdinand Rwehumbiza	WFP	International Organization	July-September 2013
Marina Negroponte	WFP	International Organization	July-September 2013
Sebastian Sambuo	RUDI	NGO	July-September 2013
David Rohraback	World Bank	International Organization	July-September 2013
Fanuel Kalendo	Office of PM Disaster Management Department	Government	July-September 2013
Valerian Kidole	Ministry of Agriculture - Department of Food Security	Government	July-September 2013
Ramashani S. Zanda	Chairperson of irrigation Scheme project in Mongomole - Kwala	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012 July-September 2013
Oswald Mashindano	Senior researcher at ESRF and Economic Lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam	Research institution	July-September 2013
Lukas Botha	Lonagro	Private company	July-September 2013
Luca Scarpa	NTC	NGO	Sept.-Dec. 2012 July-September 2013
David Legge	Mining Agriculture Construction Limited	Private Company	July-September 2013
Raphael Laizer	FAO	International Organization	July-September 2013
Abdul Kadege	Kigare Ward Councillor	local - Mwanga	July-September 2013
Reis A. Doyle	Chairperson of Kigare	local - Mwanga	July-September 2013
Rashidi Vitusi	Chairperson of Mperamumbi	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012

Ashura Hussein	Politicians of Mperamumbi - area representative	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Mr Kimicho	Extension officer of Kwala	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Kassim Msemakweli	Chairperson of Kwala	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Kakweke C. Zulu	Extension and veterinary officer of Dutumi	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Mkali S. Kanusu	Chairperson of Dutumi	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Shabani A. Mwimbe	Chairperson of Mwembengozi	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Abdul M. Tengeneza	Mwembengozi village secretary	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Selena Pengo	Msua Area representative	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
Pendi A. Semoka	Extension officer of Mwembengozi	local - kibaha	Sept.-Dec. 2012
January Makamba	Deputy Minister of Communication	Government	July-September 2013
Mwatima Juma	IFAD Tanzania Country Programme and chairperson at TZ Organic Movement	International Organization	July-September 2013
Alex Mangowi	DFID in Tanzania	International Organization	July-September 2013
Bahati Maregeri	TAPP - USAID - FINTRAC	NGO	July-September 2013
Abel Kinyondo	REPOA	Government	July-September 2013
Mt Mtembo	Director of Department of Food Security	Government	July-September 2013
Malema	Crop Production Services	Government	July-September 2013
Ambaeli Lemweli	Assistant director crop monitoring and early warning	Government	July-September 2013
Justa Katunzi	acting assistant director of Extension service	Government	July-September 2013
Michael Mayabu	seeds and subsidies agricultural inputs	Government	July-September 2013
Clepin Josephat	Food security Department	Government	July-September 2013
Revelian Ngaiza	Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives - Department of Policy and Planning	Government	July-September 2013
Nancy Kihara	District Livestock officer - Kibaha	Kibaha District	July-September 2013

Mr Kulos	Vet officer - Kibaha District	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Mr Joseph	Livestock and agricultural officer	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Gabriel Hango	Accountant	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Michael Euzebio	Fisheries officer	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Mama Kuayu	nutritional officer	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Mama Mganua	Irrigation Officer	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Sihaba O. Singa	District Agricultural Livestock development Officer	Kibaha District	July-September 2013
Josephine Amollo Juma	Principal Agricultural officer	Government	July-September 2013
Mathew A. Ngwahi	Feed the Children Tanzania	NGO	July-September 2013
Mr Singida	officer	Mwanga District	July-September 2013
Mr Michael	Officer	Mwanga District	July-September 2013
Andreas Joseph	Officer	Mwanga district	July-September 2013
Anthony Mbeela	Officer	Mwanga District	July-September 2013

Appendix 4

Examples of households' classification

Kilimanjaro region:

Group 1 (wealthy households)

A. I. D., (man, 77 years old) has eight children, but only one of them lives with him and his wife (he helps in the farm). He has one and a half acres of land where he cultivates bananas, and two acres where he cultivates maize. He never sells and he never buys food, he exchanges some of it for other crops such as sugar. They eat ugali,⁵⁵ beans, bananas, and meat sometimes. He claims that the food is enough to satisfy the needs of the household, he harvests enough and he stores the harvest in order to use it during the whole year. He has two cows and several chickens; his house is made of bricks and has electricity, a water tap and a biogas system that he uses to cook. The manure of the cow is used in the biogas system. The ability of storage is particularly important, and not common to most farmers in rural Tanzania. This is one of the reasons why this household has been considered wealthy and less vulnerable than others to food insecurity.

Group 2 (poor but resilient households)

F. M., (woman, 53 years old). She has five children, but only one is still living with her and her husband, and helps her in the farm. They have two acres of land where they plant maize, bananas and yams (for own consumption and for sale). She claims that the food is not enough because of wild animals and pests, although they usually eat three times per day, mostly ugali. To be able to buy the food that they need they do some petty business, for example buying beans in the city and re-selling it in the village. She is also part of a microfinance group, so in case of emergencies she can borrow some money that she will

⁵⁵ A dish made of white maize flour cooked with water to a dough-like consistency (no salt or spices added).

have to give it back with interest. They also have two cows for milk and manure, two ducks and several chickens. Sometimes they sell the animals. The house is made of mud, with laminated roof, a water tap outside the house but they have no electricity. Although diversification of food remains a problem and her declaration of food not being enough to satisfy the needs of the family, this household can be considered less vulnerable to food insecurity than others because of the amount of resources owned (such as animals) and the petty business and microfinance activities that provide the household with some extra income in periods of needs and bad harvest.

Group 3 (poor and very poor households – highly vulnerable to food insecurity)

J. M., (woman, 66 years old) lives alone, as her husband and children have died. She lives in a house made of bricks, with laminated roof, and a water tap in the proximity of the house, she has several chickens, which she mainly uses for the eggs. She has two acres of land, borrowed from a friend. She cultivates beans, yams, potatoes and bananas, but because of her old age, unreliable rain and bad quality seeds she claims that she does not harvest enough for herself to eat or to sell to buy other staples. She eats three times per day, mostly ugali and bananas, and she gets the money to purchase maize flour by her two brothers that work in Arusha. Despite the structure of the house, this household is considered vulnerable because of the old age of the woman (inability to provide for herself), and the lack of ownership on the land she cultivates, and the reliance on aid from family members to survive.

Coast region:

Group 1 (wealthy households)

A. P. N. (man, mid 40s). His household is composed of five people (including three children). He has over 20 acres of land, but he doesn't cultivate all of them. He cultivates

about 10 acres, with rice, maize, fruits and vegetables (water melons, pumpkin, okra, chillies, and spinaches). However, they mainly eat ugali and beans (that they buy from the village). They hunt meat in the bushes. There is enough food according to Alfred, as he sells most of what he produces (he does not have a storage facility to store it). He invests what he saves to improve his farm, for example he has been able to buy his own tractor, although he struggles to purchase the spare parts and the petrol. He has a motorbike so he can transport his crops to Dar es Salaam market, or can go to the near town to purchase the inputs he needs. His house is made of bricks, with laminated roof. There is no electricity and no water tap nearby (he irrigates by fetching the water in Mongomole, about three kilometres away). Despite food diversification remains a problem, and he is forced to sell part of his produce to buy it later at a higher price, he has a large amount of assets (motorbike and tractor) and land that allow him to produce a discrete amount of vegetables that he can sell, making him less vulnerable to food insecurity and better off than many other farmers in this area.

Group 2 (poor but resilient households)

A. C. (man, over 50). There are six people in the household, all farm, except three children that are too young and go to school. They have two acres where they only cultivate rice. The food is not enough, according to A.C. They sell the rice after the harvest because they lack a storage facility to store it, and they buy maize flour which is cheaper than rice on the local market. They mainly eat ugali and beans, three times per day. His wife also cooks in the village and sells meals. They have some chickens, and sometimes they sell them if they need more money. Their house has laminated roof, it is made of mud and it is plastered. No electricity and no water. The income gathered from catering for other people is a determinant in making this household less vulnerable to food insecurity than households classified as belonging to Group 3.

Group 3 (poor and very poor households)

S. S. (woman, under 30 years old). She lives in a household with her husband, two children and her husband's parents. Only her and her husband farm. They have three acres, cultivated with maize, vegetables and sorghum. They usually eat twice a day, ugali or rice, and beans. The harvest is scarce because of the weather, so she also makes charcoal in order to buy the food that her household needs. Sometimes they sell the vegetables in a nearby village. They live in a house made of mud that has thatched roof. Despite having three acres of land, this family is very vulnerable to food insecurity; the income from making charcoal is not reliable and does not seem to help cover even the basic needs of the household.